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SUMMARY
There has been a renewed emphasis in town and regional planning 
in recent years on implementation and "getting things done". This has 
arisen partly as a consequence of (i) sociological critiques of the 
effects of planning decisions in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and (ii) the 
reduced status for the activity and profession of town planning in the 
context of a political-economic milieu which restricts public 
spending programmes and emphasises a market economy approach to the 
distribution of goods and services (including the development of land).
' Although implementation has become an "idea in good currency", 
there is little general agreement among theorists and practitioners of 
policy planning as to what implementation involves, or its role in 
decision-making processes. Chapter I identifies and discusses a wide 
range of interpretations and definitions based on different 
conceptualisations of planning and of the relationship of planning 
to action. The burden of recent research and practice focusses on 
the "pathological" nature of implementing policies and plans, on 
improvements to policy design, and on management strategies, as central 
to improving the prospects for "successful" implementation. Little 
attention has been given to pluralist/structuralist conceptions, and 
the role of key individuals, emphasising the politics of decision­
making and the dynamics of competing interests and value-systems in 
which planned action is shaped, modified, and occassionally subverted*
Chapters II to IX provide an in-depth, historical analysis of a 
major, long-running development project in west central Scotland. They 
seek to identify the detailed processes of bargaining and negotiation 
in the evolution and implementation of the project in relation to (a) 
the power relationships between, and patterns of influence brought to 
bear by, participating individuals and organisations; (b) the 
changing context for action provided by wider policies in regional 
development planning, and in planning for leisure and recreation, over 
the post-war period; (c) the effects of combinations of circumstance 
on the course of implementation, and on the scope for action and 
manoeuvre as perceived by participants.
(vii )
The evolution and development of Strathclyde Park, in the middle 
Clyde valley was, at the time of its construction, one of the largest 
and most significant physical planning projects in Scotland. The 
development history of the park is interwoven with the history of post­
war physical and economic planning in Scotland, from the early regional 
plans, through the high growth/low inflation 1960’s and low growth/ 
high inflation 1970's, to the severe economic environment of the 1980's. 
This changing context for action, and the behaviour of participating 
interests, significantly influenced the course of implementation of 
the park idea.
The final chapter concludes with a reformulation of the main 
characteristics of public planning processes, and considers current 
trends in British planning practice, particularly the pursuit of 
"effective" planning and the search for new styles, addressed to the 
current political-economic context for action. It may be a 
misconception of the implementation process to judge the 
effectiveness of planned action by the extent to which stated 
objectives and intentions are realised. A more sophisticated method 
of evaluating the outcomes of planning efforts is required which 
takes account of the complex environments in which planning is pursued.
In research and education, there is a need for a greater 
understanding of (a) the political nature of implementing public 
policies; (b) the organisational and resource requirements of planning 
processes; (c) the implications of both for how decision-makers 
approach the planning task, in particular how they address the 
inherent problems of future uncertainties.
(viii)
CHAPTER I
CONCEPTS AND PARADIGMS
— 1 -
CONCEPTS AND PARADIGMS
1• Introduction
Despite the apparent successes of post-war town planning in the 
UK (Cullingworth 1982; Hall 1974), a paradox has emerged whereby both 
the town planning profession and the town planning system have come 
under attack from (a) a radical sociological critique founded upon 
issues of distributional equity (Davies 1972; Harvey 1973; Simmie 
1974), and (b) public expenditure restraint in a period of reduced 
investment and economic decline, leading to a reassessment of the 
utility of town planning and its contribution to the achievement of 
the dominant economic goals (Diamond 1979).
A reorientation of public and political attitudes to town 
planning has induced a decline in (i) its status as a legitimate 
field of government activity, and (ii) the morale of town planners. 
These changes have stimulated a period of self-examination by the 
planning profession which accelerated in the late 1970's. The Royal 
Town Planning Institute (RTPI) set up working parties to consider the 
implementation (RTPI 1979) and the promotion of planning (RTPI 1930). 
The themes of recent RTPI annual conferences also reveal some 
sensitivity to these changes - "Getting Things Done" in 1930, and 
"Planning Achievements on the Ground" in 1931, The emphasis has 
shifted away from planning as a central task of bureaucratic 
organisations, back towards town planning, its achievements, 
effectiveness, and the need for action, ie a shift from "planning 
society" back towards "planning towns" (Healey et al 1982). The 
underlying motive is that of seeking utility for planning processes 
and policies.
Healey et al charge that the concern with "getting things done" 
marks a retreat from theory and a "dangerous relapse into pragmatism". 
Yet there are two points which need to be made to put what has been 
termed the "crisis in planning" into some perspective;
(i) the critique of planning is not confined to physical or
- z-
land-use planning, but permeates the whole field of public 
policy in the 1980's, and calls into question the general 
efficacy and utility of public intervention strategies* 
Questions about the nature and effectiveness of 
implementation processes sit at the fulcrum of debate about 
the future of planning and public policy-making.
(ii)the"failure of planning"critique is largely a failure of the 
prevailing rational-comprehensive paradigm, rather than a 
failure of planning per se. The focus on implementation 
could therefore mark a paradigm-shift away from considerations 
of general societal guidance towards contextual, problem- 
orientated planning; away from a focus on management, towards 
a focus on "action".
Implementation issues are therefore central to the debate about 
the usefulness and effectiveness of public planning processes. Levin 
(1981) has suggested that the renewed emphasis on implementation is 
due to a recognition that, in recent times, something has "gone wrong" 
in the application of policy : deficiencies have been noted in the 
plans and programmes themselves, in their data bases and forecasting 
methods, and in the organisational and political structures within 
which planning processes have operated. These deficiencies have 
given rise to concern about our ability to identify and resolve the 
issues that beset public policy at the present time, or will do so in 
the future.
Much is assumed, but little understood, about implementing 
policies and plans. Alterman (1981) has suggested that this stage 
in decision making has been regarded as a "black box" where something 
is supposed to occur to make reality out of policy. What she terms 
"implementation analysis" seeks to open this box in order to gain 
understanding of the processes occurring within it and the factors 
affecting them, so that the prospects for more effective 
implementation may be enhanced. One of the reasons why implementation 
is regarded as so difficult, therefore (Gunn 1978), is its neglect as 
a field of distinct expertise and social research. It was Nehru 
(Faludi, ed. 1973) who was reported to have said of the Indian five- 
year plan "We are not quite as expert at implementation as at
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planning" (p.278), More recently Goldsmith (1980) has suggested that;
In a period of economic decline and financial 
uncertainty, planners have learned how difficult 
it is to persuade others to do the things necessary 
if a plan is to be fulfilled. In a nutshell, while 
planners produce plans, others implement them, and 
to a large extent it is this lack of control over 
their environment, and over the other agencies and 
actions whose support is necessary if plans are to 
be successfully implemented, that lies at the heart 
of what may be regarded as the current crisis in 
planning. (p.126)
Blowers (1980) suggests that the power to implement policies is
often weaker than the power to make them, and adds;
There is evidence of a growing dissatisfaction with 
planning, and this partly stems from the delays, 
duplication and ineffectiveness of the present 
system. (p.37)
Much of the research focus to date has been directed at 
understanding the inputs to policy-making processes, ie the factors 
influencing the formulation of policy. The objective of such 
research has been to improve the rationality of policy and the 
reduction of uncertainty through the improvement of the knowledge 
base and the development of new decision-making technologies (Weiss
1972). Rossi and Wright (1979) contend that what they term 
"evaluation research" is part of a broader effort to bring greater 
rationality to t^e policy process. Much recent action-orientated 
research has been directed at the impacts of public policies, in 
particular, the distributional consequences (Webster, 1977).
Very little research has been focussed specifically on the 
stage which bridges and translates inputs into impacts, ie the 
outputs of decision-making processes. There is an important 
distinction to be drawn between studies of policy impact and studies 
of policy implementation (Dunsire 1973). Policy impact studies 
attempt to evaluate policies by measuring the amount of change brought 
about by policy decisions, comparing it with the amount intended, and 
accounting for any difference. Such studies are concerned with the 
substantive results or outcomes of action. Their aim is the 
improvement of policy preparation and decision. Policy implementation 
studies are less concerned with outcome than with output. They 
attempt to identify the conditions under which an intended output 
may be achieved. Such studies attempt to evaluate not policies but
agency capacity to deliver, or carry through to output stage, whatever 
policies are agreed and promulgated. They measure output intended, 
compare it with output achieved, and attempt to account for any 
difference: what Dunsire (1978) has termed the "implementation gap".
Concern with implementation is not new. Underlying many of the
developments in planning thought and legislation has been the aim to
ensure better chances of successful implementation. The report of
the Planning Advisory Group (Ministry of Housing and Local
Government 1965), followed by the 1969 and 1972 Town and Country
Planning (Scotland) Acts, were essentially attempts to move away
from static, end-state planning, and to improve the effectiveness of
development plans. Yet the RTPl's "Implementation in Planning"
working party (RTPI 1979) was moved to state:
Compared with the attention given to plan-making,
implementation is a neglected subject. The
practice of planning has developed an emphasis on
strategic policy, flexibility, monitoring and
review, and has drifted away from its original
focus on impact and implementation, (p.l)
Few systematic questions have been asked about what the assumed
implementation processes actually entail, what factors are likely to
affect them, and how likely is a given proposal to improve them in
practice. ^Consequently, the literature on implementation is diffuse
and difficult to assemble. Van Meter and van Horn (197 5) state:
At present we know relatively little about the
process of policy implementation. __  (p.449)
Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) earlier literature search
revealed the dearth of studies which took implementation as their
central focus of attention:
We have not been able to locate any thoroughgoing 
analysis of implementation. (p.xiii)
Whilst those studies which have been undertaken have focussed 
on initiation rather than execution (Friend and Jessop 1969; Levin 
1976), implementation has rarely been formally defined or taken as a 
major concept or process to be studied or explained. In planning 
practice, a great deal of effort and energy is expended preparing 
plans of various kinds with little or no consideration given to the 
complex chains of reciprocal interaction required to implement them.
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Planning theory and education pay lip-service to the importance of
policy execution, but there is little or no understanding of what this
involves. Barrett and Fudge (1981) decry the paucity of British case
material on policy implementation, whilst Hambleton (1978) remarks
on his "astonishment" at the little attention that has been paid to
the connection between planning and implementation, which he regards
as the most urgent problem for planning theory, education and practice.
Roberts (1974) had earlier come to the same conclusion:
It is a familiar, but still valid, criticism of land
use planning that it fails to place enough emphasis
on the "quality of the action". A look at the
literature of planning, the allocation of research
funds or the content of planning courses would give
the impression that much more effort, time and money
goes into the production of land use plans on paper
than into the achievement of those plans in reality. (p.161)
2. Models of Planning
A few conceptual frameworks have been constructed and applied 
to the main questions about the nature, characteristics and role of 
implementation with a view to clarifying the nature of the policy 
process and the significance of implementation within it. To 
different degrees, these frameworks tend towards either a model of 
decision-making based on comprehensive rationality, or on 
incrementalism. Different models of decision-making processes imply 
differing conceptions of what implementation entails and how it is 
measured. It is important, in this context, to arrive at a clear 
conception of the implementation process before trying to speculate 
about what might be done to resolve these problems. The two 
prevailing models of the planning process might be characterised as 
follows :
(a) the rational-comprehensive model, dra^m. largely from
operations research (Friend and Jessop 1969), cybernetics 
principles (McLoughlin 1969) and what Faludi (1973) has 
termed "procedural planning theory". It is based upon the 
classic rational model of decision-making, and the use of 
rational procedures and frameworks in which the central 
elements are seen as knowledge and control. This has 
been the dominant model of planning for the last 25 years or so;
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(b) the behavioural-incremental model, based on a critique of the 
rationalist model, behavioural studies of organisational 
activity, and especially the writings of Lindblom (19 59, 
1965). This model stresses the inherent problems of 
prediction, and instead focusses upon political bargaining 
("partisan mutual adjustment") and "satisficing", in contrast 
to "optimising" objectives of the rationalist model. Its 
proponents argue that policies must be prepared to adapt to 
survive.
From these, several sub-models, specifying degrees of 
rationality or incrementalism, have been developed in recent years 
in recognition of the limitations of both;
(c) new idealism or "social utopian" model, based on humanist 
philosophy, community participation in decision-making, and 
a revolution in attitudes to environmental change (Friedman 
1973, Schon 1971). Its proponents stress the fusion of 
policy-making and implementation into a community-based, 
adaptive rationality employing systems analysis (Emery ed. 
1969);
(d) urban managerialism, as developed by Pahl (1970). A variant 
of the rational-comprehensive approach which focusses on 
bureaucratic management or "steersmanship" of the policy 
implementation process through a pluralist social milieu;
(e) political economy model, only recently developed, and still 
highly theoretical, it comprises essentially a neo-Marxist 
critique of capitalist-dominated urban planning, focussing 
on the plurality of the policy-making environment, conflict 
and power, the central role of values and beliefs (ideology) 
and distributional impacts (Paris ed. 1982, Castells 1977).
In its present state of development, the model has more 
explanatory than prescriptive value.
Given that policy implementation is highly complex, undertaken 
in a plural context of a variety of goals, perceptions, "assumptive 
worlds" (Young 1979) and conflict, how is this complexity reduced 
and managed in practice? Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) may be right 
to suggest that it is often surprising that implementation takes
-7-
place at all, but why does it often "fail" or change course? Is it 
due to weaknesses in policy design, to organisational factors, to 
external environmental factors, or to the values, motives and 
influences of powerful and energetic individuals? Perhaps there are 
different kinds of implementation forces at work, pushing or pulling, 
explicitly or implicitly, to influence the direction and effect of 
policies and plans? By analysing the rationalist/incrementalist 
dialectic, the main features of the debate about the factors 
influencing action may be highlighted.
As Reade (1982) has pointed out, up until the 1950's no general 
theory or ideology of planning had been articulated, for the simple 
reason that none was necessary. Planning was implicitly accepted as 
a valid and valued activity of the State. The emergence of issues 
concerning the impact and effectiveness of planning, firstly in the 
United States in the 1950's, led to more explicit consideration of 
and debate about theoretical and ideological aspects.
Rational-Comprehensive Planning
One of the earliest statements of the rational-comprehensive 
model, based on empirical study, is that by Meyerson and Banfield 
(1955). In this and their subsequent writings, they spawned a 
school of thought on the planning process based on rational- 
comprehensive principles. Proponents of this mode view society as an 
organic whole. They suggest that traditional comprehensive planning 
has never really been effective due to the lack of relevant 
information and guidance to decision-makers on the consequences of 
their decisions (Friend and Jessop 1969). Rational-comprehensive 
planning is therefore seen as a linear process of (Banfield 19 59);
1. listing all opportunities for action;
2. identifying all consequences following from each possible 
action;
3. selecting the action which would be followed by the preferred 
set of consequences; -
4. monitoring the results.
The "intelligence function" is central to this model, since it 
is employed to assist in the clarification for decision-makers of the 
implications of (a) alternative policy decisions so that more 
meaningful policy choices can be made, and (b) the performance of
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policy in action. Hence Faludi (ed. 1973) contends that successful 
implementation in rational-comprehensive planning rests on the twin 
factors of knowledge and power, and that shortcomings or failures in 
implementation are due to (i) an imperfect image of the outside 
world, and/or (ii) misapprehension of the control process and of 
available resources;
Difficulties during implementation must stem from
inadequacies in the way in which that programme
has been formulated. (p.278)
Therefore, effective implementation is seen as a function of 
the degree of formal and informal control which can be brought to 
bear to ensure policy conformance. Banfield (19 59) therefore 
suggests that;
It is by the process of rational choice that the best
adaptation of means to ends is likely to be achieved.
Rational-comprehensive planning thus assumes, in ideal form, 
that rationally-derived policies offer the best prospects for 
implementation, based on perfect knowledge of the consequences of 
action. The implementation structure is seen as pyramidal, with 
control focussed at the centre. The aims of the implementers are 
assumed to correspond with the aims of the policy-makers. Successful 
implementation is thus based upon a high degree of consensus between 
the makers and the applicators of policy. The implementation process 
is seen as a linear progression by which policies or plans are 
translated into anticipated consequences.
Friedmann (1973) and others have described the aim of rational- 
comprehensive planning as a "search for the holy grail'V whilst 
Schon (1971) has dismissed it as a "myth". The main defects in this 
model have been cited as;
1. its a-political presumptions;
2. its deterministic view of the policy implementation process;
3. its assumption of goal-consensus between policy-makers and 
implementers;
4. its emphasis on comprehensive knowledge and accurate 
prediction of policy consequences;
5. its assumption of the linear/sequential nature of decision­
making;
6. its implicit distinction between means and ends, and between
—y -
the formulation and the implementation of policy.
Although this model has dominated planning theory and practice 
throughout the 1950's and 1960's, these are characteristics which have 
been attacked for being at variance with the realities of policy­
making (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Friedmann 1973; Bardach 1977), 
Faludi (1973) admits that the problem which rational-comprehensive 
planners have been unable to come to terms with is the gap between the 
ideal and the reality of organisational choice and system control.
He suggests that it is only as a normative model that the rationalist 
conception has any relevance.
Behavioural-Incremental Planning
Much of the critique of rational-comprehensive planning has 
emerged and developed from empirically-based studies of organisational 
behaviour and decision-making. The antithesis of this model is 
Lindblom's (19 59) "disjointed incrementalism". Lindblom denies the 
validity of even the ideal of rational-comprehensive planning. In 
his view, decision-makers do not, cannot, and have no chance of ever 
being able to, decide in ways outlined by the rational-comprehensive 
model. Lindblom starts from the premise that practicioners of 
disjointed incrementalism expect to achieve their goals only partially, 
and implementation thus has a lower horizon of achievement. IVhilst 
policy-making in rational-comprehensive planning starts from the 
isolation of ends, followed by identification of the means to achieve 
them, in Lindblom's model means and ends are not distinct. The main 
presumptions behind the incrementalist model are;
1. administrators often decide policy without first clarifying 
objectives;
2. choices are made among policies which combine values in 
different ways;
3. circumstances play an important part in policy choices.
Lindblom sees agreement on policy as "the only practicable test
of the policy's correctness". The plural conception of society is
viewed as ensuring a process of mutual adjustment between objectives
and strategies. Incremental policy-making is seen as fitting with
this multiple pressure pattern:
Policy is not made once and for all, it is made 
and re-made endlessly. Policy-making is a process 
of successive approximation to some desired
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objectives in which what is desired itself
continues to change under reconsideration. (p.164/165)
An essential feature of the planning process in the 
behavioural-incremental conception is that implementation is viewed 
as part of, and not distinct from, policy-making. The 
incrementalist approach has been criticised (Etzioni 1967; Faludi ed.
1973) for;
1. favouring powerful groups in its emphasis on partisan mutual 
adjustment in a plural society;
2. neglecting basic social innovations in its focus on the short 
term;
3. not applying to large-scale or fundamental decisions, thus 
amounting to action without direction.
Blowers (1980) contends that incrementalism is not a model for 
decision-making, so much as a description of what tends to occur, 
whilst Michael (1973) rejects Linblom's thesis as "profoundly 
inadequate for dealing with the present and conjectured future" (p.4). 
Schon (1971) has accused it of playing into the hands of what he 
terras society's "dynamic conservatism". Etzioni (1967) seeks to 
combine the advantages of the rationalist and incrementalist models 
in his strategy of "mixed scanning" in which;
1. high-order, fundamental policy-making processes set the basic 
directions, and
2. incremental processes prepare for fundamental decisions, and 
work them out after they have been reached.
Etzioni contends that the "unrealistic" aspects of rationalism 
are reduced, combined with avoiding the "conservative" slant of 
incrementalism. Faludi (ed. 1973) suggests that this approach provides 
a description of and a prescription for effective action.
Utopian Planning
The "New Humanist" or social utopian models are characterised 
by the writings of Friedmann (1973, 1976), Schon (1971) and, to a 
lesser extent Michael (1973) and Dunn (1971). Their search for a 
normative model of societal organisation is based upon individual 
interactions, a decentralised, bottom-up approach to policy and 
action which rejects the central control inherent in rationalist 
models, and the pragmatism of Lindblom's disjointed incrementalism.
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The decision-making structure is seen as reticular rather than 
pyramidal. Friedmann (1973) stresses the fusion of policy-making 
and implementation into a community-based, adaptive-responsive 
framework, based on the accumulation of knowledge about the policy
environment through action upon it. In his "paradox of planning"
Friedmann contends that rationality only occurs when it is least 
needed, ie under conditions of relative calm and stability. Under 
conditions of extreme crisis, planning becomes an extension of 
politics:
The rationality of planning practice must therefore 
be a rationality adapted to its conditions: it
must sacrifice comprehensiveness to the urgency of
overcoming specific bottlenecks; it must be more
problem- than goal-orientated; it must be 
piecemeal and fragmented rather than co-ordlnative.
(Friedmann, 1965, pp 28-30)
Friedmann thus advocates the fusion of planning and action 
into a single operation so that the conceptual distinctions between 
planning/decision/implementation/review are expunged. He suggests 
that the reason for the inconsequential nature of much planning 
resides in its failure to take into account the basic difficulties 
of implementing decisions. The essential problem, therefore, is not 
how to make decisions more ‘"rational*^ but how to improve the 
quality of the action (which he regards as far from identical with 
the rationality of the underlying decision process).
Schon (1971) draws attention to what he terms the "distorted 
forces" which, in practice, act upon centre-periphery models of 
policy implementation. These forces are the different interests, 
perceptions and values of the actors involved. Schon’s thesis thus 
focusses upon organisational pathologies as central to 
implementation problems. Organisations, he argues, exhibit dynamic 
conservatism as a means of resisting change, which does not occur in 
a vacuum, as inferred by the rationalist models, but in "the plenum 
of self-reinforcing systems".
Schon and Friedmann, and Dunn (1971), contend that the 
formation of policy cannot be separated from its implementation, for 
implementation is the means by which knowledge about the environment, 
and about the impact of policy outcomes upon it, is gained and used 
to inform on the effectiveness of policy. Whilst the "new humanists"
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advocate an approach based upon "bounded" rationality, it is a 
decentralised conception based upon reticular decision networks. It 
is essentially a utopian approach, since it is dependent upon a 
prior revolution in social attitudes and organisational responses to 
change. It is a conception borne of experience in the United States 
with advocacy forms of planning, and is not easily translated to 
highly centralised policy-making systems such as exist in the UK.
In the absence of empirical formulations it remains, like the Marxist 
model, a useful analytical rather than prescriptive framework, where 
its philosophy has much in common with community-based politics and 
neighbourhood action.
Urban Managerialism
The urban managerialist thesis emerged from a late-1960*s 
view of town planning as "urban management" (Pahl 1970). It has 
three strands;
1. a systems-based approach (McLoughlin 1969,1973; Chadwick 
1971);
2. urban sociology (Cans 1968, Pahl 1970);
3. applied management techniques (Stewart 1971, Edison 1975),
The basis of these approaches is an assertion that, by virtue 
of the complexity of urban living, considerable power is placed in 
the hands of bureaucratic officials (Lambert 1970). Town planners 
are thus viewed as the master-allocators of the scarcest urban 
resources (Eversley 1973). This is fundamentally a top-down, 
elitist, hierarchical view of decision-making and implementation.
The focus on urban managers has been criticised (Rhodes 1981) for 
drawing attention away from the crucial influences of central-local 
government political relations, and national economic changes. The 
assumption of the effectiveness of central control over the processes 
of implementation and change far exceed what occurs in reality. In 
this respect, the thesis is sensitive to many of the criticisms of the 
rationalist model.
Political Economy : The Marxist Critique
The political economy model, propagated since the early 1970's 
in sociological critiques of the planning process such as those of 
Davies (1972), Harvey (1973) and Paris et al (1982), rejects 
ameliorative policies as mechanisms for long-term structural change
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(and hence rejects both the rationalist and incrementalist
conceptions) and sets town planning firmly within the capitalist
mould. It is essentially a theoretical critique which relates broad
economic and political forces to the detailed operation of urban
and regional policies. As such, it has yet to spawn any detailed
frameworks within which could be explained the nature, role and
scope of implementation processes. In its present state of
refinement, it has more analytic than prescriptive value. It may be
seen as occupying the opposite end of the conceptual spectrum from
rational-comprehensive planning, and shares with behavioural
approaches a concern for the circumstances within which policy is
formulated and implemented. The model stresses the political
dimensions of planning, and takes a view of planning as being largely
impotent in seeking to achieve its objectives, and highly sensitive
to the interplay of market forces and capitalist power structures.
Hence, in Fainstein and Fainstein's (1982) view:
The effectiveness of planners depends on the 
functions which planning fulfils within advanced 
capitalism and its importance to the maintenance 
of the economic systems. (p.155)
Criticisms of the Marxist model tend to be ideologically loaded, 
but its usefulness for implementation research is the reformulation 
it provides for interpreting planning activity and the constraints of 
(i) its operation within State bureaucracies, and (ii) its impact 
upon capitalist economic systems. The model can be viewed as an 
extension of--the "politicisation of planning" debate, heightening 
renewed interest in the distributional aspects of planning, equality, 
and democratic planning.
3. Implementation ; Empirical and Theoretical Concepts
The foregoing appraisal of the main models of the planning 
process is a necessary precursor to the analysis of specific 
approaches to implementation which follows. Each of these approaches, 
either implicitly or explicitly, draws on one or more of these models 
in its conception of (i) the definition and nature of implementation 
and its position in the planning process, and (ii) prescriptions for 
improving the effectiveness of action.
Much of the debate about implementation focusses on where in
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the decision making process it occurs: whether it occurs at specific 
stages, eg after policy is "made" and before it is reviewed, or 
whether it permeates the whole planning process to the extent that, 
as Friedmann (1973) and others contend, distinctions between policy 
analysis, decision-taking, execution and review are blurred. It is 
not proposed here to get embroiled in a debate which Dunsire (1973) 
has described as "a wrong turning leading to a dead end", but as 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue:
There must be something out there prior to
implementation; otherwise there would be nothing
to move toward in the process of implementation.
A verb like "implement" must have an object like
"policy". (p.xiii)
What is important here is what the segregation of policy from, 
or its integration with, implementation reveals about the conceptual 
biases of empirical or theoretical formulations about implementation. 
None of these formulations are objective or value-free. Descriptions 
of the implementation process each have an underlying model (mainly 
pyramidal or reticular in conception) made up of assumptions about 
a number of elements;
1. about the nature of the implementation process; stages of 
development or chain of events;
2. about the ordering or sequence of such stages or events;
3. about the character of each stage or groups of events;
4. about the nature of the transition between stages or links in 
the chain (how progress is made);
5. about the relationship of the implementation process to 
"authority".
Differing assumptions about each element create differing 
accounts of the implementation process. These assumptions, and the 
relative strengths or weaknesses of the models on which they are 
based, can be weighed against the potential effectiveness of the 
prescriptions for change advocated in each.
The "Pathology" of Implementation
One of the earliest, and foremost, studies of the 
implementation process is that by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973).
They sought to trace the tortuous course of an urban aid programme 
from the time of its inception, examining those factors that lay
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behind the programme's frustrations; difficulties of translating 
broad agreements, among the large number of organisations involved 
and their differing perspectives, into specific decisions; the 
opportunities for blockage and delay resulting from a corresponding 
multiplicity of decision points; and the economic theories on which 
the programme was based. Pressman and Wildavsky argue that the 
study of implementation requires understanding that apparently simple 
sequences of events depend upon complex chains of reciprocal 
interaction; what they refer to as the "implementation chain". In 
their view, each part of the chain must be built with the others in 
view:
The separation of policy design from implementation 
is fatal* It is no better than mindless
implementation without a sense of direction. (p.xvii)
Pressman and Wildavsky thus focus on the causes of 
implementation "failure" which they highlight as;
1. inability to follow through (ie lack of continuing 
commitment among crucial participants);
2. poorly conceived policies (in terms of to whom they were 
directed);
3. delay due to "technical details" of implementation, rather 
than initial design and commitments (ie poor conception);
4. conflicting objectives, and conflicts of interest;
5. administrative antagonisms within and between agencies;
6. poorly defined aims and intentions, and lack of attention to
detailed programming and co-ordination among agencies which
have diverse perspectives and objectives. Hence they conclude;
What had looked like a relatively simple, urgent
and direct programme...eventually involved numerous
diverse participants and a much larger series of
decisions than was planned. None of the
participants actually disagreed with the goal...
but their differing perspectives and senses of
urgency made it difficult to translate broad
substantive agreement into effective policy
implementation. It was not merely the direction of
their decisions - favourable or unfavourable -
but the time orientation of the participants -
fast or slow, urgent or indolent - that determined
the prospects of completion. When so many future
decisions depend on past actions, delay in time
may be equivalent to defeat in substance. (p.113)
According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the basic reason that 
programmes survive is that they adapt themselves to their
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environment over a long period of time. In their view, delay is a 
basic pathology of implementation processes. It is a function of the 
number of decision points, the number of participants at each point, 
and the intensity of their preferences. The essential policy problem 
is seen as how to provide incentives to change low to high intensity, 
and how to maintain high positive intensity through lengthy delays. 
Pressman and Wildavsky thus focus on organisation and policy design 
in order to minimise the commitment-eroding nature of programme delays
Successful implementation is seen as depending upon a high 
probability of co-operation between all the actors involved (ie 
consensus-building). Improved co-ordination is seen as a function of
(a) mutually supportive rather than contradictory policies, and
(b) corporate and inter-corporate management. Policy makers can 
"close the gap" between design and implementation by gearing 
programmes more directly to the demands of their execution by;
1, appreciating the length and unpredictability of necessary 
decision sequences in implementation, and by minimising the 
number of what Levin (1976) has termed "multiple clearance 
points" (ie the need for prior agreement by a number of 
participants on any course of action); and
2. paying as much attention to the creation of the organisational 
machinery for executing a programme as for launching one.
This leads Pressman and Wildavsky to conclude that:
The fewer the steps involved in carrying out the 
programme, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster 
to overtake it. The more directly the policy aims 
at its target, the fewer the decisions involved in 
its ultimate realisation and the greater the 
likelihood it will be implemented. (p.147)
This approach, though representing the most detailed and 
comprehensive study of implementation yet undertaken, is criticised 
by Barrett and Fudge (1981) for its basic assumption that policy­
making and implementation proceed by a series of logical steps (from 
intention, through decision, to action); by distinguishing between 
policy-making (the "initial conditions") and the creation of 
programmes, which are seen as "inputs" to the implementation process; 
and by conceiving implementation as a process of putting policy into 
effect. The approach focusses on co-ordinative and managerial skills 
to assemble and maintain consensus in order to achieve desired ends.
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Pressman and Wildavsky therefore exclude from the implementation 
process what they nevertheless refer to as "governmental action" to 
convert policy intentions into programmes.
The Pressman and Wildavsky approach, although behavioural in 
its analysis, exhibits many of the characteristics of the rational- 
comprehensive model. They view implementation as distinct from 
policy-making, as a linear process, requiring central management.
They fail to take account of the reality of the conditions in which 
policy implementation takes place. The central task is seen as 
control, to ensure conformance to original intentions.
Dunsire's (1978) sphere of interest is the very process which
Pressman and Wildavsky ignore - the conversion of policy intentions
into programmes of action. His is the most explicit focus on output
of any recent study of implementation. Dunsire argues that programme
implementation is not linear, nor even uni-directional. People alter
their objectives as circumstances change; money and staff and other
resources are subject to slippage; the actual implementers find
themselves sustaining the "initial conditions" in assembling fresh
political support. The longer the chain of causality, the more
numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links. Dunsire defines
implementation as;
The choosing, linking and wielding of the
implements by which words become action-on-
the world. (p.viii)
Dunsire focusses on behavioural factors influencing the actions
and motives of bureaucracies and the individuals within them. In
order for implementation to proceed, the intentions of policy-makers
must first be transformed into the actions of officials:
Do organisations decide, or is it only organisms
(men and women) that decide? Can organisations
act, or is it only organisms that can act? (p.10)
In this conception, two types of implementation process are 
identified; (a) developmental, and (b) aggregative. The developmental 
assumption states that the nature of a succeeding step in the process 
is uniquely determined by the nature of the preceding step. Thus 
progress is made at the expense of shutting off, at each stage, all 
the other possibilities. Implementation by this means becomes a 
progressive "pragmatisation" of the general into the
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specific, in a series of stages marked by the passage of time, and 
by descent through a hierarchy. The aggregative approach, on the 
other hand, is multi-organisational. Getting something done is seen 
as a matter of putting together a number of discrete units, ie 
"making a chain". Each link in the chain has its own function. The 
nature of activity at each succeeding stage is wholly independent of 
the nature of the activity at the preceding stage. The stages 
pre-exist the process, and can be combined in different ways, orders 
or sequences, provided only the output of one can be "plugged into" 
the input of the next. Which method is most appropriate to a 
particular circumstance depends, says Dunsire, on the hierarchical, 
organisational and temporal context.
Dunsire’s aggregative model and behavioural focus has much in
common with Bardach's (1977) conception of the implementation
process as "a process of assembling numerous and diverse programme
elements" (p.37). In Bardach’s view, implementation is concerned
with "putting the machine together and making it run".
Implementation problems are, in this conception, control problems,
specific to the assembly activities that constitute some
implementation process. The processes of assembly and control occur
in the realm of politics, and are integrated through the idea of a
system of loosely-related implementation "games". Here Bardach
concurs with Dunsire that a crucial element in the success of
implementation programmes is the motives and behaviour of key
individuals. He stresses the importance of actively seeking out
or creating resources, maintaining or recreating legitimacy and
motivation during the implementation process:
The implementation process is therefore 
characterised by the manoeuvring of a large number 
of semi-autonomous actors, each of which tries to 
gain access to programme elements not under its own 
control while at the same time trying to extract 
better terms from other actors seeking access to 
elements that it does control. (p.51)
There are so many features of the implementation process that 
tend to aggravate and exaggerate underlying conflicts, that much of 
the process moves along "out of control", driven by complex forces not 
of any party's making. The process is therefore dynamic and, says 
Bardach, "shot through with gamesmanship". This analysis leads on to 
his metaphor of implementation as a system of games, the rules of
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which must be grasped in designing strategies for minimising delay - 
which Bardach, like Pressman and Wildavsky, regards as the central 
problem:
If there is one attribute of the implementation 
process that everyone would agree was symptomatic 
of "pathology", it would be delay. (p.180)
1
Thus, delays arise from (a) inherent difficulties of future- 
testing under conditions of uncertainty, and (b) the latent functions 
of protracted negotiations as a ritualistic and instrumental adaptation 
to residual uncertainties. Bardach suggests that delay can be avoided 
by (i) using intermediaries to^facilitate negotiations (who can and 
who is willing to do it?), and (ii) foreclosing options by 
manoeuvring, ie by closing off viable alternatives, actors can be 
manoeuvred into certain inescapable positions. In this context, the 
essential implementation problem is seen as the control and direction 
of the "vast profusion" of programme-related activities carried on by 
numerous and disparate organisations and individuals so as to achieve 
programme objectives, keep costs down, and reduce delay. Therefore 
the message is quite clear: design simple, straightforward programmes 
that require as little management as possible.
The approaches by Bardach, Dunsire, and Pressman and Wildavsky 
are founded upon a view of implementation as a sequence of events 
"triggered off" by a policy decision, involving translation of policy 
into operational tasks to be carried out by a variety of actors and 
agencies, and requiring substantial co-ordinating activity to ensure 
availability of resources, and that things happen as intended. This 
is the conception of the implementation task most widespread in current 
planning practice. As such, these approaches have much in common with 
rational-comprehensive ideology, and Pahl’s (1970) managerialist 
methodology. It is also a conception which underlies much of the 
literature on implementation. It indicates a shift from diagnosis of 
policy failure, to identification of ways in which such failure can 
be prevented. Bardach's games metaphor is perhaps the most refined 
form of this managerialist view.
The rationalist conception of implementation as putting policy 
into effect is the prevailing perspective from which implementation 
and its problems tend to be conceived, and in many cases leads to 
formulae-type approaches such as those of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1930)
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and van Meter and van Horn (1975). Unlike the previous 
conceptions, these are purely abstract formulations of the 
Implementation problem and frameworks for its explanation and 
resolution. Each of these Is considered in turn, for they are perhaps 
the most detailed attempts yet to move towards a "theory" of 
implementation.
1
Sabatier and Mazmanian identify six preconditions for 
"successful" policy Implementation;
1. clear and consistent policy objectives;
2. the existence of a sound causal theory for the policy, 
relating changes in target group behaviour to the achievement 
of objectives (ie the desired end-state);
3. implementing agencies must have sufficient control over the 
target groups and other critical areas of intervention, and 
policy design must maximise the probability that target groups 
will perform as desired;
4. leaders of the implementing agency must possess substantial 
managerial and political skill, and must be committed to the 
policy goals;
5. the programme must be actively supported by organised 
constituency groups and by a few key politicians throughout 
the implementation process;
6. the relative priority of the policy objectives must not be 
undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public 
policies, or by changes in relevant socio-economic conditions, 
which undermine the policy's causal theory or political 
support.
Similarly, van Meter and van Horn focus on consensus-building 
and policy design, which together they regard as providing an 
effective antidote to implementation pathologies. They assert that 
"effective" implementation is most likely to occur where goal consensus 
is high and the change proposed is marginal. Conversely, where major 
change is intended and goal consensus is low, the prospects for 
effective implementation will be less assured. This leads them to an 
identification of six variables which, they suggest, shape the 
linkages between policy and performance;
1. policy standards and objectives;
2. policy resources;
3. interorganisational communications and enforcement activities;
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4. characteristics of the implementing agencies;
(a) competence and number of staff;
(b) degree of hierarchical control;
(c) political resources;
(d) vitality;
(e) degree of "open" communications within an organisation;
(f) formal and informal linkages with the policy-making or 
enforcing body;
5. economic, social and political conditions;
6. disposition of the implementers.
These two theoretical formulations are perhaps the rational- 
comprehensive model of implementation in its purest form. As such, 
they are sensitive to the criticisms of rational-comprehensive 
planning as previously discussed. These formulae must be regarded 
as most demanding for any policy process, and they have been 
severely criticised for demanding preconditions which have no 
prospect of being found in reality, derived from simplistic 
conceptions of implementation processes (figure 1). The attempt to 
construct a general theory of implementation is regarded, at the very 
least, by Bardach (1977) as premature, since the systematic study of 
implementation processes, problems and remedies is in its infancy.
It is perhaps more realistic, with the present state of knowledge, 
to seek to suggest, describe and illuminate certain problematic 
tendencies and to offer a preliminary assessment of strategies that 
might offset them.
The Structuralist Analysis
Barrett and Fudge (1981) advocate the pursuit of alternative 
avenues of investigation from the "conventional wisdom" based on;
1. a closer examination of the whole question of consensus, control 
and compliance as essentially a political rather than a 
managerial issue, and
2. a re-examination of the conceptualisation of the 
implementation process itself.
Barrett and Fudge therefore suggest that:
Rather than treating implementation as the 
transmission of policy into a series of consequential 
actions, the policy-action relationship needs to be 
regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, 
taking place over time, between those seeking to put 
policy into effect and those upon whom action depends, (p.4)
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They argue the need for theories of the implementation process 
that take account of individual and group behaviour within 
institutional settings, and practical methodologies that utilise more 
behavioural explanations, as a reaction to rationalist approaches. 
Barrett and Fudge therefore emphasise the ideological and value­
laden nature of policy-making processes, in a plural social context, 
in which distinctions between the making and implementing of policy 
are blurred. In this conception, the key issues of importance in 
understanding implementation processes are considered to be:
(a) the multiplicity and complexity of the linkages involved;
(b) questions of control and co-ordination; and
(c) issues of conflict and consensus.
Here, policy is seen as the key to the whole debate about 
implementation. It is seen as the starting point for action, the 
focus of negotiations, the expression of values, stances and practices 
which frame organisational activity. Barret and Fudge therefore 
present a conception which moves away from a pathology orientation to 
a structuralist analysis of the context for, and influences upon, 
action. They have much in common with the theoretical perspectives 
of Lindblom's (1959) incrementalism and Etzioni's (1967) "mixed 
scanning" in their quest for practical, behavioural-based methodologies. 
The conception of implementation is action-centred as opposed to the 
rationalist's policy-centred.
In this pluralist conception, policy cannot therefore be taken 
as constant. On the contrary, it is seen as being mediated by actors 
operating within different "assumptive worlds" (Young 1979) from 
those formulating policy. It thus inevitably undergoes interpretation 
and modification and, in some cases, subversion. Since "pluralists" 
assert that, in a complex and dynamic society, there are a multitude 
of forces, many of which are inherently opposed to one another, these 
are incapable of being accommodated simultaneously. The horizons of 
the expected achievements of implementation are therefore more modest 
than in the well-ordered and controlled assumptive world of the 
rationalist conception. The focus of analysis and evaluation is 
therefore policy performance, rather than the policy conformance which 
predicates the rationalist "knowledge-control" perspective. In the 
former, negotiation, bargaining and compromise assume central 
importance in the process.
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4. Conclusion
Derived from the theoretical frameworks discussed previously, 
there emerge two quite distinct schools of thought on the 
methodology of implementation;
(i) those deriving from the rationalist/policy analysis perspective, 
represented by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Bardach (1977) and 
Dunsire (1978), who view the implementation problem from a 
managerialist perspective, requiring the development of strategies 
to steer the course of a policy or programme through a "turbulent" 
operational environment. The key to effective policy conformance 
is therefore the construction of rational policy designs, 
organisational structures and decision-making frameworks;
(ii)those deriving from the incremental/behavioural perspective, 
represented by Barrett and Fudge (1981), and also Goldsmith (1980), 
who see implementation in essentially a political context, where 
policy must be expected to undergo alteration, and even subversion, 
as it impacts upon a dynamic environment of conflicting interests, 
values and power. Policy performance therefore becomes the 
criterion of evaluation. In this context, policy and action are 
inextricably interlinked. In many respects, Lindblom's "partisan 
mutual adjustment" is the key to action.
Leach (198 2) contends that explanations of and prescriptions 
for policy processes cannot be restricted by a simple choice 
between rational-comprehensive and disjointed incremental models.
Whilst the pure rationality model, taken to its logical conclusion 
by Dror (1964), has little practical value, Leach and Stewart (1982) 
see no inherent conflict between the use of rationality in policy 
processes, and the constraints imposed by organisational structures, 
politics and values. Theirs is the bounded rationality of Banfield 
(19 59), in which the rational model is used flexibly. Leach, in 
fact, refers to "purposive rationality" to mean a rationality which 
also includes judgements as to ends, and an ability to recognise ways 
in which it is possible and appropriate to apply the rational model.
The use of the rationalism/incrementalism dichotomy has 
become something akin to a conceptual straitjacket, restricting 
understanding and the development of a constructive debate about 
policy processes. Whilst Friedmann (1973), Schon (1971), Barrett
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and Fudge (1981) and others attack the rational approach, they seek 
to replace it with a form of rationality adapted to its conditions 
and context. Therefore, for the purpose of understanding and 
explaining policy processes and the conceptualisation of 
implementation within these, the rationalism/incrementalism debate 
should be viewed less as a dichotomy and more as a continuum along 
which the different models of policy-making processes may be placed, 
according to whether the emphasis is (a) more prescriptive (rational) 
or more descriptive (incremental), and (b) more theoretical or more 
practice-orientated (see Figure 2). The pure rationality of Dror 
(1964) or the disjointed incrementalism of Lindblom (1959) might 
therefore be seen as occupying polar positions on this continuum.
Thus, all planning processes are, by definition, "rational". 
Models which exhibit more of the characteristics of pure rationality 
tend to arrive at a technical rationality, whereas behavioural 
models tend to exhibit a political rationality. Planning processes 
have been characterised more by technical rationality in a decision 
context dominated by political rationality.
Attempts to analyse the policy process are inescapably based 
upon explicit or implicit models of the policy system, which 
themselves derive from ideological considerations. Some models are 
seen as being "driven" by environmental forces; others by internal 
objectives and goals; and others by internal perceptions of the 
external environment. However, these models can tend to over­
emphasise the constraints to action to the point where patterns of 
activity are portrayed as the necessary outcomes of a confluence of 
forces.
Implementation is taken for granted in rational-comprehensive 
models, since problems are seen as technical, the climate as 
consensual, and the process as controlled. Behavioural-incremental 
models, on the other hand, view policy-making as an inescapably 
political activity. Implementation thus becomes problematic, where 
policy is seen as a bargained outcome (as opposed to an input), the 
environment as conflict-ridden, and the process as characterised by 
diversity and constraint. Rational models therefore posit a high 
degree of control over the decision-making situation, whilst 
incremental models assume much less command over the environment.
— 26“
Descript ive
ü_ ÜJ
dJ
>
(/)
c
Ol
JZ
GJ
U.
CL
e
o
w
E.
w otu
00 ID
en
00
<  CL
CL
m
- L -
C
OJ
E
OJ
c.
u
c
a A j ^ d u D s a J d
Kl
QJ
OJ
Oc_
CL
enc
"c
cro
OJ
_c
00
OJ
"D
O
O
X
fO
di
-27-
The assumptions of the rational model have been undermined by 
empirical studies of policy processes, whilst its predictive record 
is uneven. It survives primarily due to its status as a normative 
model (I'aludi 1973), and as a "dignified myth" often shared by 
policy-makers. Therefore, as Gordon et. al. (1977) state:
To depart from the assumptions of classic
rationality is inevitably to widen the
boundaries of the "relevant" in the analysis
of policy making. (p.29)
khilst the most recent implementation analyses have been less 
useful as predictive and prescriptive instruments, the improved 
understanding of the processes of policy determination, and the 
"transmission" of policy through outputs into impacts, has at least 
as much to contribute to the improvement of policy-making as better 
information has to contribute to the improvement of policy.
The issues to emerge from the preceding analysis, and which 
would appear to have a critical influence upon policy processes, 
might be summarised as follows;
1. the relationships between policy-makers and implementers;
2. the nature of the decision-making structure - reticular or 
pyramidal;
3. the nature and role of implementation in the policy process - 
policy performance or policy conformance;
4. policy as management, or policy as politics;
5. the influence of individual and organisational perceptions, 
values and beliefs.
From these issues derive some fundamental questions which must 
predicate any analytical standpoint;
(a) to what extent is the environment controllable by public 
authorities?
(b) to what extent are they subordinate to or dependent upon it?
(c) to what extent can they influence or shape the nature of the 
distribution of public goods and services, and move towards 
realisation of policy objectives?
These are fundamental questions which need to be resolved before 
embarking on any exegesis of implementation processes. As Goldsmith 
(1930) observes:
— 28 —
The realisation that governments have limited
ability to control or manage their turbulent
environment is the major lesson to be learnt
from the experience of the 1970's. (p.169)
Tie last few years have seen the emergence and development of 
a raging debate, primarily in academic environments, about the 
nature of planning, its relationship to social processes, and the 
validity of planning theory (Healey et al 1982; Paris et al 1932;
Minay ed. 1979). Healey et al (1932) refer to the current "pluralism" 
of theoretical positions on planning, primarily as a reaction to 
rational-comprehensive models (see Faludi ed. 1973). Consequently, 
there will persist a concurrent plurality of concepts about 
implementation. Reade (193 2) contends that any attempt to build a 
theory of planning, or a theory of implementation, can only be 
understood through causal explanation. The conclusion from the 
preceding analysis is that, like Friedmann's (1973) criticisms of 
comprehensive-rationality, the search for a theory of implementation 
is misguided. It may not be possible to consider causal explanations 
of implementation in abstraction from causal explanations of general 
planning activity. In the end, as Blowers (1980) suggests, theories 
of planning merge with theories which seek to explain social 
processes•
5. The Implementation Problematic
The study of implementation in the planning process is 
problematic. The limited research undertaken to date on the outputs 
of the planning process contrasts sharply with the abundance of 
case material on policy-making (inputs) and evaluation (impacts). 
Research into implementation processes encounters three major problems 
The first is that implementation analyses, like all social science 
research, proceed from some implicit or explicit "paradigm" - a set 
of organising principles which tend to colour the perceptions of the 
analysts. Such perceptions generally fall into two groups. Firstly 
those that perceive the problem as one which can be resolved by 
greater rationality - better information, and better communication 
with and control over those implementing policies and programmes. 
Secondly, those who view the prospects for more effective 
implementation as being closely tied to the need for less overt 
rationality and more emphasis on behavioural aspects, together with 
the development of more adaptive response frameworks.
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The second problem for Implementation research concerns 
terminology. There is no generally accepted definition of 
"implementation". How one defines implementation is closely tied to 
one's conception of the policy-making process. Rationalist 
frameworks tend to view implementation as a discrete stage, proceeding 
policy formulation and preceding evaluation. Behavioural 
orientations tend to view implementation less as a discrete stage, 
but more as one aspect of what Barret and Fudge (1981) have called a 
"policy-action continuum".
The third problem is the lack of previous research specifically 
on implementation aspects of the policy process. The seminal study 
on implementation remains that by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), 
although more recently, theoretical frameworks have been developed 
by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), van Meter and van Horn (1975), 
and Barrett and Fudge (1981). However, implementation remains a 
relatively under-developed field of social science research. This 
poor level of understanding is reflected in a contemporary perception 
of planning which highlights its under-achievements, both as an 
approach to decision-making, and as a substantive field of public 
policy (namely, land-use planning).
CHAPTER II
STRATHCLYDE PARK;
A CASE STUDY IN IMPLEMENTATION
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STRATH CLYDE PARK;
A CASE STUDY IN IMPLEMENTATION
1# Introduction
The proposal to create a regional park out of dereliction in 
the highly urbanised middle Clyde valley (Figure 3) spans the whole 
period of post-war physical and economic planning in Scotland. The 
development of Strathclyde Park is intertwined with the evolution of 
ideas in Scottish regional and recreation planning during a period of 
changing economic and political conditions over the last 35 years.
As a project, Strathclyde Park is a good example of the application 
of national economic and physical planning at the local scale, and 
provides a section through the profile of post-war Scottish planning.
The park had national/regional and local objectives, and its 
planning and development proceeded via a multi-organisational 
planning context involving central government departments and 
agencies, local authorities, and sectional interest groups. The park 
project is also a good example of public policy-making processes in 
action, over an extended period of time, subject to varying political 
and economic conditions. The development of the project illustrates 
the use of political and economic power, by both institutions and 
individuals, the influence of the general political and economic 
conditions, and the interrelationships of central and local 
government, and the links between national/local and physical/ 
economic planning.
As a physical planning project in Scotland, the park covers 
many aspects of Scottish planning practice in the post-war period, 
and has both historical and contemporary relevance. The project has 
yet to be "completed" nearly 40 years after its original conception, 
and 20 years after detailed planning began in earnest. It may never 
be completed as originally intended by its protagonists, and the 
reasons are of central relevance to contemporary physical planning 
problems and to our understanding of implementation in the planning 
process.
-31-
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Whilst Greenburg et al's (1977) truism that implementation is 
an inherently localised and responsive phenomenon, highlights the 
important role circumstances play (to the extent that the construction 
of all-embracing theory is a mis-direction of research effort) it 
does not follow that such processes are not amenable to the search 
for their greater understanding.
The detailed analysis of one long-running case-study 
potentially provides opportunities to make more meaningful statements 
about the influences bearing upon implementation processes in 
planning. In this respect in-depth implementation analysis is an 
under-developed field of research into policy processes in comparison 
to comparative analysis (ie unlocking Alterman's (198 2) "black box").
Since the case-study is set in central Scotland, involving 
national public bodies and Government departments, as well as local 
interests, the geographical factors which assume significance in 
comparative studies are less relevant in the findings of the 
Strathclyde Park analysis, ie what can be said about the 
implementation processes of Strathclyde Park should be generalisable 
to other Scottish physical planning contexts, in both time and space. 
Finally, an understanding of the processes leading to the 
implementation of the Park, together with the current state of 
knowledge about implementation generally, has important application 
to the current focus on the effectiveness of planning and policy­
making systems.
2. Strathclyde Park : Historical Outline
The genesis of Strathclyde Park occurred during the years of 
the Second World War. Around the time Abercrombie and his team were 
studying the Clyde Valley region, there was a scheme to create an 
artificial loch in the Hamilton Low Parks area on which to land 
seaplanes flying the north Atlantic route from North America. 
lÆiether Abercrombie knew of this scheme when he was preparing his 
Clyde Valley Regional Plan is not known, but he gave formal expression 
to the potential of the area as a recreational centre of strategic 
significance in his 1946 proposals to the Clyde Valley Regional Plan 
Advisory Committee. The Committee comprised elected representatives
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of the local authorities for the Clyde valley area, appointed by the
Secretary of State for Scotland in 1943 to prepare;
An Outline Plan for the whole area, which Plan, when 
approved, is intended to form the basis or groundwork 
for the statutory Schemes of Planning of the individual 
Local Authorities* (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.l)
Abercrombie's conception included a hierarchy of recreational
provision at the national, regional and "community planning" scales*
Four "Regional Recreation Centres" were proposed, including one at
the Hamilton Low Parks (Figure 4) which, like others, was "placed
strategically to serve groups of towns and urban areas*.•to give a
wide range of sports suitable for all ages and conditions of people"
(Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.157)* The Plan saw the special
advantage of the Low Parks area in the following terms:
It is strategically placed to serve a great industrial 
population within easy reach and it was an obvious 
choice, particularly in view of the fact that it 
entailed a certain amount of river training which is 
badly needed in any case. (p.157)
Whilst the Advisory Committee failed to reach agreement on a 
number of proposals contained in the Plan, the concept of and 
locations for the Regional Recreation Centres were accepted. There 
is no evidence to indicate why, in the early post-war period, no 
action was taken* These reasons may have included the following:
(a) heavy local industrial pollution, and some active coal working;
(b) the availability nearby of country and seaside of some scenic 
beauty;
(c) periods of alternating industrial and mining development and 
slump;
(d) local authority interests in the area for refuse disposal 
and sewage treatment;
(e) the low priority of planning for leisure and recreation in 
the early post-war period;
(f) limited local resources, and lack of policy direction both 
locally and nationally.
The Clyde Valley Plan had also included proposals for an A74 
Hamilton by-pass road through the Low Parks area, but again this was 
only a paper scheme until around 1960 when the whole question of 
traffic growth and movement was re-examined by the Scottish Office.
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The outcome was a motorway scheme, more or less on the old line, with 
a major service area in the Low Parks close to the Mausoleum of the 
Dukes of Hamilton.
The 19 60's was a decade of great activism by Government in
regional planning. The 1963 White Paper "Central Scotland: A
Programme for Development and Growth" (Gmnd. 2188) laid great stress
on making industrialised central Scotland more attractive to new
industry by schemes to eliminate the impression of decay and
dereliction. It suggested a number of "growth points", one of which
was to be north Lanarkshire:
The hub of which, so far as blight is concerned, is 
the Hamilton Low Parks which is to be traversed by 
the motorway link between Scotland and the South; 
the fast route which will be taken by the tourist 
and the industrialist travelling into Scotland by 
road. The impression of dereliction created will 
do nothing to help the Scottish industrial image.
(Lyall, 1964, p.2)
As well as questions of aesthetics and image of the area, there 
was also, at that time, the potential resource provided by the bings 
in the area as spoil material for the motorway construction, whilst 
at the same time using excavated material from the motorway to 
landscape the Low Parks area (Figure 5),
In addition to the spoil heaps and refuse tips, the major
feature of the area was flooding caused by subsidence resulting from 
coal workings. The last of the local workings, Dothwellhaugh 
colliery, closed in 19 58. These workings resulted in considerable 
subsidence as the tunnels collapsed, as much as five metres in places.
Local depressions were formed which filled with water or turned to
marsh. Some of the ponds were filled and stocked by angling clubs. 
Others were adopted by wildlife. Such was the wildlife value of the 
area that, in 1953, the Secretary of State for Scotland issued an 
Order under the Protection of Birds Act 1954, providing for a 335 
acre sanctuary.
Building on the aims of the 1963 White Paper, the Scottish 
Development Department (SDD) resurrected Abercrombie's proposal in 
1964 by suggesting to the local authorities for the area the formation 
of a loch in the Low Parks in order to (a) rehabilitate areas liable 
to flood, and (b) provide water sports facilities, as part of a
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general recreation plan for the middle Clyde valley. 'Ihis outline 
scheme was put to the North Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee (set 
up in the wake of the White Paper) in November 1964. It is clear 
SDD considered the scheme a priority requiring early implementation 
in view of the M74 construction programme, due for completion in 
1966:
The need for rehabilitation and landscaping at this 
point where the motorway from the South enters
Central Scotland is paramount and must be tackled. (Lyall, 1964, p.4)
The 1964 outline scheme drew on the knowledge of the Lee Valley 
Park project in north London (Civic Trust 1964), a similar reclamation, 
landscaping and recreation project, but comprising a number of 
schemes linked together to form a linear park 20 miles in length. At 
the same time, the SDD scheme was based on what central government 
planners saw as "an obvious relationship between the general 
condition and amenity of the countryside, and the probability of 
firms moving into a district" (SDD 1964, p.l). The Middle Clyde 
Regional Park (as it was then named)emerged as a form of landscape 
"infrastructure" for industrial development in the area.
The park scheme was conceived in the days before the 1967 
Countryside Act which formally established the Country Park idea.
The scheme emerged, and its main components were largely finalised 
during, an era notable for its countryside policy vacuum. There was 
no SDD view on planning for the countryside, nor on recreation
planning, at that time. This presented considerable scope for a 
variety of ideas and ambitions for the development of the area, most 
notably from the local authorities. SDD's "Middle Clyde Regional 
Park" was seen from the outset as the focal point of a much wider 
rehabilitation programme encompassing a nine-mile stretch of the 
middle Clyde valley. The park was to be linked to other recreational 
facilities in this wider area by a system of footpaths, picnic areas, 
tourist viewpoints, and a transformed visual environment. Apart 
from the cost of forming the loch, which required a detailed 
feasibility study, the cost of realising the SDD scheme was estimated 
in December 1964 at £575,000.
In April 1965, following further discussions with SDD, the 
three local authorities involved - Lanark County Council, Motherwell 
and Wishaw Town Council, and Hamilton Town Council - formed a joint
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working party and appointed engineering consultants to investigate 
the feasibility of forming an artificial loch on the River Clyde in 
the Hamilton Low Parks area. As required by the Working Party the 
loch was to have a surface area of approximately 200 acres, and would 
have amenities for sailing and other recreation (Figure 6). The 
consultants estimated the cost of the major works at £300,000, and 
recommended further technical studies of the river system, likely 
pollution problems, and hydraulic studies of the Low Parks area 
(Binnie and Partners, 1965). Evidence of the national importance of 
the park project is provided by reference to it in the 1966 VJhite 
Paper "The Scottish Economy 1965 to 1970: A Plan for Expansion"
(Cmnd. 23 64):
Perhaps one of the most imaginative pointers to ways 
in which new development and rehabilitation can be 
combined is the proposal now being investigated for 
a Middle Clyde Regional Park...a landscaped entrance 
to the heart of the country from the South which 
could do much to repair the tarnished image of 
industrial Scotland. (p.42)
The whole scheme had by then gathered sufficient momentum to be 
publicly launched in August 1966, following discussions in Edinburgh 
between the three local authorities and the Parliamentary Under­
secretary of State for Development, J Dickson Mabon. It was 
anticipated that the scheme, to cost approximately £lmillion, would 
take five to seven years to complete. Further investigations were to 
be held to determine how costs could be shared between central and 
local government.
In April 1967, the three local authorities appointed landscape 
and planning consultants for the project, and in the autumn they 
produced their main planning proposals for the park (Montagu, 1967) 
based on a detailed brief specifying the main requirements of the 
local authorities. The proposals were focussed on the middle Clyde 
area as "a potential linear park serving the Region south-west of 
Glasgow" and were based on the following assumptions;
1. the working-out of coal in the area nearing completion;
2. an advanced programme of elimination of pollution by the 
Clyde River Purification Board;
3. increased leisure time;
4. pressure of population;
5. improved communications and increased personal mobility.
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The Park was seen as serving an immediate population of some 
215,000 within a three mile radius, and perhaps as much as four- 
fifths of the population of Scotland, living within a 50-mile radius 
of the park. These opportunities were seen to be enhanced by the 
growth prospects forecast in the 1963 White Paper, particularly the 
planned population growth in north Lanarkshire. It was in the 1967 
report that the term "Strathclyde Park" was first used. The 
proposals included a phased development based on the following 
objectives;
(a) the elimination of industrial dereliction and dumps, and the 
screening of essential industrial features;
(b) the improvement of access to the area;
(c) the provision of additional attractions and amenities, and 
their grouping with those already existing in the area.
After land reclamation, the main proposals of the 1967 scheme 
were much more ambitious than SDD's outline suggestions. As well as 
including a loch with provision for sailing, canoeing and angling, 
the 1967 proposals also featured an international standard, 2,000 
metre rowing and canoeing course, caravan sites and a motel, 
restaurants, dry ski slopes, an equestrian centre, a regional sports 
centre, and an athletics stadium and sports village. The whole 
complex was aimed at attracting and supporting national and 
international events;
The aim should be to provide as many complementary
facilities as possible, grouped together in order
to serve different age groups, and varying weather
conditions. (Montagu, 1967,pS)
Stage' 1 of the scheme was costed at £2, 532,000, and this 
excluded the second phase of the sports centre, the ski slopes, the 
canoe centre, additional restaurants and leisure facilities, and 
further landscaping and car parks. Also excluded was the athletics 
stadium, which was to be undertaken in Stage 3, and the sports village 
in Stage 4. In short, the local authorities had transformed the SDD 
outline plan into a plan for a regional park: a complex of active and 
passive recreation facilities serving west central Scotland.
Not surprisingly, SDD expressed some concern at the cost of 
these proposals, and there followed a period of re-evaluation of 
what could feasibly be provided within a reasonable time-scale
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in the context of the financial resources likely to be available. 
Consequently, a second Ministerial meeting was held in Edinburgh in 
January 1968 to rationalise central and local government ambitions, 
and to establish what the extent of Government involvement would be . 
To compound matters, the engineering consultants to the project 
revealed at the meeting that major changes in the loch arrangement 
were required as a result of studies which had shown that the River 
Clyde carried too much sediment to be the loch's source of water 
supply. A new channel for the Clyde would have to be cut, 
separating it from the loch, which would instead be supplied by the 
South Calder Water. This major revision was estimated to increase 
the capital costs of the project by around 10% (£200-300,000), 
although these would be offset by avoiding annual dredging costs of 
approximately £50,000.
At the same meeting the Minister, Lord Hughes, suggested to the
local authorities that they form a joint authority to set up and
manage the park. They agreed to consider a revised layout in the
context of the engineering consultants' findings, and to carry out
further investigations so that detailed costs could be worked out and
the availability of grant-aid settled. SDD felt the 1967 proposals
were "too lavish", and one of the purposes of the January meeting was
to consider what major works were required initially in order to get
the project going, so as to get some measure of the kind of
expenditure which would have to be met:
There is room for a good deal of detailed argument
about what might or might not need to go in at
this stage. (SDD, 1968, p.3)
The main sources of Government grant-aid were section 20 of the 
Industrial Development Act 1966, which provided for up to 85% grant 
for the rehabilitation of "derelict, neglected or unsightly land", 
and section 67 of the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967, which provided 
for up to 75% grant for the provision of countryside recreation 
facilities. A later source of grant-aid was the Scottish Sports 
Council which assisted, through the Scottish Education Department, 
the provision for some of the sports facilities, notably the rowing 
and canoeing course.
Whilst section 20 of the 1966 Act was primarily intended to 
contribute to the development of industry in a given area, this
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requirement had been liberally interpreted to include "the clearance 
of dereliction where this would make a piece of country more 
attractive to potential industrialists". Even so, there was some 
debate between the planning and finance divisions of SDD concerning 
the definition of derelict land in the case of Strathclyde Park, 
since only a small part of the park site (Bothwellhaugh bing) could 
be considered "classic" derelict land within the strict meaning of 
the Act. Host of the rest of the area was nominally in agricultural 
use, although the poor drainage and flooding in the area severely 
curtailed agricultural use for all practical purposes.
The provisions of the 1966 Act were used to rehabilitate and 
reclaim the land, and the provisions of the 1967 Act used to 
transform it into "countryside". Thereafter, grant-aid for passive 
recreational facilities could also be provided under the 1967 Act.
It was not until the establishment of the Scottish Sports Council 
in 1972 that the sports facilities became eligible for grant-aid.
Following the preparation of the hydrological report on the 
new loch arrangement, the planning consultants prepared in 1969 a 
more detailed study report, with cost estimates, as a basis for final 
decisions. At the same time, a Technical Working Party of central 
and local government officials, together with the consultants, 
considered what, in detail, would be eligible for grant-aid. 
Eligibility for grant-aid was a major consideration since:
 The scope of the scheme as a whole depended on the
extent to which the rehabilitation grant would be
payable. (Technical Working Party, 19 69, p.l)
The Technical Working Party reported in 1970 that the necessary 
Stage 1 works would cost approximately £1,146,300, and would comprise 
the formation of the loch and diversion of the River Clyde by 
means of a by-pass channel; construction of a park road, bridge and 
culverts; two caravan sites; car parks, playing fields and footpaths. 
The total area of the park would extend to approximately 1,745 acres. 
Of the £1,146,300 estimated cost for a revised Stage 1, all but 
£90,000 was expected to attract either rehabilitation or countryside 
grant. SDD gave strong support to the scheme in its submissions to 
the Treasury:
In view of the benefits accruing to the immediate
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area and to Scotland as a whole in terms of
the encouragement of industrial development. (Butler 1969)
In 1970, rehabilitation grant was expected to account for 
approximately two-thirds of the total cost of the scheme, whereas 
the "countryside" element was estimated at £300,000. Following 
consideration by the local authorities of the report by the Technical 
Working Party, SDD granted approval in April 1970 for the revised 
Stage 1 and the Strathclyde Park project was officially re-launched.
In the early part of 1971, there was some re-evaluation of the 
need for the international rowing course, in view of the cost of 
providing this to the exacting standards set by the Federation 
Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron (FISA), the international 
sporting body for rowing. To provide a course to international 
standard required a larger and deeper loch than would otherwise be 
necessary, as well as additional access roadworks and race timing 
equipment. It was estimated that savings of £276,000 could be made 
(Binnie & Partners, 1971), Whilst the provision of the course was not 
an automatic by-product of the park development, and required 
substantial expenditure over and above that required to form a 
similar loch without the rowing course, there was nevertheless 
considerable pressure exerted on the Joint Committee at this time 
to retain the proposal.
It was the Scottish Amateur Rowing Association (SARA) and the
Scottish Council for Physical Recreation (SCPR) who had suggested
the inclusion of the 2,000 metre course in the 1967 proposals, and it
was SARA again which in 1971 reminded the Joint Committee of what
it saw as the excellent opportunity to provide at Strathclyde Park
facilities for improving standards of amateur rowing and for
national and international rowing events, for^ which there was only
one other centre in the UK (at Nottinghan) at the time. SDD also
brought some pressure to bear for the course's retention:
We are as concerned as the local authorities that
the opportunity to provide this when the main
engineering works are undertaken should not be
missed...In view of the acceptance by the
Government of so large a proportion of the overall
costs of this highly, expensive scheme we should
hope that the Joint Committee would see their way
to accepting the relatively low balance of cost of
developing the rowing course. (SDD, 1971)
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At its meeting on 14th April 1971, the Joint Committee agreed 
to retain the 2,000 metre international rowing course, and to
construct the loch accordingly. As far as the Joint Committee was
concerned, the future prospects for the whole area were tied up with 
Strathclyde Park. International rowing held out the prospect of 
international recognition for the area, and the provision of a new
landscape and new recreational facilities on a large scale was seen
as a way of transforming the image of north Lanarkshire and thus 
improving the attraction of the area to inward investment. The 
revised cost of the 1971 scheme was £2,637,000, and the local 
authorities' contribution had risen to £500,000 (207. of the total 
capital costs).
Following the deliberations of the Technical Working Party, 
revised Stage 1 proposals were produced by the planning consultants 
in July 1971. The estimated cost of the revised scheme was £2,784,600 
of which £1,308,000 was eligible for up to 8 57. rehabilitation grant. 
Approximately 507. of this cost was attributed to the engineering 
works required to form the new loch and by-pass channel (including 
the capacity to accommodate the rowing course) (Figure 7). Of the 
remaining £1,467,000 some of this was eligible for up to 757. 
countryside grant. The revised Stage 1 therefore essentially 
comprised the complete clearance of dereliction, the formation of the 
loch, the raising of the ground subject to frequent flooding, and the 
provision of a nucleus of sports and recreational facilities linked 
by roads, car parks and footpaths. The area of the park was to be 
650 hectares(1600 acres) and the loch 81 hectares (299 acres). The
watersports centre was not originally included in Stage 1 but, 
following consultations with SARA and SCPR, a combined centre for 
storage and changing facilities was to be provided, to be grant- 
aided up to 307. by the new Sports Council.
In November 1971, the Joint Committee of the three local 
authorities was formally constituted, and it assumed the powers of
section 48 of the Countryside Act for the area within the park 
boundary. Twelve months later, it appointed a Park Director, who 
was to be its principal advisor, and who would assume overall 
responsibility for co-ordinating and carrying through park 
construction and, thereafter. Its management and further development. 
This was followed by the appointment of new landscape consultants in
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1973, who produced a Landscape Master Plan in May 1974. The Master 
Plan provided the detailed framework for implementation lacking in 
earlier proposals.
Construction work on Stage 1 began in June 1973 with the
reclamation and rehabilitation of the land, major earthworks, the
excavation of the loch, and the diversion of the River Clyde. The
total cost for the approved part of the project had risen to
£4,300,000. Of this, £2, 300,000 was provided in grant-aid by the
Government, which also permitted the Joint Committee to borrow an
additional £l million to meet the cost of the sports facilities. At
that time, it was envisaged that the Stage 1 works would be completed
in 1975 and, as far as the local authorities were concerned;
The Park will continue to grow to meet needs as they
develop...Eventually it is hoped that the Park will
grow outwards, especially along the Clyde and Avon
rivers, with riverside walkways forming a network of
open spaces throughout Lanarkshire. (The Surveyor, 1973, p .21)
In April 1974, the Joint Committee considered the Stage 2 
proposals which it envisaged being constructed over the 1974-1977 
period. These included further major recreational facilities 
including a dry ski slope, an indoor sports centre and swimming pool, 
a separate sailing centre on the north side of the loch, an athletics 
track and stadium, an equitation centre, a canoe slalom course, and 
feasibility studies for the extension of the park northwards and 
southwards to include Hamilton High Parks, Cadzow Castle, and the 
Avon Gorge.
The formulation of the Stage 2 proposals was undertaken at a 
time of change in the economic and political climates. Whilst both 
the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) and the Sports Council were 
becoming critical of too many "man-made” and active recreational 
facilities being "squeezed into" the park, to the detriment of the 
park's role as a focus of passive recreation, SDD's earlier, 
equivocal, view of Stage 1 had hardened into a positive hostility to 
any further development beyond that which had already been agreed in 
detail, in view of imminent local government reorganisation, the 
rising costs of the project in general, and its demands on the 
countryside budget in particular, SDD considered the first priority 
to be the implementation and operation of the Stage 1 proposals, 
and suggested that the Joint Committee leave the consideration of
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stage 2 to the successor Strathclyde Regional Council.
In March 197 5, following representations from the Joint
Committee, Strathclyde Regional Council agreed to assume
administrative and financial responsibility for the park on local
government reorganisation. By 1976, the cost of Stage 1 had reached
£10 millions, and the increasing costs of the project, combined with
persistent technical problems such as pollution control, had a
serious impact on the project's public image, and hence its political
support. Financial restrictions began to affect the completion of
Stage 1 as well as the prospects for Stage 2. The most serious
outcome of these restrictions was postponement of the completion of
the centrepiece of the park, the international rowing course;
In the present economic crisis, Strathclyde Regional 
Council just doesn’t have the cash for this kind of 
project. (McKillop, 1976)
As a result, in 1976 the Regional Council's Leisure and 
Recreation Committee had £800,000 of planned expenditure on the 
park cancelled. The proposed park administration building and 
education centre were deleted, as well as some footpath construction, 
one of three planned beaches, road lighting, a sluice gate and 
pumphouse, work on the camping sites, and completion of a clean-up 
of the South Calder Water. As the "Glasgow Herald" reported at the 
time:
When plans for the centre were drawn up, nobody
doubted that the loch would provide facilities
for international rowing. If the Government does
not come up with the money and this course has to
be scrapped, the centre could well prove to be too
elaborate. (McKillop, 1976)
On 13th September 1976, Strathclyde Park was opened to the 
general public, exactly 30 years after its conception in the Clyde 
Valley Plan. However, the Government would not approve the £500,000 
for the installation of the race timing equipment needed to bring 
the rowing course up to international competition standard. Yet some 
of the more modest and less politically sensitive facilities continued 
to be provided, such as a golf driving range, clubhouse, and catering 
facilities.
On 22nd April 1978, Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce 
Millan, officially opened the park, which at the same ceremony was
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formally certified a Country Park by the Chairman of the Countryside 
Commission for Scotland. To those critics of the cost of the £10 
million park, the Secretary of State reminded them that clearing up 
the original dereliction would have had a financial cost anyway.
Whilst this had been done, a park had also been established in its 
place;
I look upon this as an investment for the future.
This is only the first phase. I think future 
generations will be grateful for the foresight of 
those who planned and those who have developed 
this project. (Motherwell Times, plO)
The Countryside Commission had contributed £3,200,000 in 
countryside grant, whilst the Sports Council had provided £300,000.
The Chairman of the Countryside Commission remarked on "the 
characteristics of real countryside that have now been created in 
the heart of Strathclyde". Councillor Bernard Scott, former Park 
Chairman and then Convener of the Regional Council's Leisure and 
Recreation Committee, picked up the Secretary of State's optimistic 
remarks :
I see today not as the end of this project, but
merely the beginning of a new era and approach in
the field of leisure and recreation. (Motherwell Times, plO)
A survey of park useage in 1977 (Amott et. al. 1978) 
concluded that the majority of park users lived in adjacent urban 
areas, whilst use of active sports facilities was primarily made by 
higher socio-economic groups, travelling greater distances. The 
study team therefore concluded "it is primarily a neighbourhood park 
serving the needs of adjacent communities" (p.xxii). The 
importance of the park lay not only in its wide variety of 
recreational opportunities and its proximity to large concentrations 
of population, but also in its catchment area, which includes many 
areas suffering from economic decline and possessing large areas 
of substandard housing. In this respect, the study team made a 
number of recommendations for improving the accessibility and 
management of the park which were not taken up. The Regional Council's 
concern, faced with the park's burgeoning capital debt and delays in 
its construction, was to finish Stage 1 as quickly as possible and 
at minimum cost.
In 1978, the revised estimated cost of the project was
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£11,015,000. To date, the rowing course has yet to stage
International competition, although the race timing equipment is to
be installed in time for the 1986 Commonwealth Games rowing events.
After 1975, with the aim of an early conclusion to the park
development, the role of the Leisure and Recreation Committee declined,
and responsibility for the park is now vested in the Council’s 
Buildings and Property Committee, which has no remit for the 
development of park policy. The capital debt for the park for the 
year 198 2-8 3 was £6,900,000, whilst annual running costs were £2,022,000 
(Wilkinson 1983). In 1979, the park recorded 1 million visitors 
(compared with 300,000 forecast during planning). The nearest 
comparison is Clyde-Muirsheil Regional Park, which attracted 500,000 
visitors in the same year. The estimate for 1934 is 3*5 million 
visitors.
Strathclyde Park does not figure amongst the Regional Council’s
current priorities, and no reference is made to it in the Council’s
policies for leisure and recreation. It is unlikely that the items
earmarked in Stage 2 will be constructed, at least in the forseeable
future. The park has not attracted the private capital anticipated
(which may be due in part to its uncertain future), whilst it is
currently the focus of a marketing exercise by the Scottish
Development Agency (Drivers Jonas, 1983). The former Park Chairman,
Bernard Scott, remarked in 1983;
The park was never built the way it should have 
been built...it doesn’t function as it should 
function. Some of the main essential things are 
missing. (Scott, 1983)
Strathclyde Park was the product of a cooperative effort over 
12 years by central and local government to bring about a trans­
formation of the middle Clyde valley and provide much-needed recreational 
facilities in a countryside setting. In contrast to other projects 
which have foundered due to opposition or conflicts of interest, there 
was no "opposition" to the environmental changes which the project 
entailed. All the participants in the project, and other interested 
parties were agreed on the need for change. Yet the project took 12 
years to realise from its "re-launch" in 1964, and even then it is 
generally accepted that its original conception has not been fully 
realised, and that it does not perform some of the functions for which 
it was constructed. The construction of the park cost much more and
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was the subject of some bitter conflict between the main participants 
over detailed aspects of its development. Figure 3 lists the main 
stages in the development of Strathclyde Park, in chronological order, 
since the publication of the Clyde Valley Regional Plan.
3. The Context for Action
In order to put the evolution, planning and construction of 
Strathclyde Park into context, it is important to consider the 
significance of external influences on the project before the 
detailed analysis of the park which follows thereafter. These external 
influences could be regarded as the opportunities and limitations 
presented by Government policies; by the wider relationships between 
physical/land-use and economic planning; by general trends in 
recreational planning theory and practice; and by local political 
influences.
From the outset; the recreational potential of the Hamilton 
Low Parks/middle Clyde valley was given a regional context by the 
Clyde Valley Plan. SDD resurrected and actively promoted a landscape/ 
recreation scheme for the area as a direct response to the 19 63 
White Paper and to the impending construction of the M74 motorway.
The park project was widely promoted at the time as a good example 
of the interlinking of physical planning with regional economic and 
industrial planning. Local government reorganisation in 197 5 and 
changing regional priorities had an important bearing on park 
implementation. The evolving and changing regional economic and 
land-use planning context has been an important factor as the fortunes 
of the park project have waxed and waned. Although resurrected by 
SDD in 1964 as primarily an exercise in land rehabilitation with 
recreation as a secondary, but supporting, consideration, the park 
project was b o m  into an era of intense activity in the recreation 
planning field. Following the land reclamation phase, the main 
focus of the park shifted to a recreation perspective on a regional 
scale.
The developments in regional and recreation planning over the 
last 35 years, particularly since 1964, have had a significant 
influence upon the timing, content and eventual prospect of
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Strathclyde Park, It is important to understand these 
interrelationships if meaningful conclusions are to be drawn from 
the subsequent detailed analysis. Furthermore, by considering the 
regional economic and recreation planning dimensions, the external 
events which are most likely to have had the most significant impact 
on the park's development, and on the perspectives and scope for 
manoeuvre of the principal actors, are brought into focus.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (1):
THE REGIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 1946-82
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THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (1):
THE REGIONAL PLANNING PROCESS 1946-82
1 . Introduction
The idea for a major countryside recreation facility which 
eventually became Strathclyde Park is rooted in a regional conception 
of recreational provision as part of the supporting structure for the 
economic development of west central Scotland. The interlinking of 
physical and regional economic planning was first articulated in 
Scotland in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Plan, and remained a
strong feature of Scottish regional planning, at least until the mid
1970*s. Ultimately, the link between Strathclyde Park and this 
regional planning dimension contributed to undermining the major 
aspirations of the park's protagonists.
It is important to set the history of Strathclyde Park within 
the evolving post-war regional planning context since;
(a) Abercrombie's original proposal was for a regional centre, 
forming part of a spatial and functional hierarchy of 
recreational provision which was an important component of 
the Clyde Valley Regional Plan. The idea of a regional park 
was revived by SDD planners in the 1960*s for primarily 
strategic reasons, and the intentions as subsequently
expressed in new detailed proposals were certainly regional
in outlook;
(b) During the 1960's, through to the early 1970's, regional 
economic planning in the UK, but traditionally even more so 
in Scotland, was politically fashionable, and major physical 
renewal and infrastructure provision was considered an 
essential foundation for industrial development and economic 
growth in the depressed regions;
(c) The whole project was seen from the outset as beyond the 
scope of any single local authority. Abercrombie saw the 
provision and management of the regional recreation centres
as functions of a new regional authority; the 1960*s 
proposals were progressed through to detailed planning and 
construction by a partnership of local authorities, assisted 
by specially tailored central government financial aid and 
advice; from 1975, development and management passed to the 
Strathclyde Regional Council, and up to this time at least, 
the park was generally regarded as a regional facility.^
An appraisal bf the regional context provides an important 
dimension to understanding the park's origins, the timescale of 
planning and development activity, the flow of financial resources, 
and the level of political support at various stages. Changes in the 
regional context can also be offered as a partial explanation for the 
lack of progress during the 18 years following publication of the 
Clyde Valley Regional Plan, the intense planning and development 
activity between 1964 and 1976, and the curtailment of further 
development in recent years.
The remainder of this chapter comprises (i) a brief historical 
outline of the evolution and development of regional planning in 
Scotland; (ii) a focus on the particular phases of this development 
which have had a significant bearing on the Strathclyde Park project; 
(iii) some concluding comments on the interrelationships between 
regional and local planning processes in this instance.
2. Regional Planning in Scotland t A Historical Outline
The first attempts to deal with the economic imbalance between 
the different regions of the UK was the creation of "special areas" 
under the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934, and 
its Amendment in 1937. This legislation, along with the report of 
the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population 
(1940), which emphasised the need for the dispersal of industry, set 
the pattern for the more comprehensive Distribution of Industry Act 
1945, which introduced financial inducements and associated measures 
for industrial development in "Development Areas". This was allied 
with other measures which emerged from a number of wartime studies, 
including the 1946 New Towns Act to aid the dispersal of population 
from overcrowded cities; the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, 
which introduced a comprehensive system of land use controls.
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iacLuding a certification system for industrial developments; and a 
number of regional planning studies, including reconstruction plans 
for Greater London (1944), and in Scotland studies and plans for the 
river valleys of the Clyde (1946), the Forth (1947) and the Tay (1950), 
These Scottish regional advisory plans were the product of a Scottish 
Office enthusiasm for regional development which had also included 
the earlier establishment of both the North of Scotland Hydro Electric 
Board, and the Scottish Division of the Forestry Commission in 1943, 
and the Scottish Tourist Board in 1949.
The Clyde Valley Plan represented the first practical steps 
in positive regional planning in Scotland (McGuiness 1968). However, 
this early activity was followed by a period of retrenchment in 
regional planning which began in 1951 with the return of a 
Conservative government hostile to such intervention. No new 
regional plans were prepared in the UK during the subsequent 10 years, 
although Carter (198 2) suggests that the period was not insignificant 
in contributing to a distinctive approach to regional planning in 
Scotland, where economic problems were dominated by Clydeside and 
thus differed significantly from the rest of the UK. The Scottish 
interest in regional planning was maintained with the Caimcross 
Report (Scottish Council 19 52) on "Local Development in Scotland", 
Glasgow's overspill programme requiring the designation of a third 
new town at Cumbernauld in 1955, further new town construction, and 
the generation of industrial effort (Lyddon 1971). Local Authorities 
were preparing development plans under the 1947 Act which the Scottish 
Office was guiding towards the objectives of the regional advisory 
plans (McGuiness 1968).
Only in the early 1960’s did the UK government begin to find 
favour both with national and regional economic planning as a 
response to (a) recurrent and ever-deepening economic crises during 
the 1950's, which highlighted the shortcomings of existing methods 
of economic control; (b) more acute economic imbalances with the 
onset of recession in 1958; (c) a growing interest In France's 
economic success, which was attributed to a sophisticated form of 
economic planning; and(d)criticisms of existing regional policy, which 
in the case of Scotland, were focussed in the Toothill Report 
(Scottish Council 1961).
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The Local Employment Act 1960 had replaced Development Areas 
with more limited "Development Districts" where unemployment was 
acute or expected to become so* This approach was much criticised 
for dispersing industry over wide and often remote areas lacking in 
any economic advantages. The Toothill Report advocated the need for 
positive industrial redistribution away from the magnetic pull of 
the Midlands and the South-East of England, and argued for specific 
grants for factory building, investment in infrastructure, a balanced 
national policy, and a strengthening of economic planning measures in 
the Scottish Office. These recommendations were largely taken up in 
the 1963 White Paper for Central Scotland (and in a similar paper 
for the North-East of England) which identified growth zones within 
Development Areas where especially advantageous growth prospects 
were defined. Public expenditure focussed on improving communications, 
urban renewal, and improved public services in these zones, on the 
grounds that building upon their growth prospects would make for a 
much more effective industrial location policy, with the zones 
developing eventually into industrial complexes capable of self- 
generating growth. (Figure 9)
The 1963 White Papers expressed the priority attached by 
Government to the less prosperous areas, and acknowledged the 
radically changed circumstances since publication of the regional 
advisory plans in the 1940's. They were intended as regional economic 
plans which translated their programmes into spatial terms. The 
Central Scotland White Paper was prepared by the Scottish Development 
Department, which was formed in 1962 out of the planning division of 
the Department of Health with the express purpose of bringing together 
under one administrative umbrella all the physical planning and 
infrastructural services of Government which required coordination 
if economic planning objectives were to be achieved. Of the Central 
Scotland White Paper, according to Carter (1982), "it truly did 
represent a coming together of economic and physical planning at the 
regional scale" (p22). This view is supported by McGuiness (1963) 
who states that the objective of this period was to marry the techniques 
and processes of physical planning to the economic policies of 
Government in order to stimulate new economic growth and exploit 
resource potential. A feature of this period was a deliberate policy 
in the Scottish Office to establish closer links between the central 
administration and the planning and economic expertise and advice
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available in the Scottish Universities (Lyddon 1971) of which early 
evidence was indicated in the commissioning of the Lothians Regional 
Survey and Plan in 1962. Full regional planning machinery in 
Scotland was established in 1965, with the definition of eight sub- 
regions, and following the formation of the Scottish Development 
Group of civil servants in 1963 to implement the White Paper,
The 1963 White Papers opened a period of intense Government 
activity in regional economic planning throughout the UK. The early
1960's were also notable for the establishment of the Location of
Offices Bureau, the Beeching Report on the rail network, the 
decentralisation of the Midlands car industry, including new car 
assembly plants at Linwood in Renfrewshire and Bathgate in West 
Lothian, the location of an aluminium smelter at Invergordon on the 
Cromarty Firth, a green-field steelworks development at Ravenscraig 
in Lanarkshire, and the formation of the (short-lived) Department 
of Economic Affairs by the incoming Labour government.
The 1955 to 1964 period had been characterised by an unexpected 
and continuous rise in the national birth rate. Official national 
projections of future population were continually revised upwards: 
in 1960, a total UK population of 64 millions was forecast by the end 
of the century. In 1965, this was revised to 75 millions (Hall 1974), 
By the mid-60's, the UK population level was rising by 500,000 per 
annum and was expected to accelerate. From 1965, however, the 
Scottish population level began to fall for the first time, primarily 
due to emigration, leading to substantial falls in the projected 
working population in the late 1970's and I960's. A major objective 
of the 1966 White Paper, which set out the Labour government's plans
for the expansion of the Scottish economy up to 19 70, within the
framework of the 1965 National Plan, was to reduce emigration by 
creating a fast flow of new jobs. It proposed new special incentives 
in the Development Areas for industrial investment; the maintenance 
of the high level of public investment embarked upon in 1963; a 50% 
cut in emigration to 20,000 per annum; a programme of advance factory 
building; grant-aid; industrial redistribution; and improvements to 
the physical environment, including measures to achieve faster rates 
of slum clearance and derelict land reclamation.
An accelerated programme of infrastructure provision and road
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building was proposed, including the Clyde Tunnel approach roads, the 
Glasgow inner ring road, the Tay and Erskine bridges, rail 
electrification and port modernisation, the development of Abbotsinch 
Airport, and 200 miles of motorway standard roads. A 43% increase in 
the output of the construction industry was envisaged, with nearly 
£2,000 millions of public investment to 1969-70. The population of 
Scotland was expected to increase by 100,000 by 1970, 500,000 by 1980, 
and 2 millions by the end of the century (Nicoll 1969). This 
strategy was assisted by the definition of wider Development Areas in 
the 1966 Industrial Development Act.
The 1963 White Papers were not a rational allocation of 
investment resources, since the rival claims of different regions 
were not considered. They were more a response to particular regional 
pressures bearing on the Government at that time (McCallum 1976).
This probably contributed to the Labour government's entirely new 
machinery for regional planning, in support of the new policy 
initiatives. Ihis included the setting up of Regional Economic Councils 
and Boards for each of the UK planning regions, which in Scotland 
replaced the Scottish Development Group.
The general theme of this period was growth. The UK population
was forecast to increase by 20 millions by the end of,the century,
the car industry was expanding rapidly, oil was cheap, and the natural
birth rate was high. The particular problem for regional planning in
Scotland during the 1960's was not unemployment but emigration
(Nicoll 1966), which was then running at 40,000 persons per annum
(almost equivalent to the birth rate) with Clydeside being the major
source. The principal aim of the 1966 White Paper was therefore;
To speed up the evolution of a modern industrial 
structure in Scotland, providing more jobs and 
stemming the outward flow of young Scots to the 
south. (p.vii)
The reasons for such high levels of emigration were considered 
to be poor employment opportunities and poor environment. The latter 
was also regarded as a factor which required resolution if central 
Scotland was to compete successfully for mobile industry with more 
attractive locations in the south of England. The White Paper 
represented the first attempt to provide comprehensive socio-economic 
guidelines for subsequently more detailed regional and local planning
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and, according to Grieve (1973) was "probably the most important of 
all the productions of the Scottish planning process" (p.413).
In the wake of the White Papers, the late 1960's and early 1970*s 
were notable for a focus on sub-regional planning studies which 
integrated social, economic and physical aspects. These included 
studies and plans for the Lothians (1966), the Falkirk-Grangemouth 
area (1968), the Central Borders (1968), and the Moray Firth (1968). 
Indeed, by 1970, seven of the eight planning sub-regions set up by the 
Scottish Office in 1967 had been the subject of a sub-regional plan, 
whilst work on the West Central Scotland Plan began in 1970.
The early 1970*s witnessed changing political, social and 
economic circumstances. Following the report of the Royal Commission 
on the Reform of Local Government in Scotland, (1969), the 1973 Local 
Government (Scotland) Act introduced a two-tier local government 
system broadly based on city regions, and the 1972 Town and Country 
Planning (Scotland) Act introduced structure and local plans 
following the report of the Planning Advisory Group (1965). The late 
1960*s and early 1970*s also saw the establishment of new government 
planning agencies with an implementation focus at the national scale: 
the Countryside Commission for Scotland (1967); the reconstituted 
Scottish Tourist Board (1969); and the Scottish Sports Council (1972). 
The Highlands and Islands Development Board had been set up in 1965 
as a response to the particular economic problems of that area, 
following the previous focus on industrialised central Scotland.
In contrast to the future prospects as envisaged in the 1963 
and 1966 IVhite Papers, there was a slow rate of growth in the
national economy after 1965, which slowed even more after 1970 into
real decline in 1974-75, partly as a result of international recession 
which, after 1973 became the most serious since the 1940's. Yet the 
period 1965 to 1975 was a time of economic optimism in Scotland.
There were significant falls in unemployment relative to the UK as a 
whole, and in emigration, and above-average growth in GDP (Cuthbert 
1982). During the 1960*s, Scotland steadily improved its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) relative to the UK, and in 19 76 it had reached
98% of the UK level (compared with 88% in 1965). Scotland's share
of total UK investment peaked during the period 1971-75, whilst 
1971-76 saw a 140% increase in the total personal disposable income
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of Scots (compared with 1347, for the UK) (SDD 1978). Over the period 
1971-77, the total Scottish population fell marginally to just below 
5*2 millions, almost wholly due to a 100,000 decline in Strathclyde.
The policy after the White Papers largely served to create a 
physical environment (transport, housing and other infrastructure) to 
accommodate the additional population, jobs and investment 
anticipated. The mileage of motorway standard and trunk roads 
increased from 83 miles in 1963 to 265 miles in 1973; the north and 
west flanks of the Glasgow inner ring road were completed, as also 
the Clyde Tunnel approaches and major bridges over the Tay and over 
the Clyde at Erskine. The 1966 Industrial Development Act increased 
Government grant-aid for land rehabilitation, and physical planning 
and land renewal projects such as Strathclyde Park were major 
components of this programme.
From the mid-1970's, there was a discernible change in this 
broad inter-regional policy towards an intra-regional and urban focus, 
in response to changing demographic, employment and economic 
circumstances. There was no growth in Scottish industrial production 
after 1975 (Cuthbert 1982). Scottish manufacturing employment fell 
by 10% between 1977 and 1980 (compared with 77, for the UK) whilst 
unemployment increased by 9% above the UK average between 1979 and 
1980. The Scottish population peaked at 5*2 millions in 1974, and by 
the end of the 1970's it was expected to fall by 7% by 1991, 
Clydeside's by 13%, and Glasgow's by almost 33% ( F i m  1976), with a 
continuing downward trend to the end of the century. New town 
development programmes began to be cut back with the slowdown in 
dispersal of population from Glasgow and the severe curtailment of 
the city's massive redevelopment plans. More emphasis began to be 
placed on rehabilitation and urban initiatives such as the Glasgow 
Eastern Area Renewal project, which was launched almost 
coincidentally with the abandonment in 1976 of Scotland's sixth new 
town at Stonehouse in Lanarkshire.
The Regional Employment Premium, which was introduced in 1967 
and provided 39% of Government expenditure on regional assistance to 
industry in Scotland in 1974-75, was abolished in 1976. There was 
also a reduction in the coverage and intensity of regional industrial 
and office development controls, and a slowdown in the Government's
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jobs dispersal programme. According to Ashcroft (1982) 1979 was 
"a watershed year" in British inter-regional policy, with a two- 
thirds cut in Scotland's share of dispersed Government office jobs, 
inter-regional industrial location controls effectively abandoned, 
and a phased reduction in the size of the Assisted Areas over the 
following three years from 43% to 25% of the UK working population. 
Regional Development Grant, introduced in the 1972 Industry Act, and 
providing 42% of regional assistance in Scotland during 1974-75, was 
reduced from 20% to 15% in 1980. At the same time, there was an 
expansion in urban policy initiatives which had uncoordinated 
beginnings in the late 19 60's and early 1970's, but which gained 
momentum after the 1977 White Paper "Policy for the Inner Cities" 
and the Inner Urban Areas Act.
The Scottish Development Agency became the focus of industrial 
and economic planning initiatives after 1975, whilst the link between 
physical and economic planning, which had been characteristic of 
Scottish post-war regional planning, was effectively severed in 1973 
with the formation of a new Scottish Economic Planning Department, 
which became responsible for industrial policy, independent of SDD.
Scottish local government was reorganised in 19 75, and the 
nature of and economic climate for local government activity was from 
the outset radically different from the immediately preceding period. 
The West Central Scotland Plan 1974 was a very different type of 
regional study from the Clyde Valley Plan. Its economic and strategic 
planning analysis provided much of the foundation for the abandonment 
of Stonehouse new town and for much of the subsequent strategic 
planning of the Strathclyde Regional Council.
Since 1975-76, there has been a falling trend in Scottish local 
government expenditure (Heald 198 2). The introduction in 1976-77 
of the block grant system of financial allocations by the Scottish 
Office coincided with sharp reductions in local authority capital 
expenditure programmes, and the Government proportion of local 
authority financial resources has fallen steadily since 1975-76. 
Criticisms of the structure and functioning of the two-tier local 
government system led to recommendations by the Stodart Committee 
of Inquiry into Local Government in Scotland (1981) for the 
transfer of some regional powers to the District Councils which was
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enacted in the Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 198 2.
These particularly affected leisure and recreation functions, whilst 
there has been a mounting campaign by the four city Districts for a 
return to their unitary status.
Since the 1940*s, the need for regional policies has varied 
with the state of the national economy. The policy mix and the 
extent of enforcement have shifted according to the economic, social 
and political objectives of successive governments (House 1982).
However, throughout the 1960's and 1970's there was a general political 
consensus on the continuing importance of full employment, industrial 
location policy, regional aid, extension of the social services', 
population redistribution, improvement of the national infrastructure 
(especially housing and communications) and the total living 
environment, and local government reform. Over this period, regional 
economic-physical planning has been a central feature of industrial 
planning in Scotland.
In the 1960's particularly, the regional problem was seen as a 
problem of economic growth (McCrone 1969). Attention was directed 
to ways of promoting regional expansion and to the contributions the 
regions might make to the achievement of a higher national rate of 
growth. To this end, the 1963 and 1966 White Papers were concerned 
with creating an environment (physical, economic and social) conducive 
to growth. Increasing priority was given to regional policy during 
this period, and to the role of new towns, urban renewal and 
infrastructure provision as means to the achievement of this end.
Changing economic conditions in the 1970's, and growing 
emphasis on the problems of inner cities, together with a philosophy 
of rehabilitation rather than wholesale redevelopment, led to a 
focus on tackling the structural problems of older urban concentrations 
in situ, as opposed to population and industrial dispersal. Reduced 
financial resources, economic and population decline have served to 
lower the horizons of expectation about influencing regional change, 
and have correspondingly witnessed a reduction in the status of 
regional scale approaches, and thereby ambitious, large-scale capital 
projects purporting to serve a regional purpose. House (1982) 
suggests that the adverse economic climate of the 1980's has rendered 
much of the regional planning initiatives of the 1960's "little
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more than relics of a vanished age of growth optimism" (p.52),
According to the "Scotsman" (1983) it is the "spectacular 
failures" that have helped to give regional policy "a bad name", the 
most vivid Scottish examples being the closure of the Linwood car 
assembly plant in 1981, with the loss of 4,800 jobs, at a cost of 
£173 millions; the aluminium smelter at Invergordon, which closed in 
the same year with a loss of 900 jobs, at a cost of £170 millions.
The future of other regional development initiatives of the 1960's, 
such as the Ravenscraig steelworks, remains finely balanced.
Unemployment in Scotland in September 1983 stood at 14'5%-of the 
workforce, and in contrast to policies of the earlier periods, current 
regional economic planning in the depressed regions is led by the 
Scottish Development Agency and the Strategies of the Regional 
Councils. The primary focus is now on safeguarding existing jobs and 
industries and competing, together with District Councils, new towns. 
Enterprise Zones and Inner City Partnerships for the limited mobile 
industry available.
3, The Regional Influence
The significant stages in the evolution and implementation of 
the Strathclyde Park project coincide with periods of ascendancy in 
regional planning ideas and mechanisms. These periods can be 
identified as, firstly, the late 1940's, commencing with the 
publication of the Clyde Valley Plan; secondly, the early 1960's 
through to the raid-1970's, starting with the 1963 White Paper on 
central Scotland; through to local government reorganisation in 197 5 
and the opening of the park to the public one year later.
The Clyde Valley Plan
As early as the war years, Abercrombie was quick to see the 
importance of integrating regional economic planning with physical 
planning, not only as a means of rebuilding war-damaged areas, but 
also in tackling industrial obsolescence, population overcrowding, 
and physical decay on Clydeside. No less important to the achievement 
of economic aims was the physical renewal of places such as North 
Lanarkshire, with all the characteristics of neglect, depression and 
"sheer muddled untidiness" (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949, p.8) which 
combined to reduce the competitive potential of the area for new
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industries and jobs with parts of the country where amenity was much
higher. The Clyde Valley Plan (Abercrombie & Matthew, 1949) called
for the urgent treatment of this whole area;
Especially in the case of North Lanark, the 
re-creation of amenity will be an essential 
factor for industrial recovery. (p.9)
In North Lanarkshire alone, the Plan saw the need to re-house 
one-third of the population, excluding further housing to relieve 
high densities in some central areas. As part of these proposals, 
one of four "regional recreation centres" was proposed at Hamilton 
Low Parks in view of its "strategic" location, as well as the 
opportunity to undertake major rehabilitation of derelict and despoiled 
land. Thus, in 1946, the link was established between land 
reclamation and environmental improvement, allied to strategic 
industrial and economic policies for the region, which have provided 
the backdrop to the Strathclyde Park project. The regional recreation 
centres were part of a hierarchy of recreational provision intended 
to provide more space for games of a regional character, and in order 
to compensate for the low standard of open space in the Clyde Valley 
in general, and in industrial Lanarkshire in particular.
Like many other recreational aspects of the Clyde Valley Plan, 
no action was taken on this proposal for a period of time which 
coincided with a hiatus in regional policy initiatives, in particular 
the failure to maintain the momentum established by the Plan and 
other initiatives of the 1940's. The main priority for local 
authorities in the immediate post-war period was to tackle the 
problems of unfit housing, overcrowding, and traffic congestion in 
central areas. The regional recreation areas were dependent for their 
development and management oh the setting up of the regional 
authority recommended in the Plan. Recreation planning at local 
level generally only began to blossom after the introduction of the 
Countryside Act in 19 67, and Government aid to undertake derelict land 
reclamation, which only became sufficiently attractive with the 
additional resources provided in the 1966 Industrial Development Act.
Of regional planning up until this time Grieve (1973) has suggested 
that "psychologically, and in terms of statutory planning powers, the 
times were not yet ripe" (p.411),
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The 1960*s and the White Papers
Regional economic planning was rediscovered in the 1960's,
largely in response to a deterioration in regional imbalances during
the preceding decade* The 1963 White Paper on central Scotland
(Cmnd.2188) proposed a major programme of infrastructural development,
based on growth centres, to provide the foundation for new investment
and economic development* Stress was laid on making industrial
Scotland attractive to new industry by schemes designed to eliminate
the impression of decay and dereliction;
It is also vital more rapidly to create a Scottish 
environment which, both from the point of view of 
industrial firms and in terms of its attraction as 
a place to live in, makes Scotland and the more 
prosperous areas in the South more equally matched* (p.15)
To assist in the achievement of this objective, grants for the 
rehabilitation of derelict land were increased, whilst town centre 
renewal schemes were envisaged to create a more favourable economic 
environment. The raising of standards of amenity and environment 
were considered essential if Scotland was to attract and hold a 
population with increasingly varied skills, rising earning capacities 
and a widening variety of personal tastes, as well as to present a 
favourable image to the potential industrialist. It was recognised 
in particular that the older urban centres identified as growth areas, 
such as north Lanarkshire, were dependent upon substantial investment 
in the clearance of derelict land and general rehabilitation. To 
this end, £2 millions were allocated by the Government in 1964-65.
Whilst the task of phasing and coordinating the implementation 
of the outline programme set out in the White Paper was given to the 
Scottish Development Group, local Growth Area Committees were 
established, including representatives from local and central 
government, to consider the implications of the White Paper for each 
Growth Area. SDD took the initiative to resurrect the idea of a 
recreation centre in the Hamilton Low Parks as an opportunity to bring 
about Large-scale landscape improvement in an area of despoilation 
through which the construction of the M74 motorway from the south was 
due to pass, on the basis that;
(i) the image of the area, through which visitors, including 
potential developers and industrialists, would pass would 
have a significant bearing on future private investment in 
west central Scotland, and
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(ii) there was assumed to be a direct relationship between the 
general condition and amenity of a locality, and the 
probability of firms moving into it.
SDD took the initiative on the basis of these factors (Lyall
1964), and the local authorities became initially involved through
the Growth Area Committee. \-/hilst the White Paper provided the
favourable conditions, it was the construction of the M74 motorway
through the Low Parks that presented the opportunity to examine the
whole condition, use and future of the area, and which introduced the
national/regional perspective to the park idea. Specifically, Hamilton
Low Parks were seen as the "blighted hub" of the North Lanarkshire
Growth Area, and;
The impression of dereliction created in all but 
the most insensitive will do nothing to help the 
Scottish industrial image. (Lyall, 1964, p2)
The first Ministerial meetings on the park project commenced 
in 1966, and the White Paper of that year on the Scottish economy 
(Cmnd.2864) provided a further fillip to the embryo park proposals.
The White Paper sought to accelerate the programme of infrastructure 
investment to stimulate economic growth as embarked upon in 1963.
Again, great emphasis was placed on the need to clear dereliction and 
rehabilitate unsightly and run-down areas, especially at the approaches 
to towns and on important routes. Examples in addition to the 
"Middle Clyde Regional Park", as it was then labelled, included the 
Glasgow inner ring road, the infilling of the disused Monkland and 
Forth and Clyde canals, and the rehabilitation of the shale mining 
areas of West Lothian as part of the Livingston proposals.
Physical planning and infrastructure were seen as the essential 
backbone of future economic prosperity, with environmental 
improvements an integral component of this programme during an era 
dominated by population and emigration issues, in particular high 
levels of emigration from west central Scotland. A basic cause of 
emigration was considered to be the generally poor environment of 
Clydeside:
The speed at which new industry can be attracted, 
and the readiness of firms to establish head­
quarters as well as production units in Scotland 
will depend considerably on the energy and 
imagination with which general amenity can be
improved. (Cmnd. 28 64, p.42)
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The regional significance of the ideas for a major land
rehabilitation and recreational development scheme in the middle
Clyde area was explicitly referred to in the White Paper as;
One of the most imaginative pointers to ways in 
which new development and rehabilitation can be 
combined...The proposals would not only create 
a valuable recreational asset for nearby urban 
communities but also provide on M74 a landscaped 
entrance to the heart of the country from the 
South which could do much to repair the 
tarnished image of industrial Scotland. (p.42)
The park proposals represented the biggest planned scheme of
land rehabilitation in Scotland at this time (McGuiness 1968) and was
regarded by the Scottish Office as a big and important pioneering
project which was hoped to stimulate, by example, other authorities
to consider land rehabilitation and recreational provision on a
large scale;
The importance of this project for the region 
itself and for Scotland as a whole is such that 
expenditure on it ought to be given as early a 
place as possible in the programmes for
rehabilitation and country parks. (Butler, 1969)
Strathclyde Park was thus launched on a tidal wave of enthusiasm 
for large-scale physical renewal in support of economic development, 
stoked by the climate of growth optimism then prevailing, SDD played 
the role of catalyst in re-launching the park idea, backed by the 
increased financial resources provided for land reclamation and 
recreational developments in the 1966 Industrial Development Act and 
the 1967 Countryside (Scotland) Act respectively.
The Post-1975 Period
The commencement of park construction in 1973 coincided with 
the onset of recession and a period of rapid inflation, growth in 
unemployment, and economic crisis. The escalating costs of the 
project over this period, combined with a changing perspective on 
regional issues, exemplified at the regional scale by the 1974 West 
Central Scotland Plan and by the early priorities and policies of 
the Strathclyde Regional Council after 1975, served to severely 
diminish the status of the scheme.
\diilst park development and administration became tasks for the 
Regional Council, leisure and recreation was a low priority policy
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area compared with the economic, industrial and environmental 
problems of the older urban centres, and other issues such as 
deprivation. From 1976, the capital spending programme for the park 
was substantial/ pruned, and the recommendations of the Stodart 
Committee (1981) and subsequent legislation have since rendered the 
development future of the park uncertain. The high status scheme of 
the 1960's and early 1970's has subsequently been perceived by its 
administrators as a financial burden much more than a regional asset.
4, Conclusion
Although conceived in the 1940's, Strathclyde Park was 
essentially a product of the growth conditions of the 1960's, 
particularly of Scottish Office initiative in regional planning in 
the west of Scotland. The local authorities played a relatively minor 
role in this process until around 1965, when, at SDD's prompting, they 
joined forces to commission feasibility studies, and thereafter 
to progress the project to implementation.
Such a large project was beyond the financial resources of 
even three local authorities acting together, and the relaunch of the 
park idea in the mid-1960's coincided with the substantial increase 
in Government financial aid for the reclamation of derelict land, 
followed by the introduction of a new grant for the provision of 
recreational facilities in the countryside. The whole park project 
was conceived, relaunched and progressed in a regional planning 
context, directed by Government. Only in this way could justification 
be marshalled for the substantial public resources required. The 
rationale for Government action was essentially grounded in the 
economic development policies of the 1960's, and it is significant 
that the political fortunes of the park began to wane after 1975-76 
when the emphasis of regional policy started to tilt towards tackling 
the problems of city regions at their source, ie within the older 
urban centres, whilst the comprehensive system of regional Controls 
on industrial investment began to be dismantled.
It is unlikely that the park in its present form would have 
emerged purely from local initiative. The area straddled the 
administrative responsibilities of three local authorities, whose
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primary interests in the area up until the SDD initiative were in its 
value as a location for waste disposal and sewage treatment. The 
problems of dereliction and subsidence were of such a magnitude that 
they required intervention from an outside source, and the injection 
of substantial financial aid, for their resolution. At the same time 
a stimulus to action was required, and this was provided by (i) the 
strategic location of the area in relation to a major transport (and 
investment) route, and (ii) a favourable economic and political 
environment which encouraged action to be viewed in regional terms.
The year 1975 could almost be taken as the fulcrum in a 
transition from the planning context of the decade preceding to the 
decade following. The general economic and demographic context had an 
important bearing on the timing and implementation of the park proposals, 
In general terms, the scope for local initiative on an ambitious 
scale is so circumscribed by general economic and political conditions 
that successful implementation is often dependent upon favourable 
conditions in this wider environment and a policy or project 
sustaining as an "idea in good currency" (Schon 1971) in order to 
attract the required level of political and financial support. Figure 
10 identifies, in chronological order, the main events in the 
evolution of regional planning in Scotland since the 1920's.
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Department of Economic Affairs.
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1970 Local Employment Act.
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Designation of Stonehouse New Town.
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New Scottish local government system c 
Industrial Strategy launched.
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Strathclyde Structure Plan submitted.
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THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (2):
PLANNING FOR RECREATION AND LEISURE SINGE 1945
1. Introduction
Although proposals for a major recreation facility in the middle 
Clyde valley were first set down in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional 
Plan, no further action was taken until the idea was resurrected in 
1964 by SDD with the outline scheme for land rehabilitation and 
recreational development. With initial Government prompting and the 
prospect of significant grant-aid, the local authorities affected 
combined to commission and then implement a plan for a regional park. 
These proposals were based on quite different concepts and assumptions 
from those in the Abercrombie plan.
The reasons for the 18 years of inactivity since 1946, and for 
the changing nature of the project, can to some extent be explained by 
considering the evolution and realisation of the park idea in the 
context of the parallel evolution of ideas and practice in planning 
for recreation and leisure which emerged in the UK in the years after 
1945. Such ideas reached the height of their currency during the 
years from the raid-1960*s to the mid-1970's, until the onset of 
recession and the emergence of radically different ideas about the 
nature of leisure and the distribution of leisure opportunities. A 
consideration of the changing state of knowledge, attitudes and 
practices in public provision for leisure and recreation over this 
period also provides an insight into some of the external factors 
influencing the preparation and execution of the Strathclyde Park 
proposals.
The evolution of public policy-making for leisure and recreation 
can be divided into four distinct historical phases;
(a) the period up to the early 1940*s;
(b) the post-war years, up to the early 1960*s;
(c) the mid-1960*s to the mid-1970's;
(d) the period since the mid-1970's.
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These phases can be distinguished by distinctly different 
concepts and ideas about planning for leisure. The threshold of change 
from one phase to another is marked by a burst of Government policy 
activity, and by changing perceptions of social and economic trends. 
This chapter therefore seeks to put Strathclyde Park into the context 
of developments in recreation planning ideas and practice by 
considering;
1. the evolution of planning for recreation in the countryside;
2. the development of leisure research; and
3. the evolution of the Country Park concept in Scotland,
2. Developments up to the Early 1940's
The development of planning policy in relation to the spatial 
aspects of leisure and recreation essentially originates from the 
mid-20th century, although it is helpful to consider earlier history 
in order to appreciate the timing of Strathclyde Park.
Prior to the 1940's, planning as an activity of local government 
was generally limited to urban areas, reflecting the modest land-use 
planning powers and initiatives prior to 1947, Public provision of 
open space and parks in tovms and cities in the 19th century was 
essentially a response to a general concern about public health in. 
overcrowded and congested urban areas, assisted by some Victorian 
philanthropy. Ashworth (1965) points to the Report of the Select 
Committee on Public Walks (13 33), and the campaigning of Octavia Hill, 
the Society for the Preservation of Commons, and the Public Health 
Acts of the latter half of the 19th century. During this period, the 
main focus of public leisure provision was in formal urban parks, 
open spaces and playgrounds, whilst attending theatres and music halls 
was a major form of mass entertainment. In the latter half of the 
19th century, railway expansion, shorter working hours and free 
Saturdays made the seaside and country areas more accessible to many 
town dwellers. The trip "doon the watter" to the Clyde coastal resorts 
became a feature of the annual Glasgow Fair holiday. Such provision for 
these new leisure opportunities was fluctuating in response to demand, 
and public provision only emerged incrementally during the first half 
of the 20th century.
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During the 1920's and 1930's, unfettered urban expansion began 
to be seen as prejudicing countryside amenity, which developed into a 
major concern, culminating in the appointment in 1929 of the Addison 
Committee to examine the relevance of national parks, already well 
established in North America, to the UK context. The early regional 
planning schemes of the 1920's had drawn attention to the need to 
preserve good landscape (Cherry 1975), whilst the 1930’s saw the 
emergence of urgent questions concerning the need to reserve country­
side areas for amenity and recreation, related to the introduction of 
"green belts" to contain urban expansion, and the need to plan for 
the provision of countryside facilities in response to new demands 
from urban areas. Whilst car ownership was rising, the most popular 
countryside pursuits were rambling, hiking and cycling (the Scottish 
Youth Hostels Association was formed in 1931, and by 1940 It had
46,000 members). The National Trust for Scotland was formed in the 
same year, and the first national forest park opened in Argyll in 
1936. However, such provision was ill-coordinated, and whilst 
Cullingworth (1974) points to a "policy vacuum" in recreation planning 
until the 1940’s, Veal (1975) remarks of this period;
As with planning generally, local authorities were 
enabled to do certain things in the area of 
recreation, but were not required to do anything, (p.4)
The Addison Committee reported in 1931 with recommendations for 
.the introduction of National Parks, whilst in urban areas the 1937 
Physical Training and Recreation Act signalled the move away from 
Victorian ideas about public walks and pleasure grounds to a focus on 
major facilities such as playing fields, gymnasiums, swimming baths 
and camping sites (Hoddis 1970). It was in 1925 that the first 
national standards for open space provision in towns were formulated 
by the National Playing Fields Association.
Whilst evidence to the Barlow Commission (1940) pointed to the 
importance of open space and recreation for the health of the 
community, and to its scarcity as an example of the disadvantages of 
living in large urban centres, it was the Scott Committee (1942) which 
pointed to the need for comprehensive planning for the countryside as 
well as to\TOs. The 1940's mood of post-war reconstruction produced 
much governmental activity, with recreation and national parks again 
resuming significance with the Dower Report (Ministry of Toim and 
Country Planning 1945). In Scotland, a Scottish Council on National
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Parks was appointed in 1942, and in 1944 the Scottish National Parks 
Survey Committee was formed to advise on the identification of suitable 
sites. In 1942, Abercrombie produced his Greater London Plan, in which 
his comprehensive, hierarchical approach to provision for leisure and 
recreation was further advocated in the Clyde Valley proposals four 
years later. The tide had turned in favour of positive public 
planning for recreation and leisure, primarily in response to a 
perceived threat to high quality landscapes of national significance 
as articulated by a well-organised amenity lobby (Cherry 1975). At 
the same time, leisure and recreation began to emerge as an important 
component of development plans for large conurbations.
3. The Late-1940's to the Nid-1960's
The late 1940's saw the laying of the foundations for a 
centralised, comprehensive land-use and environmental planning system 
with the passing of the Distribution of Industry Act in 1945, the New 
Towns Act in 1946, the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947, and the 
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act in 1949. In relation 
to leisure and recreation, government was confronted with a new set of 
problems concerned with useage of the countryside, as a result of 
rising car ownership, affluence, and more leisure time (the 1938 
Holidays With Pay Act increased from 4 millions to 14 millions over 
the following decade the numbers of UK insured workers entitled to 
annual paid holidays). The need for more open space in cities and the 
preservation of open space in the countryside for agriculture and 
recreation were fundamental considerations in new planning approaches.
Although legislation and developments in planning procedures 
during the early post-war period did much to increase the abilities 
and powers of local authorities to plan, their abilities and powers to 
provide facilities were less fully developed, partly due to a general 
shortage of resources, and partly due to the low priority given to 
recreation compared with other concerns such as housing, education 
and transport. Whilst National Parks were not introduced in Scotland, 
and much of the Scott Committee's recommendations did not apply, the 
early post-war period in Scottish recreation planning was 
characterised by little activity by local authorities, although the 
Forestry Commission began to develop its interest in forest parks.
— 76—
and the Nature Conservancy, established under the 1949 Act, began to 
articulate the ecological interest. The post-1949 Act era is 
characterised by a gradual movement towards comprehensive policies 
for leisure and recreation, in both urban and rural locations.
In the early post-war years, annual paid holidays were extended 
to nearly all workers, there was growth in holidays away from home 
and in spectator sports, and a rise in cinema attendances up to the 
mid-1950's, before the advent of TV in the home. From the mid-19 50's 
to the mid-1960's there was a significant rise in active recreation, 
with rapid growth rates in sailing, golf, climbing, pony-trekking, 
caravanning and camping, and motoring for pleasure. These were the 
product of several influences, including paid holidays, reduced 
working hours, and rises in real incomes. Burton and Wibberley (1965) 
contend that the single most important factor was the rise in car 
ownership, bringing increased mobility and greater flexibility in 
the use of leisure time.
Many of these developments were seen as mirroring earlier 
changes in the United States. Granz (1982) points to the early 1900's 
as the period when "leisure time" emerged in the US, for the same 
reasons as outlined by Burton and Wibberley. Demand led to the sudden 
creation of facilities such as urban parks, whilst the 1930's to the 
1960's saw the characterisation of the urban mass population in the 
US as the "leisure class" whose members had achieved their economic 
goals, and who were now focussing on leisure pursuits as a means of 
1i fe-enhancement *
The early 1960's in the UK saw an enlarged awareness and new 
scale of thinking on provision for recreation and leisure, relating 
to a developing set of academic and other enquiries in the UK and 
especially in North America, particularly the 1962 study by the 
Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission ( ORRRG), which analysed 
US demands in great detail. This new government interest was in part 
stimulated by the 1963 "Countryside in 1970" conference, which 
articulated the implications of the general pressures on countryside 
and other recreation resources arising from a rapidly growing urban 
population with more money and leisure time. Cherry (197 5) points 
to these rapid changes in national circumstances and to two factors 
in particular which occassioned a review of leisure and recreation
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planning in the mid-1960's :
(a) US research into the use of leisure time suggested an explosion 
of demand for family-based, car-orientated, countryside 
activities. There was no reason at the time why the UK should 
not follow suit;
(b) the need to reconsider UK land-use policies, including those 
affecting outdoor recreation, in the context of the "threat" 
posed by the effects of rapidly increasing car ownership.
Between 19 50 and 1960, there was a 100% increase in UK car 
ownership, which doubled again between 1960 and 1970, producing "a 
wave of recreationists escaping from the towns and cities in search of 
leisure in the countryside" (Blackie et al, 1979, p.3). Day trips by 
car had become the most popular form of countryside recreation. Yet 
even with the growth in weekend and annual holidays, rises in car- 
ownership and personal incomes, and reductions in average working 
hours, little advance thinking had taken place prior to the early 1960's 
about provision for the growth in and demand for leisure and recreation, 
(the Clyde Valley Plan authors complained of a 1940's "indifference" 
to the need for recreation space).
By the mid-1960's, public bodies began to realise the strength 
of what Dower (1965) evocatively termed the "fourth wave" of mass 
leisure activity which had developed since 1945, and the writings of 
Dower and Burton and Wibberley (1965) which pointed to the 
significance to the UK of US research into leisure patterns, in 
particular the 28 volume study by ORRRG (1962). This study concluded 
that the volume of demand for most outdoor recreation activities would 
treble, and in some cases quadruple, by the end of the century.
Several British surveys confirmed these findings, including those by 
Burton and Wibberley (1965), the Pilot National Recreation Survey 
(British Travel Association/University of Keele 1965), and the 
Government Social Survey "Planning for Leisure" (Sillitoe» 1969)
There emerged a view in Government that there was a need for 
action on a wider front than simply amending the 1949 Act as had 
hitherto been proposed, focussing in a comprehensive way on protection 
of the countryside and its use for recreation and leisure. The 1949 
Act and the Hobhouse Report (Ministry of Town and Country Planning 
1947) were based on an expected resumption of pre-war trends, in a
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countryside as envisaged by the Scott Report (1942). There was a 
need for a readjustment of policy in response to current and 
anticipated conditions.
Countryside policy had fared even less successfully in Scotland 
than south of the border. The parts of the 1949 Act setting up the 
National Parks Commission and National Parks did not apply, and no 
Scottish national parks have since been designated. Two attempts 
at introducing Scottish countryside legislation foundered in the 
early 1960*s before the deliberations of Study Group 9 of the 1965 
"Countryside in 19 70" conference recommended the establishment of a 
Countryside Commission for Scotland, thus presaging the 19 67 Act. 
Government action in Scotland up until then had been limited to 
piecemeal measures such as Scottish Health Department Circular 
40/1960, providing the basis for control of development in the country­
side, and SDD Circular 2/1962, recommending local authorities to 
survey and produce proposals for tourism and the establishment of 
Areas of Great Landscape Value. Further action awaited the machinery 
and finance provided in the 1967 Act.
4. The Mid-1960's to the iiid-1970's
By the mid-1960's, there was a clear perception in Government,
based on a "burgeoning latent demand" (Bannister 1974) that widespread,
positive provision of leisure space in the countryside was needed,
and for participation in active sport in both urban and rural settings.
In 1966 the Government produced its White Paper "Leisure in the
Countryside" (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1966) which
followed both Labour and Conservative manifestoes in emphasising the
need to promote outdoor recreation (in contrast to the 1949 Act, which
was founded on preservation of the landscape). There was a dramatic
shift of focus from national parks to "country parks", and a need to
make provision "both to meet public demand and to relieve pressure
on remote or outstandingly beautiful places" (para.7). Cherry (1975)
suggests that it was only with the countryside arguments of the 1960's
that anything like a comprehensive countryside policy began to emerge:
In both England and Wales and Scotland the country 
park idea was taken up so avidly that one is led 
to think that in Government circles at least it 
was almost a reaction to the years of failure. (p.159)
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The 1967 Act established the Countryside Commission for 
Scotland, introduced Government grant-aid for countryside projects, 
and the concept of the country park. To some extent it represented 
Scotland catching up with the provisions of the 1949 Act. This period 
saw the start of what Dower (1974) has referred to as "a new era" in 
official leisure planning and provision. The need for action had 
been focussed by the Wo If end en Report (1965) ''Sport and the Community", 
by the "Countryside in 1970" conferences, and by the 1966 White Paper.
Up to the late 1960's, the role of Government was seen as the 
provision of support for voluntary bodies through a variety of 
statutory and non-statutory agencies; to pass enabling legislation; 
and to exhort local authorities to examine provision in their own 
areas. By the end of the decade, the Government role had been 
strengthened by the replacement of voluntary bodies with statutory 
agencies. The 1969 Development of Tourism Act provided statutory 
duties for the Scottish Tourist Board. In 1972 the Scottish Sports 
Council was formed by amalgamating the Scottish Council for Physical 
Recreation with the Advisory Council for Scotland and that part of the 
Scottish Education Department with responsibility for grant-aiding 
sport and recreation. Thus, three central implementing agencies were 
created within five years, providing the framework for further 
developments in the field.
At local authority level at this time, there was increasing
recognition of leisure planning, not only as an integral part of
physical planning and development, but also as a means of attracting
grant aid. At national level, there was concern to develop
recreational pursuits as ends in themselves, and an acknowledgement
of the broader role of leisure, eg as a tool for community
development :
The Government's concern with recreation flows 
basically from their recognition of its importance 
for the general welfare of the community.
("Sport & Recreation", Cmnd.6200, Para.13)
In the late 19 60's, increasing attention was now being given 
to planning for leisure, with the spread of regional sports councils, 
physical education, provision in new towns, the development of arts 
centres, financial aid to live theatre, museums and libraries 
(Cullingworth 1974). The Highlands and Islands Development Board,
—8 0 —
established in 1965, included within its remit powers which could be 
used for recreation provision in the countryside; the Scottish Tourist 
Board was focussing on countryside recreation matters, particularly 
caravanning and camping; the Local Government (Development and Finance) 
(Scotland) Act 1964 provided local authorities with new powers to 
provide facilities for the public enjoyment of the countryside.
Greater public funds were becoming available, and with them 
possibilities of a new scale of public investment to meet recreation 
demands.
Leisure spending in the 1970's was occupying a growing proportion 
of public expenditure, mirroring the increase in spending on leisure 
by the individual (Morrell 1969). Even so, there was a perception 
that demand had outstripped supply: Dower (1974) forecast the need for
1,000 new sports centres in the UK to meet 1981 needs. He also 
pointed to the growth of leisure and the use of space at the regional 
scale, as illustrated by the 10,000 acres Lee Valley regional park on 
the northern fringe of London (Civic Trust 1964),and regional-scale 
developments in Europe and North America. The climate for public 
action during this period was firmly set fair for greater financial 
provision and comprehensive planning. Bannister (1974) has charted 
the significant growth in provision for sport, leisure and informal 
recreation over the decade preceding local government reorganisation.
The highpoint of planning for leisure and recreation during 
this period could be regarded as the Scottish Tourism and Recreation 
Planning Strategies (STARTS) as developed jointly by the Country­
side Commission, Sports Council, Forestry Commission and Scottish 
Tourist Board. STARTS was an attempt to coordinate the activities 
of national agencies and local authorities "to assist in the 
evolution of outline strategies for each new regional and island 
authority area in Scotland, coordinated within a broad national 
framework"(SDD, 1975,para.1). The strategies were aimed at coordination, 
but were adversely affected by the financial cut-backs after 19 75, and 
overtaken by the preparation of structure and local plans.
5. After the Mid-1970's 
The 1972 Town and Country Planning Act and the 1973 Local
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Government Act provided a new organisational context for recreation 
planning at both regional and local levels in Scotland. The changing 
social and economic conditions of the mid/late 1970*s and a greater 
emphasis in public programmes on tackling urban deprivation, led to 
new considerations and priorities for recreation planning. The 1973 
Act laid a statutory duty on regional authorities to ensure adequate 
provision for countryside recreation, and new leisure and recreation 
departments were formed in Regional and District Councils. However, 
leisure and recreation committees were politically "lightweight" 
concerns in terms of budgetary and political influences, and recreation 
issues developed a secondary importance in relation to what were seen 
as more pressing economic problems.
At the same time, agencies individually began to develop and 
refine their recreation strategies. In 1975 the Scottish Tourist 
Board produced its Preliminary National Strategy emphasising the 
employment-generating role of tourism and the importance of urban- 
based facilities. In 1974 the Countryside Commission produced its 
"Park . System for Scotland", and in 1978 it produced a policy for 
National Scenic Areas. At the same time, Government instituted its 
programme of disengagement from day-to-day local planning, delegating 
grant disbursement to the national agencies. More emphasis was being 
given to effective management of existing facilities than to the 
planning of new projects involving large amounts of public expenditure.
Leisure services today are generally regarded as a non-key 
sector of local government spending, and have been an easy target for 
severe restrictions in the annual round of Rate Support Grant 
settlements :
Current restrictions on spending imposed by central 
government severely constrain any proposals for 
providing leisure and recreation facilities.
(Tourism & Recreation Research Unit 1976, p.118)
The focus in the early 1980*s has been on the development of 
joint initiatives between the public and private sectors in the 
provision of major leisure facilities - a feature of the current 
economic climate in which public funds are no longer readily available.
The early 1970*s formed a high point in recreation and leisure 
provision by government. Since then, real incomes have risen despite
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Inflation, but transport costs have been greatly increased by the 
rapid rise in petrol prices since 1973. Current trends show a lower 
rate of increase in leisure activity than assumed in earlier 
predictions. Reductions in rural bus services make it more difficult 
for people without cars to gain access to countryside facilities.
The long-established trend of increasing car ownership is slowing down, 
and demographic changes are likely to affect the pattern of 
participation, not only spatially but also in terms of socio-economic 
groups.
Criticisms have been levelled at the emphasis in recreation 
provision of large-scale recreation centres which limit the 
opportunities for participation by the less mobile. Hillman (1979) 
asserts that there is a steady fall in participation with distance, 
and that this is sharpest among people without access to a car. The 
extension of participation to a representative cross-section of the 
population requires a major shift of policy from the provision of large, 
expensive (and few) leisure facilities, entailing long journeys to 
reach them,towards a strategy of providing smaller, cheaper (and 
therefore more numerous) facilities, local to intended users.
6. The Development of Leisure Research
Most writings on recreation since the 1950's/early 1960's 
usually include some reference to the "growing importance" of 
recreation in people's lives, and to the burgeoning of leisure activity 
as a direct consequence of increases in leisure time, personal incomes, 
mobility and education. Recreation planning in the UK in the 20 year 
period following the end of the Second World War was conceived and 
developed against a background of US research and practice, and by 
existing and anticipated growth in car ownership, incomes and leisure 
time (Dower, 19 65).
The theme of demand for outdoor recreation was first 
substantively developed by ORRRG in 1962, and this research, with its 
forecast of an explosion in leisure demand by the end of the century, 
provided much of the early foundation for British research and 
practice. The first British research began to develop in the mid- 
1960' s (Dower 1965; Burton and Wibberley 1965; BTA/University of
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Keele 1965; Sillitoe 1969). Cullingworth (1964) complained of "the 
much neglected subject of planning for leisure", and added in 1974 
that:
The discussion of positive planning for leisure 
(in the 1960's) dealt mainly with American 
material and experience; there was little that 
could be recounted of policies and achievements 
in Britain. (p.226)
The "Countryside in 1970" conference concluded, largely by
analogy with research results from the US, that demand for leisure
provision in the UK might treble by the year 2000, and that a large
increase was likely before 1980. The conference concluded;
During the forseeable future there will continue to 
be a rapidly expanding demand for a variety of 
outdoor recreation facilities. (p.13*6)
Influential studies by Dower (1965) and Burton and Wibberley 
(1965) were based upon the application of US trends to the UK planning 
context. Burton and Wibberley cite the importance of US experience 
and its relevance to UK leisure planning ^for two reasons;
(i) the US had by then already achieved many of the social and 
economic goals most likely to be achieved in the UK over 
the following 25 years, and therefore there was a "strong 
tendency" for these achievements to have similar impacts 
over the immediate future;
(ii)the US possessed at that time the most detailed information 
on outdoor recreation in the world (the 23 volume OR.RR.C 
study, 19 58-62). The ORRRC study found that two factors 
particularly affected the level of outdoor recreation activity: 
location and accessibility. The major imbalance between supply 
and demand was considered to be due largely to location. The 
study established links between active recreation and the
rise in real incomes (up to a threshold), level of education, 
age, occupation and opportunity ("when the facilities are 
there, people use them").
Dower (19 65) agreed, and likened the future impact of leisure 
to three earlier "waves" influencing the growth and pattern of urban 
development: (i) 19th century growth of industrial towns; (ii) railway 
development and expansion; (iii) 20th century suburban growth. There 
was liberal use of emotive, metaphoric language to colour perceptions
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about leisure needs during this period, and their potentially
damaging impact on the countryside if not controlled:
People like ants scurrying from coast to coast, 
swarming out of cities...roads sweat with traffic..
(Dower 196b, p.167)
Thus practice, up until the mid-1970's at least, had sought
to develop and implement recreational policy on the basis of ideas
and information originating in the US, on the assumption that leisure
demands experienced there in the 19 30's and 1960*s would be replicated
in the UR over the rest of the 20th century. It had also focussed
on the provision of facilities, on the assumption that there was a
demand that needed to be satisfied, and took its cue from Government
policies and financial incentives which themselves were a reaction to
external pressures, with Government rarely the innovator (Cherry
1975), At the same time, research has sought to expand on the first
tentative explorations into need in the 1960's, towards a concern
to define more rigorously the nature of "leisure" and the estimation
of "need" based on pluralist concepts, in contrast to the unitary
view of leisure provision which has traditionally dominated practice.
Roberts (1981) asserts the need to focus much more on a recognition
of conflicting needs for leisure provision, in a context dominated
by conflicting groups competing for limited resources:
Paternalism has yielded ground to a liberal 
definition of the leisure problem which professes 
agnosticism as to which pastimes are particularly 
worthy. (p.114)
Elson (1977) suggests that, during the late I960's/early 1970's, 
leisure research had developed twin focii of interest: (i) a concern 
to predict the future scale of leisure and recreation impacts, as 
a reaction to the "burgeoning demand" thesis of the 1960's, and
(ii) a concern to explain more accurately the place of leisure and 
recreation as part of emergent life-style patterns.
Demands for action on the leisure front usually start from the 
assumption that leisure time and its uses are growing problems. In 
this conception, it is difficult to resist the case for more arts, 
sports and community centres, and more provision for countryside 
recreation and education. Driver (1970) criticises this traditional 
"activity" approach to recreation planning, which assumes that supply 
defines preferences (and sometimes that supply will generate demand),
but does not question which latent demands are not being met. This 
causes recreation planners to focus on supply, and to give too little 
attention to demand, which is frequently assessed in terms of past 
consumption.
During the 1970's, this developing behavioural critique began 
to stress the importance of the perceptions and psyche of the 
recreationist as a crucial connection between supply and demand. 
Recreational behaviour began to be directly linked to social and 
economic circumstances, and to the spatial impact of the consumption 
of recreation resources.
Traditionally, there have been four causal factors regarded 
as central to assessments of recreational demand; mobility, leisure 
time, population and income. Behavioural approaches go beyond these. 
Stankey (1979) attempts to define a set of concepts for recreation 
planning, whilst more systematic approaches to the problem of demand 
began to emerge (Lavery 19 75). At the same time, others were drawing 
attention to the poor data base for estimating demand, and the 
aridity of conceptualisations, whilst recreational packages began 
to be seen in terms of social meanings (Hendlee et,al,1971). Interest 
began to develop in useable behavioural models incorporating 
individual perceptions of recreational opportunities (Elson 1977), 
and "interest fulfillment" (Rapoport and Rapoport 1975). Behavioural 
approaches stemmed from a criticism of the trend towards the 
institutionalisation of leisure provision in the UK which, they argue, 
leads to a gap between the goals and procedures of providers, and 
the needs and desires of those provided for. Much of this work is 
still at the theoretical stage of development.
This radical critique has sought to re-interpret leisure as 
"a central life interest" (Smith et. al.1973) rather than the residue 
of social life, at a time of ascendancy in the importance of leisure 
as a social issue, characterised by increasing diversity in the form 
and content of leisure values and behaviour - the antithesis of the 
view, prevalent in the 1960's, of leisure as mass demand, and 
therefore requiring large-scale solutions.
Roberts (1931) suggests that, ultimately, individuals' ability 
to use leisure to enliance their quality of life depends less on 
the providers of recreation facilities than the other resources at
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their disposal, namely time and money, but also self-confidence, the 
distribution of which is not in the hands of the recreation professions. 
Ihe role of the professionals in recreation provision may therefore 
be incidental to the equation of leisure provision and life- 
satisfaction;
Leisure activity is most limited among individuals 
handicapped by age, gender and low income, and the 
best way of extending their leisure opportunities 
would be through addressing these disadvantages. (p.125)
The transitory nature of trends in outdoor recreation demand 
over the past 30 years has made its forecasting difficult. Patmore 
(1977, 1978) points to the inherent problems of prediction due to 
the mercurial nature of leisure behaviour, which is moulded by 
taste, fashion and the media, responds to a variety of cultural, 
psychological and economic stimuli, and is conditioned by the supply 
of facilities and by participants' effective knowledge of 
opportunities, and means of access to them. Patmore identifies a 
concern to date with symptom rather than cause, with conflict-resolution 
and cost-effectiveness rather than human needs and satisfactions.
There is still a fundamental lack of understanding of the phenomenon 
of recreation, and we need to treat US and other experience elsewhere 
with care. The simple transformation of ideas and methods ignores 
wide variations in the patterns of experience between nations, even 
where the basic elements of population and resources seem closely 
matched.
In the post-war period up to the early 1970's, rising mobility 
was seen as a central precept of recreation planning. \diat could
not be foreseen was the impact of external factors on the patterns of 
mobility, especially the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. The effect of 
these, combined with the evolution of more critical, context-based 
research, has been to ask fundamental questions of the assumptions 
on which UK planning has been based. There has persisted during 
this period an "ideology of leisure" (Cranz 1982) to the extent 
that ;
(a) there was a belief in the continued growth of leisure time, 
affluence, mobility and population which would produce 
"mass" demand for leisure facilities, especially in 
countryside locations;
(b) US leisure patterns, and economic and social trends, would be
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repeated in the UK;
(c) "sensitive" locations had to be safeguarded by deflecting 
recreation pressures to accessible, multi-purpose recreation 
centres, based on a hierarchy of provision at different 
spatial scales;
(d) there was a focus on supply-led provision to meet a perceived 
"burgeoning demand".
This was an "ideology" in the sense that leisure provision has been 
based on beliefs rather than research knowledge. As Roberts suggests
The leisure concept is analytically arid but
ideologically potent. (p.113)
7• Conclusion
The evolution of recreation planning in the UK since 1945 can 
be summarised as;
(i) a dependence, up until the mid-1970's at least, on research 
and ideas imported from North America, based on the premise 
that the assumptions upon which US provision was based held 
good for a UK planning context. These assumptions proved
to be (a) ill-founded, since trend projections in the US did 
not materialise to the same extent in the UK, and (b) ill- 
suited to a land-use context where the impact on land and 
ecology required stricter controls;
(ii)provision based on ascending spatial scales, ie at local, 
regional and national level, and an attempt to utilise 
recreation provision as a means of directing pressures away 
from sensitive landscapes;
(iii)a focus on the affluent, mobile, active and middle/upper 
income earners, to the detriment of the poorer sections of 
the population, reliant upon public transport, and generally 
able to participate only at the local level of provision;
(iv)ad hoc and pragmatic in its application, (eg the country
park idea underwent radical reformulation following experience 
with the early parks);
(v) the central role of national government policy, agencies and 
financial resources;
(vi)an over-reaction to what was perceived in the 1960’s as
a "wave" of mass leisure demand which had to be satisfied 
primarily in the form of comprehensive, multi-purpose, 
indoor and outdoor leisure facilities;
(vii)changing conceptions of the nature of leisure, with 
implications for future provision - away from leisure as the 
residue of working hours and as a unitary phenomenon, towards 
leisure as intertwined with the life-cycle (producing 
different needs at different stages);
(viii)a lack of articulation between an understanding of leisure 
and planning for it. "Needs"assessments have been a 
misnomer, but have had emotive appeal to practitioners and 
politicians.
8. Country Parks in Scotland
The centrepiece of the 1967 Act was the country park. The whole 
concept stemmed from the "urgent need" to provide adequate facilities 
for open-air recreation in the countryside in order to meet growing 
demand from the towns. Section 48 of the Act defined a country park 
as I
A park or pleasure ground in the countryside which 
by reason of its position in relation to major 
concentrations of population affords convenient 
opportunities to the public for enjoyment of the 
countryside or open-air.
Unlike the 1949 Act, the country park was based on a promotional 
view of the countryside - on the "honeypot" principle, ie deflecting 
mass, car-borne recreationists into locations where they could be 
controlled, and thereby reducing pressure on more sensitive landscapes 
and farmland. The new Countryside Commission's first priority was 
to promote country parks, and to encourage local authorities to take 
advantage of the new grant-aid arrangements for countryside facilities, 
The combination of the 1967 Act with the new local authority powers 
provided in the 1967 Civic Amenities Act, the 1969 Town and Country 
Planning Act, and the 1969 Development of Tourism Act, marked a new 
focus of government activity in countryside recreation planning.
During this period, an enhanced countryside lobby emerged with the 
formation of the Scottish Wildlife Trust in 1964, and the Scottish
Civic Trust and Scottish Countryside Activities Council (a consumers' 
group), in 1967. At the same time, the Nature Conservancy, established 
under the 1949 Act, became part of the Natural Environment Research 
Council, and began to turn attention to the growing demand for outdoor 
recreation.
The priority country parks in the years immediately following 
1967 were those which involved the creation of recreation facilities 
out of derelict land (Countryside in 1970 Conference, 1970). The 
first Scottish country parks were to be designated in the early 
1970's at Muirshiel, Culzean and Palacerigg. However, at the time 
of the Commission's establishment in early 1968, the Strathclyde 
Park proposals were the most advanced, and were immediately seen by 
the Scottish Office as the kind of pioneering proposals the Commission 
was set up to promote, involving as it did the creation of major 
countryside recreation facilities out of a derelict landscape, and 
addressed to a regional scale of demand. Strathclyde Park provided 
an early and convenient test-bed for new recreational concepts, the 
establishment of criteria for grant-aid, and a working example of 
central-local, intercorporate action.
The Commission soon set the whole country park concept within 
a wider recreation strategy, and in the early 1970's set out the 
three main functions of country parks (Select Committee on Scottish 
Affairs 1972-73);
(a) to provide, within a parkland system for Scotland, a 
variety of convenient areas in each of which people can 
enjoy a wide range of open-air leisure pursuits, both passive 
and active, with or without charge, in pleasant rural 
surroundings;
(b) to ease pressure of public use on vulnerable scenic and 
wildlife areas and high quality farmland and woodland, and 
thereby reduce the risk of damage to them;
(c) to help towards a better understanding of the need for 
conservation through a planned and controlled use of the 
countryside for leisure pursuits, and by including, where 
applicable, an interpretive function for the town dweller to 
appreciate countryside and the point of view of the 
countryman.
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Country parks therefore emerged from a gestation period during
the late I960's/early 1970's with a range of functions, including the
provision of new recreational opportunities, the reduction of
pressures elsewhere, and the education of the visitor. Ihe focus of
grant-aid, unlike the Regional Parks proposed under the 1981
Countryside Act, has been on the establishment of country parks
rather than their management or operation. By 1980, the Commission
felt able to state that;
Country parks now represent a significant element
in the developing system of countryside recreational
proyision in Scotland. (Countryside Commission 1980, foreword)
No evaluations of country parks as a whole have been under­
taken since their inception, although surveys have been undertaken 
on the use of individual parks (Amott et al, 1973 ), Country parks 
were introduced during a time of developing momentum in countryside 
recreation provision, and at a time when demand for recreational 
facilities was generally viewed as growing exponentially. In Scotland 
in particular, they were regarded almost as a substitute for the failure 
to establish National Parks, which had been introduced in England 
and Wales 20 years earlier. The 1967 Act was something of an attempt 
to catch up on ground lost in the Scottish emasculation of the 1949
Act. This may partly explain the speed and enthusiasm with which
central and local government action proceeded on the implementation 
of country parks in Scotland.
Nine Scottish country parks had preceded the designation of
Strathclyde Park in 1978. Their momentum (nationally) has been
sustained more by grant-aid and ideological commitment than by any
clear evidence of demand. The variety of ways in which country parks
have been justified may be evidence of a lack of clarity of
objectives and the lack of precision in policy:
The imprecision surrounding the term "need" has 
not made the development of a coherent policy on
country parks any easier, and may have been used
as a convenient means to by-pass rigorous thought. (Slee 198 2, p.4)
Studies that have been undertaken of the use of country parks 
suggest that they cater for a "specialised and privileged clientele" 
(Arnott et al, 1930). The socio-economic profiles of the users of 
visitor centres, for example, are markedly different from those of 
the population as a whole. Implicit in much of the thinking of the
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country park idea, and in the ideology which produced and sustained
it, is the belief in mass recreation in the countryside. Country
parks purportedly offered a type of facility wherein these mass demands
could be concentrated and effectively managed;
However, country parks have not satisfied mass
demands and it is debatable whether these demands
ever existed. (Slee 1932, p.3)
Duffield and Owen (1970) had, even earlier, gone as far as to
suggest that:
Despite the fact that the concept of the country 
park was embodied in the..(Act)..there are still 
doubts as to what constitutes a Country Park, what 
function it should serve, and what facilities it 
should contain. (p.57)
It could be argued that the challenges of the 1970's have been 
the creation of country parks, whereas the challenges of the 1980's 
are becoming the maintenance and adaptation of country parks to meet 
changing circumstances. In stark contrast to the 1960's and 1970's, 
these challenges must be met in an economic and political environment 
which, if not hostile to country park philosophy, certainly offers 
no significant encouragement.
It is perhaps significant that it was not until 1980 that the 
Countryside Commission was able to produce a coherent policy for 
country parks in Scotland (Countryside Commission 1980), based on 
the principles of cost-effectiveness and evidence of demand. Clearly 
the Commission has learned from experience of a trial-and-error 
nature in the development of country parks in particular and country­
side recreational opportunités in general.
Both at the detailed design stage of Strathclyde Park, and 
during construction, when it was attracting substantial grant-aid, 
there was no clear conception of the scope and purpose of a country 
park in detail, and no policy context or strategy for the disbursement 
of grant-aid. Although Strathclyde Park was developed during a 
policy and information vacuum, this was of some benefit to the speed 
of the construction programme following completion of the land 
reclamation works. Overall, as a country park, the development of 
Strathclyde Park has been influenced by a number of factors deriving 
from the evolving nature of recreation and leisure policy;
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(i) the prevailing ideology of leisure, imported from the US in 
the 1960's, led to the assimilation in the Park design of 
unquestioned assumptions about continued growth in 
population, income and mobility, and the supply-led nature 
of demand;
(ii)these factors not only influenced the Park designers, but 
also pervaded Government policy and recreation research 
throughout the late 1960's and early 1970's;
(iii)developed during a period of immaturity in leisure concepts 
and policies, and coincident with the introduction of the 
1967 Act, the Park was seized by Government as a prototypical 
scheme by which ambitious but ill-thought out ideas about 
large-scale recreation provision could be promulgated;
(iv)whilst the Park to some extent fed off these influences, the 
major social and economic changes of the mid-1970's, coupled 
with emerging evaluations of leisure policy, a new focus on 
cost-effectiveness in times of severe financial restraint, 
and a new administrative framework after 19 7 5, combined to 
begin to question the basic assumptions and objectives 
behind the Park proposals, and led to a severe curtailment 
of further Park expansion after 1978.
In conclusion, it could be said that Strathclyde Park, like 
many other contemporary recreation achernes, was to some extent a 
victim of changing circumstances - conceived in affluence, born in 
uncertainty, and ended in austerity. Figure 11 lists, in 
chronological order, the main events in the development of planning 
for leisure and recreation since 1945.
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THE CONTEXT FOR ACTION (3): 
CONCLUSION
1. Introduction
The main periods of the evolution and implementation of 
Strathclyde Park coincide with phases of intense Government activity 
in regional economic planning, and in planning for leisure and 
recreation. Figure 12 attempts to illustrate, in simplified form, 
the major interrelationships between the regional and recreation 
planning contexts, and park development. The schematic representation 
of these interrelationships cannot be exhaustive since (i) a schema 
is, by definition, a simplification of a subjective reality, and (ii) 
complex and dynamic policy processes are not amenable to exactitude 
in terras of the expression of direct causal linkages. However, the 
diagram is useful as an aid to clarifying and understanding the main 
influences of the external planning context on the development process 
in this instance, prior to the detailed analysis in the following 
chapters, (which focus on the internal characteristics of the Park’s 
evolution and development
As Figure 12 illustrates, the development of Strathclyde Park 
can be considered on the basis of three, broadly distinct, phases in 
which regional development and national recreation policies converge 
to stimulate or constrain the scope for action. These three phases 
are linked by intervening periods of uncertainty as to the future 
progress and direction of the development, but for contrasting 
reasons.
2. Phase 1 ; The Launch
The launch of proposals for a "Middle Clyde Regional Park" 
was stimulated by an eagerness in Government to make up for the 
period of relative inactivity in (a) regional planning, following 
the first regional surveys and plans in the early 1940’s and 19 50’s,
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and (b) planning for recreation and leisure, interest in which began 
to develop in the 1930*s, but which, as a policy area, was relegated 
in the enthusiasm for post-war reconstruction.
Although conceived in the 1946 Clyde Valley proposals, the 
regional park idea at that time had no means of implementation.
Indeed, the immediately "successful" parts of the plan, in terms of 
implemehtatioti were those that fitted the prevailing circumstances 
of the late 1940*s and 19 50's, namely slum clearance and rehousing, 
and population and industrial dispersal. Until the 1960*s, there 
was no locus for initiatives in the provision of regional or country 
parks, since until then (i) recreation planning was not a Government 
priority, hence (ii) there was no policy guidance for local action, 
nor any financial incentive, and (iii) they were not "ideas in good 
currency" (Schon, 1971).
An examination of the context for action at Strathclyde Park 
suggests that, whilst the Clyde Valley Plan team were the progenitors, 
the catalyst for action came from central government planners eager 
to demonstrate the role of the newly-formed Scottish Development 
Department and carry through the physical implications of regional 
development priorities in central Scotland. The period of the late 
1960's saw the launch of and initial planning studies for the Middle 
Clyde Regional Park, against the backcloth of considerable central 
government activity in exhorting local action and initiative in 
physical and industrial renewal in support of, firstly, the 1963 
White Paper (in which North Lanarkshire was identified,with the New 
Towns, as a growth area), and secondly, the 19 66 White Paper, in which 
the Park proposals were hailed as a pioneering approach in this 
respect. Also during this period, there was a growing momentum for 
national and local responses to a perceived growth in demand for 
recreation in the countryside. The advocacy of a Scottish countryside 
planning agency, following the deliberations of the second 
"Countryside in 1970" conference, emerged in tandem with the initial 
lobbying of the conference by SDD planners in support of their 
Middle Clyde Park initiative. This initial relationship continued 
through the early years of the Countryside Commission, during which 
the Park became a major preoccupation.
Phase 1 culminated in the 1967 park proposals. Since these 
locally-inspired proposals considerably overstepped SDD's outline
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thoughts on the level of action required, a period of reappraisal 
followed whilst the financial feasibility of the proposals was 
considered through the Technical Working Party of central and local 
government officials. This period also marked a consolidation of 
activity in countryside policy following (a) the enactment of the 
Countryside Act and the establishment of the Countryside Commission, 
and (b) the IVhite Papers and the establishment of the organisational 
and financial frameworks for their implementation.
3. Phase 2 ; Action
The main elements of the Park as it exists today were 
constructed during the period 1973-76. The approval by SDD of revised 
proposals for Stage 1 coincided with an upsurge in interest in 
planning for sport, as opposed to the previous emphasis on planning 
for passive forms of recreation. The Scottish Sports Council was 
established in 1972 to promote such provision, followed by the 
national campaign "Recreation for All". Although external events 
such as the first OPEC oil crisis in 1973, industrial action at home 
(the miners' strike and the three-day week of 1973-74), and a 
reappraisal of Scottish land-use policies (culminating in a critical 
report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Scottish Affairs 
1972-73), sufficient momentum in terms of detailed planning, financial 
resources, and political commitment meant that park construction 
commenced during a generally hostile period for large-scale capital 
projects (especially those with a low financial return), with a 
quadrupling of oil prices setting off a period of accelerating inflation 
and rising unemployment. By the start of construction in summer 1973, 
SDD was reluctant to sanction development proposals beyond a 
curtailed Stage 1.
This financial uncertainity following Phase 2 was fuelled by 
uncertainties as to the future management of the park during a period 
of public debate as to the details of the new local government 
structure following the recommendations of the Wheatley Report (Royal 
Commission, 1969). Tire rapidly-changing political and financial 
contexts for large-scale public sector development meant that 
consideration of the further development of the park was being conducted 
in circumstances radically different from those in which the park was
— 98 —
launched.
4. Phase 3 ; Changing Directions
The period from the late 1970's witnessed a continuing growth 
in interest and provision for leisure and recreation, but against 
a background of decline in regional policy and increasing financial 
stringency on the development initiatives of local authorities. In 
this changed planning climate, there has been substantially less 
scope for providing and expanding projects which are capital- 
intensive in their consumption of resources, and which are not 
directly related to economic development.
The rapid inflation of the 1970's, which contributed to a 
substantial escalation in the development costs of the park, together 
with new regional planning priorities as articulated In Strathclyde 
Regional Council's 1976 Regional Report and subsequent strategies, 
have served to severely curtail ambitions for further park 
development. The reduction in regional development initiatives was 
linked to a re-emergence of interest in inner cities, as expressed in 
the 1977 White Paper and DOE action-research projects. In addition, 
the refinement of policies for recreation and the countryside clearly 
indicated that the style of development of Strathclyde Park was at 
variance with revised conceptions of country and regional parks, and 
new priorities in the deployment of the Scottish countryside budget, 
as defined by the Countryside Commission. .
In the wake of these policy changes, financial stringency 
and the findings of the Stodart Committee of Inquiry (1981) and the 
subsequent Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Act 1982, the 
administrative and development future of the park remains uncertain.
As an initiative, Strathclyde Park largely owes its launch to 
a convergence of policy issues and an enthusiasm for new approaches 
in the 1960's, fuelled by a favourable investment climate and general 
expectations of continued economic growth. This climate was severely 
curtailed from the early 1970's by a combination of externally- 
imposed financial stringency, new policy priorities, and a revised 
structure of local administration which expunged the political support
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which had underwritten the park's momentum.
In 198 4 Strathclyde Park, although a Regional Council 
responsibility, has no clear role In that Council's development 
strategies, and is not referred to in the approved structure plan, nor 
its second'review. In the wake of new initiatives in the North 
Lanarkshire Area by the Scottish Development Agency (now established 
as the principal tool of regional development) the future development 
of the park would appear to be dependent upon the injection of 
private sector capital (Drivers Jonas, 198 3) which, although 
anticipated in the early park proposals, has yet to materialise.
CHAPTER VI
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (1): 
INTENTIONS
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (1): 
INTENTIONS
1• Introduction
This chapter and the three that follow draw on the theoretical 
discussion in chapter 1 in attempting to interpret and explain the 
development of Strathclyde Park as set out in chapters 2-5. This is 
undertaken by considering the outputs of the planning processes 
leading to the creation of the park, comparing them with the outputs 
intended, and attempting to account for any differences - what Dunsire 
(1973) has termed "the implementation gap”. In this way, these 
chapters seek to identify:
(a) the intentions of the various participants, and how and why 
these varied both between participants and over time;
(b) the means employed to translate intentions into deeds, the 
reasons underlying their selection, leading to an 
identification of the preferred planning style, focusing in 
particular on the procedural context, the plans prepared, 
and the organisational arrangements constructed;
(c) the processes generated by the procedural and organisational 
contexts and the overall planning context, and how these 
varied during each "phase" of the development;
(d) the outputs of these processes, focusing on the implementation 
gaps between intentions and achievements, and the underlying 
reasons•
The construction of Strathclyde Park depended upon a coalition 
of diverse and often conflicting interests and, from the outset at 
least, it was important that there was broad agreement as to the 
action required, and for which financial resources would be provided. 
This broad unanimity prevailed during the political/technical debate 
about the content of the park but the fragile consensus began to 
fragment during park construction, and in negotiations over subsequent 
stages, which were conducted during a period of transition in (a) 
attitudes to regional planning, and (b) the economic and political
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contexts* The reasons for this fragmentation are partly explained 
by the changing attitudes and intentions of key participants in the 
project, particularly in the wake of the 19 67 proposals. The next 
section attempts to identify the implications of these attitudinal 
changes by focusing on the aims of each of the main participants in 
turn.
2. Scottish Development Department
Up until the early 1960's responsibility for local government 
and toï-m and country planning in the Scottish Office rested with the 
Scottish Health Department. However, on the rising tide of regional 
policy, a reorganisation saw the physical planning, engineering and 
infrastructure interests combined in a new Scottish Development 
Department, established in 1962 to facilitate "the promotion and 
coordination of economic and industrial policy in Scotland" (Scottish 
Council, 1961).
I'hilst a revived regional planning context provided the 
favourable conditions for the re-emergence of a number of erstwhile 
neglected proposals in the Clyde Valley Plan, including the Hamilton 
Low Parks project, and whilst the construction programme for the M74 
provided the initial impetus, it was the new SDD's initiative and 
lobbying, particularly of the local authorities, the North Lanarkshire 
Growth Area Committee, and Study Group 9 of the 1965 "Countryside in 
1970" conference, which provoked action. In later stages, it was to 
be SDD's lobbying within the Scottish Office and in Whitehall which 
was to ensure that the park project obtained the highest priority in 
order to justify the necessary Exchequer funds.
SDD saw the context for action in 1964 being provided by (a) 
the 1963 White Paper, in which the relationship between environmental 
conditions and the attraction of industry was articulated, and (b) 
the new interest in planning for recreation in the countryside, being 
debated at that time in the "Countryside in 1970" conferences. The 
emerging proposals for a Lee Valley Regional Park north of London 
(Civic Trust, 1964) provided a contemporary example of the potential 
for environmental change in North Lanarkshire.
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The M74 motorway was seen as "an arm of possible future
prosperity" (SDD, 1964),and presented the opportunity to examine the
whole condition, use and future of that part of the Clyde Valley
through which it runs and which, in the vicinity of the Hamilton Low
Parks, was regarded by SDD as :
A sort of "back yard" to the towns on either side,
occupied by refuse tips, sewage works, flooded land, 
derelict houses, bings...the centres of population 
turning their backs on the scene they have permitted, 
if not actually created. _ (SDD, 1964a,p.1)
SDD saw the implementation of the proposal in the Clyde Valley
Plan for a regional recreation centre as an opportunity to coordinate
land uses in the area, and to undertake a large-scale rehabilitation
of a despoiled part of the Clyde valley;
The construction of the motorway, with the extensive 
earth movements which this will involve, provides 
an opportunity not only for the landscaping of its 
immediate environs, but for an integrated 
rehabilitation scheme for this,whole stretch of 
the valley. This scheme would eliminate the 
legacy of past industrial exploitation which serves 
as a brake on the attraction of the new enterprise 
which is necessary for future prosperity. It would 
also turn the valley into a positive asset to the 
area and enable a high standard of recreational 
facilities to be provided for the substantial 
population of the surrounding built-up areas.
(SDD, 1964 b, p.l)
SDD’s initial aims were therefore (a) land rehabilitation to
improve the appearance of the landscape from the motorway, and 
thereby to improve the investment "image" of the area, and (b) 
provision of new recreational facilities for a large urban 
population, linked to a network of footpaths and other facilities 
north and south of the park focus. At this time, the formation of an 
artificial loch was seen as expedient given (i) the low-lying and 
flooded nature of much of the land, and (ii) the general view then 
prevalent that a stretch of water provides a positive recreational 
asset.
With the establishment in 1965 of a joint committee of the local 
authorities involved to commission further studies into the 
feasibility of the project, the initiative for further action then 
passed to them. SDD continued to be involved, but its role changed 
to that of (i) a financial controller on the ambitions of the joint
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committee for major developments through regulating borrowing consent 
and fixing the items to be considered for grant aid under the 1966 
and 1967 Acts, and (ii) as advocate for the scheme in discussions 
nationally with the Treasury for the allocation of funds.
Whilst SDD continued to ensure that the park scheme occupied a 
high profile in Government thinking of ways in which physical planning 
could assist in the achievement of economic planning objectives (most 
notably through specific reference to the scheme in the 1966 IVhite 
Paper), after 1967 (when the local authorities produced detailed 
proposals for a regional park) some modification began to take place 
in its view as to what action was desirable in the middle Clyde valley 
in the circumstances.
SDD planners had no further direct involvement in the project
after the report of the Technical Working Party in 1970, followed by
the arrival of the Countryside Commission and detailed consideration
of the cost implications of the scheme. The initial aims and
enthusiasm could be said to be those of SDD planners, and may at
least partly explain the later modified attitude of the Scottish
Office, particularly with regard to Stage 2 of the 1967 proposals,
which were under consideration in 1974. The first reappraisal within
Scottish Office occurred in 1968, during early discussions of the
joint committee's 1967 proposals which SDD considered "too lavish".
Although SDD saw the scheme as "important" and "pioneering" and
"of a kind....which we hope will serve to stimulate other local
authorities" (SDD, 1968, p.2) SDD also felt that, in view of the
estimated costs, a "basic" scheme should be defined focusing on the
"essential" items, on the grounds that;
The amenities in the park must be designed with an 
eye to what is being provided elsewhere and to the 
likely demand. (SDD, 19 63, p.2)
By this time Scottish Office were beginning to regard costs as
more important than content, and this led even to a questioning of
the loch proposal in 1970. An early outcome of these scaled-down
objectives of Government was the formation in 1969 of a Technical
V/orking Party to set out the essential first stage works for the park,
their cost and their phasing since;
The scope of the scheme as a whole depended on the
extent to which the rehabilitation grant would be
payable. (Technical Working Party, 19 69, p.l)
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Nevertheless, the basic principle of rehabilitating the
landscape and providing recreational facilities continued to be
promulgated by SDD in discussions with the Treasury for the provision
of the necessary funds:
We feel that the importance of this project for 
the region itself and for Scotland as a whole is 
such that expenditure on it ought to be given as 
early a place as possible in the programmes for 
rehabilitation and country parks. (Butler, 1969)
I'/hilst seeking to promote (a) a landscape rehabilitation of the 
middle Clyde valley in accordance with regional policy objectives, 
and (b) a demonstration project for landscape reclamation and country 
park provision, the early SDD planning-orientated enthusiasm for a 
major recreation project was supplanted during the late 1960's by a 
finance-orientated concern to keep in check the ambitions of the local 
authorities. This conflict of interest between central and local 
government led to the political conflicts discussed later.
SDD wanted to see a start on their "basic" scheme, incorporating
the rowing course and most of Stage 1 of the 1967 proposals, without
giving any commitment to funding for subsequent stages:
Faced with the likely effects of the expenditure
for Stage 1 during a period of restriction on
public expenditure generally and in fairness to
other parts of Scotland we could not at this time
give any undertaking to commit countryside funds
to Stage 2. (Neilson, 1974)
SDD had by 19 74 become concerned at the consumption by 'Stage 1 ' 
(by then under construction) of a substantial proportion of the total 
funds available for the Scottish countryside programme, and the 
higher costs and longer construction period than had originally been 
provided for. By this time, the park project no longer occupied the 
priority nationally that it had done, and SDD's intentions focussed, 
on bringing to successful completion that part of the project already 
committed.
Between 1964 and 1974, the SDD view on the Strathclyde Park 
project changed considerably. In the initial stages, SDD planners 
took the initiative to encourage the local authorities'to think 
positively about the middle Clyde area, and then to work jointly to 
undertake the landscape and recreational improvements considered
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necessary. With the establishment of a joint committee of the local 
authorities involved to investigate the detailed feasibility of the 
scheme, and to prepare and carry out a plan, SDD planners effectively 
withdrew from any further direct involvement. Scottish Office interest 
thereafter focussed on financial control of the project. The SDD 
role had therefore changed from instigators to regulators, ie from a 
planning input to a financial and administrative unput. The different 
personnel involved, combined with a radically changed financial climate 
from the early 1970's, and the dissipation of the regional effort 
throughout the 1970's, served to significantly modify Government 
interest in and attitudes to the project as a whole and its further 
consumption of countryside funds.
3. Local Authorities
Prior to the approach by 'SDD in 1964 with its outline 
rehabilitation scheme the local authorities of Lanark County Council, 
Hamilton Town Council, and Motherwell and Wishaw To%vn Council had no 
positive intentions for the middle Clyde/Hamilton Low Parks area. The 
area was covered by three separate development plans: the Lanark 
County (Central Industrial Area) (Part) Development Plan 19 53 had 
zoned the middle Clyde valley outwith the burghs predominantly green 
belt, whilst it had an operational refuse tip at Bothwellhaugh; the 
Burgh of Hamilton Development Plan 19 53 comprised a number of zonings 
for 334 hectares within its boundary, including 50% as public and 
private open space and 37 hectares for refuse disposal; the Burgh of 
Motherwell and Wishaw Development Plan 1953 included 145 hectares of 
the park within its boundary, with 66% allocated for public and 
private open space. All three authorities operated sewage treatment 
plants in the area, whilst the Bothwellhaugh mine was operational 
until 19 53. There were no proposals for the development or 
improvement of the area in any of these plans.
The first approach by SDD to the local authorities suggesting 
landscape and recreational improvements in this part of the Clyde 
valley was made via a submission to meetings of the North Lanarkshire 
Growth Area Committee in November 1964 and January 1965. SDD 
recommended that the three local authorities involved should set up 
a joint planning committee to investigate the detailed feasibility
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of its outline scheme. Following that meeting, a joint committee 
of the three authorities was set up in February. Such joint 
arrangements to administer matters of common concern extending beyond 
the boundaries of individual authorities were not unknown, with 
similar joint committees existing at that time for police, fire and 
education.
The lack of any positive proposals by the local authorities up 
until the mid 1960's could be explained by reference to the general 
lack of local authority initiative in the fields of land reclamation 
and countryside recreation, partly due to à lack of expertise, but 
more importantly due to lack of funds for such a large-scale project 
of earth-moving, hydraulics and leisure provision. Local planning ' 
priorities generally at that time were directed at tackling housing 
problems and industrial obsolescence. The 19 60 Local Employment Act 
provided only limited grant aid for land rehabilitation, particularly 
where the after-use involved financially low-return developments 
such as recreation. The provisions of the 1966 Industrial Development 
Act significantly increased the levels of grant aid available for 
reclaiming derelict land, and a liberal interpretation by SDD of 
the definition of dereliction ensured that the necessary financial 
resources to tackle a project then estimated at £l million would be 
available. The 1967 Countryside Act introduced for the first time 
substantial grants for the provision of passive recreation facilities 
in the countryside, together with expertise in and advice on such 
matters from the Countryside Commission, whose officials began to take 
an active part in the Strathclyde Park project from early 1969.
Local authority aspirations for Strathclyde Park were founded 
upon the prior commitment of Government grant aid for land 
rehabilitation and countryside recreation. Without the prospect of 
such aid, it is unlikely that any initiative would have been taken 
at local authority level at that time. The initial loch feasibility 
study (Binnie and Partners, 1965), Ministerial meetings during the 
mid 1960*3, and the firm ideas contained in the 1967 proposals, 
generated full local authority commitment to the development of 
Strathclyde Park. The local politicians saw, in the prospect of 
substantial Government financial assistance, a major opportunity to 
transform a degraded landscape into a major recreational resource. 
Their receptive attitude to early approaches for a rowing course to be
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incorporated in the loch design derived from what they saw as the 
potential of such a unique international sporting facility to enhance 
the image of north Lanarkshire*
Of the three local authorities, Motherwell and Wishaw Town 
Council was the most enthusiastic towards the project, partly since it 
had most of the derelict land within its administrative boundary, 
and partly on account of the enthusiasm of its planning convener,
Bernard Scott, a highly motivated local politician who was to play a 
central role in the park development. Lanark County Council was not 
noted at the time for its initiatives in land rehabilitation (SDD, 1968), 
whilst most of the land affected by the park within the administration 
of Hamilton Town Council comprised neglected parkland and policies 
of the former Low Parks.
The local authorities had two primary motives in taking up 
SDD*s initiative: (i) the removal of dereliction, the considerable 
extent of which could only be tackled with the use of major financial 
resources, and (ii) the exploitation of what was seen as potentially 
a large population catchment afforded by the location of the park 
and its proximity to the M74 motorway. The ambition of the three 
local authorities was to create a regional park, and this conception 
was maintained by the joint committee up until 1975, and explains 
their ambitious 1967 proposals and the subsequent advocacy for their 
full realisation in the face of Scottish Office opposition and 
— nrestrictions on public expenditure during the 1970's.
A regional park, providing a recreational focal point for the 
Glasgow conurbation, was the joint committee's basic scheme, but 
they also wanted to improve the national and international image of 
north Lanarkshire, and the rowing course was regarded as the crucial 
component in this respect. Once their interest and commitment had 
been established, the aims of the local authorities coincided with 
initial SOD aims deriving from the wider concerns of regional policy, 
particularly the need to create environments attractive to mobile 
industry. Unlike SDD, the local authority view did not change 
substantially until 1975, with the arrival of Strathclyde Regional 
Council and its wider political interests and new leaders with other 
allegiances:
It is not often that you get the commitment from
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politicians that Strathclyde Park had at that 
time...They all had a personal commitment because 
the area was such a mess...They all wanted 
something to be done, and they saw this as an 
opportunity, politically, whereby practical 
implementation could in fact demonstrate that 
politicians not only just talk, they do things...
They were genuinely interested in providing
something for the community. (Reid, 1982)
The commitment-generating effects of planning processes 
described by Levin (1976) were broken by external means with the 
transfer of power and influence to new personnel in 1975. Strathclyde 
Regional Council quickly took up the challenge of the 1974 West 
Central Scotland Plan. The 1976 Regional Report outlined a strategy 
geared to addressing problems of unemployment, multiple deprivation 
and urban renewal. The whole approach to regional planning after 
1975 focussed on a range of priorities which relegated leisure and 
recreation, and countryside planning, to minor considerations. Although 
a Leisure and Recreation Committee with the former park chairman as 
convener was included in the new political structure, it was a 
political "lightweight" and administration of the park passed to a 
new Director of Leisure and Recreation, (although the post of Park 
Director was retained). The Regional Council's low priority for 
leisure and recreation, coupled with the uncertainity about the future 
of country parks under its administration, contributed to a decline 
in the park's development programme and to a major review of its 
expenditure in 1976. Effectively, there were no advocates of the 1967 
proposals in the face of general expenditure cutbacks. The former 
chairman remarked of the new regional administration, "they did not 
'know' the 1967 plan - they did not have the concept of it" (Scott, 
1983).
Before 1975, Strathclyde Park was the biggest project for the 
local authorities concerned. After 1975, it came to be seen in a 
much wider spatial and political context, and against a radically 
different financial and policy background.
4. The Consultants
Binnie and Partners were appointed consultant engineers to the 
Joint Committee in April 1965 to "ascertain by means of a hydraulic
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survey of the river Clyde whether the lake proposal is a practical 
proposition having particularly in mind the effect of carrying out 
such a proposal upstream and downstream of that point and the 
liabilities of the authorities concerned which might emerge therefrom' 
(Binnie and Partners, 1965).
The whole concept of tackling the degraded and subsided land 
in the form of a man-made loch hinged on surveys to assess the 
technical feasibility of this aspect. Binnie and Partners were 
appointed on the basis of previous commissions they had undertaken 
for Lanark County Council, specifically large scale hydrological 
projects such as dams and reservoirs. They were therefore well known 
to officials of the County Council, which had taken up the initiative 
provided by SDD's lead. The creation of a new loch, initially by 
damming and latterly by diverting the river Clyde, although 
apparently a logical solution to eradicating the mining subsidence in 
the Low Parks, had major technical implications for the whole river 
system, particularly since the park was to be situated in the flood 
plain of the river. Binnie's task was essentially to investigate 
the engineering feasibility of the project, assemble the technical 
analyses and data required, and report to the Joint Committee.
Binnie and Partners were unique among the consultants in being
involved in the park project from the early planning days of the mid
1960's through to construction and realisation in the mid 1970's.
Binnie handled all the detailed technical aspects relating to the
formation of the loch and the diversion of the river, and submitted
their preliminary report on the loch scheme to the Joint Committee
in April 1965. Whilst the loch was to be a fundamental feature of
any proposals, the same could not be said of the rowing course:
The provision of a 2000 metre rowing course to 
internationally approved dimensions (ie length, 
minimum depth and width, clearance at ends) is 
not an automatic by-product of rehabilitation of 
the Park area. Additional cost is incurred in its 
provision. (Binnie and Partners, 1971, p.2)
Binnie and Partners were largely unfettered in their analyses 
and advice to the Joint Committee, and there was very little conflict 
over these technical and engineering aspects. The initial proposal 
to dam the River Clyde was dropped in 1968 when studies commissioned 
at Strathclyde University indicated that this would cause high levels
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of sedimentation, requiring regular dredging to keep to within 
acceptable limits. It was then decided that the only alternative was 
to by-pass the Clyde and feed the loch from the South Calder Water. 
The effects of these engineering changes were expected in 1968 to 
increase the costs of the project by 10%, and led to a whole set of 
new problems concerning water quality.
1
At the outset of the investigations of the Joint Committee in 
1964-65, there were seen to be three alternatives to tackling the 
rehabilitation problem;
1. leave the area as "natural";
2. infill and grass over;
3. excavate to form a loch.
The last alternative was favoured by Binnie, on the basis that it 
was likely to be the cheaper solution.
In the view of one official of the Countryside Commission
closely involved with the project at that time, the consultant
engineers were given a free hand to manage the project, taking
engineering decisions without reference to the Joint Committee. In
his view, the result was additional costs without Committee approval:
There were occassions when the tail was wagging the 
dog, and others when the tail and the dog were 
nowhere near each other. (Cameron, 1982)
Binnie and Partners made perhaps the most significant 
contribution of the main consultants to the processes of Strathclyde 
Park. They undertook or supervised all the engineering aspects of 
the project, as well as the landscape aspects after 1971, and were
the leading advisers to the Joint Committee until the arrival of the
Park Director in 1973.
Binnie played a significant role in establishing the technical 
feasibility of the loch proposal, and in the final form of the park, 
with the loch divorced from the river Clyde by means of a by-pass 
channel which in itself was a major feat of engineering. However,
Binnies were not expert in the design of water facilities for
international rowing competition, and did not appreciate the exacting 
standards and design parameters. Consequently, they underestimated 
the costs of provision of such a course. As a result, there were 
radical reappraisals during construction, leading to significantly
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increased costs and a longer time-scole for construction. Reid (1982) 
considers that "the specialism just was not there at the time".
However, by the early 1970's the whole project had gainéd such 
momentum, during a favourable development climate, that it Is difficult 
to assess whether more accurate cost estimates would have led to the 
deletion of the rowing course from the park proposals. Hall (1980) 
has shown that substantial cost underestimating is a factor common 
to many large scale projects where new approaches and technologies 
are being pioneered, ie where there is a high degree of uncertainty 
as to their outcomes.
A.V. Montagu and Partners' were appointed architects, planning 
and landscape consultants to the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee in 
April 1967 "to report in general terms on the Clyde Valley from 
Garrion Bridge to downstream of Bothwell Bridge, and to make more 
detailed proposals within the Park area" (Montagu, 1967, p.l). A.V. 
Montagu was a small, London-based practice appointed largely on the 
basis of its previous working relationship with Binnie (it had 
provided architectural and landscaping input to some of Binnie*s 
engineering contracts). The major contribution Montagu made to the 
Strathclyde Park project was the 1967 report, in which credence was 
given to the ideas and aspirations of the local authorities. The 1967 
report provided the catalyst for subsequent central-local conflicts 
over the final form of the park.
Montagu saw the solution to the problems of the middle Clyde 
valley not in the form of an overall "plan", but as a "shopping list" 
of environmental and recreational improvements. The 1967 report 
contained no land use plan or other spatial form of presentation, yet 
this list, and the eclectic nature of the conceptions and assumptions 
underlying it, were vigorously pursued by the local authorities. This 
indicated that the report was less a fresh look at the area, and more 
of a cobbling together of ideas and earlier "bottom drawer" schemes, 
some, of which were subsequently shown to be poorly conceived. The 
estimated cost of £2,332,000, and its breakdown in Stage 1, was a 
substantial underestimate (as revealed during construction) and 
indicated Montagu's limited abilities to undertake such a major 
project.
Considerable pressure was put on Montagu over the period 1969- 
1971, during the deliberations of the Technical Working Party,
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and culminating in the revised 1971 proposals (Scott, 1983). In 
April 1971, Montagu's responsibilities for design, contracts and 
site supervision of landscaping were passed to Binnie, although they 
retained a role as general landscape consultants. In May 1972 
Montagu produced interim proposals for Stage 1 landscaping which 
were severely criticised by the Countryside Commission and the Nature 
Conservancy Council. At its meeting of 5th November 19 73 the Joint 
Committee accepted Montagu's resignation and appointed as replacement 
landscape consultants William Gillespie and Associates. Montagu et. al. 
were to‘remain as architectural consultants, but this role also ceased 
in 1975 with the resignation from the practice of the principal member 
responsible for much of the design work on the park buildings. By 
a combination of internal problems in the practice, and a generally 
poor standard of landscape advice (no member of the practice was a 
landscape architect) Montagu's role in the Strathclyde Park project 
began to diminish after 1971, and ceased altogether after 1975.
William Gillespie and Associates were appointed in November 
1973, and in May 1974 prepared their Landscape Master Plan for the 
park (Gillespie, 1974). This plan was instrumental in establishing 
the landscape framework which has been a major success of the park.
The landscape treatment of the area was regarded as a crucial factor 
in the success of the rehabilitation and recreational proposals, and 
this was the motivation behind Gillespie's appointment.
A large part of the overall concept for the design of the park 
had been firmly established prior to Gillespie's appointment. The 
contract for Stage 1 had been in progress for some months, and 
consequently Gillespie had to accept many of the basic design concepts, 
and weld these together within the existing and proposed park 
landscape. They had to focus from the outset on land form, footpaths, 
the treatment to the loch shore and planting in order to avoid hold­
ups in the contract. A requirement of the detailed brief prepared 
by the Park Director was the production of a comprehensive landscape 
policy map, and a master plan which Gillespie saw as:
Essential in order that landscape, engineering and 
architectural features can be satisfactorily 
interrelated within the Park. (Gillespie, 1974, p.l)
Unlike the Montagu proposals, Gillespie's master plan outlined 
proposals based on nine major habitat areas of the park, and included
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costs and phasing. Thus Gillespie brought a rigour and rationality 
to the Strathclyde Park project through the preparation of a 
detailed and comprehensive plan for the treatment of the landscape, 
as well as the design of the loch shore, car parking areas and the 
fobtpath system. Gillespie's major influence on the project was 
therefore the master plan and associated woodland management proposals 
which were regarded as solving:
The various competing design and management concepts
for the Park. (Gillespie, 1974, p.l)
At the outset of detailed planning for the Strathclyde Park 
project in the mid 1960's, none of the three local authorities 
responsible for bringing the park idea to fruition had the detailed 
technical advice at its disposal within the ranks of its own 
officials. The creation of the loch was a major engineering task 
which demanded detailed investigation prior to detailed planning of 
the form and content of the park. Each of the main consultants played 
a crucial role in influencing the output of the park project. Binnie's 
was perhaps the most significant contribution, as they were the only 
consultants involved throughout the feasibility, design and 
construction stages. The form of the loch was based on Binnie's 
advice, and it was largely left to them to resolve the major hydraulic 
problem involved in diverting the river Clyde and forming the loch, 
with the exacting standards required for the rowing course.
Montagu's major contribution was the 1967 proposals, which 
articulated the local authorities' aspirations for the park and middle 
Clyde valley area, although these led to major conflicts at political 
and professional levels with central government. Certainly, Scott (1983) 
evaluates the achievements of the whole Strathclyde Park process 
against the 1967 proposals. Yet implementation subsequently revealed 
the inadequacies of the planning stages, since much of, the basis for 
the cost estimates of the landscaping and recreation facilities was 
subsequently revealed to be inaccurate. It was only with the 
provision by Gillespie of a plan for the landscaping of the whole 
park area that some order was brought to the project, and this plan 
was Gillespie's major contribution and influence. The plan was 
prepared during the construction of Stage 1, in association with the 
Park Director, Binnie, and the Countryside Commission, and involved 
much reappraisal and redesign of detailed aspects (such as car parks)*
It also included new proposals which had not previously been
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considered (including edge treatment of the loch).
Each of the main consultants had different characteristics, 
were involved with different aspects of the park, at different stages 
in the project, and therefore it is difficult to sum up the role and 
influence of consultants as a whole: different consultants brought 
different abilities and perspectives to bear, with correspondingly 
different results. However, what they did have in common in the case 
of Strathclyde Park were (a) a technical expertise lacking within 
the ranks of the local authorities; and (b) an interdisciplinary 
and multi-organisational perspective.
5. Government Agencies
Following the establishment of the Countryside Commission for 
Scotland in 19 63, the Nature Conservancy Council and a reconstituted 
Scottish Sports Council in 1972, these Government agencies, with
their grant-aiding powers and specialist knowledge, immediately began
to play an active role in the refinement and implementation of the 
park proposals.
Part I of the Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967 established a 
Countryside Commission for Scotland with a general remit to keep 
under review all matters relating to (a) the provision, development 
and improvement of facilities for the enjoyment of the countryside,
(b) the conservation and enhancement of its natural beauty and amenity, 
and (c) the need to secure public access to the countryside for the 
purposes of open-air recreation. In particular, sections 5 and 6 
of the Act charged the Commission to become involved in development 
projects which (i) involved the application of new or developed 
methods, concepts or techniques, and (ii) were designed to illustrate 
the appropriateness of a project to that area or to other areas with 
similar problems. In addition to these specific tasks. Part IV of 
the Act provided powers for local authorities to establish country 
parks, countryside accommodation such as camping sites, and to make 
bye-laws and appoint wardens for certain areas of land, parks or 
waterways. Part V provided grants to local authorities of up to 75% 
of expenditure Incurred in "designated countryside" within the 
purposes of the Act.
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V/ith the appointment of Commissioners and officials from early 
1969, charged with a new and untried remit, the Strathclyde Park 
proposal was already at an advanced planning stage, and immediately 
became the Commission's early priority. Its objectives coincided with 
the new Act, the country park concept, and the remit of the Commission 
(SDD, 1963). The concept of the country park stemmed from a 
perception in the mid 1960's of the "urgent need" to provide for 
townspeople in concentrations of population adequate facilities for 
open air recreation in the countryside. The 1967 Act laid a duty on 
local planning authorities to assess need in their areas, and for 
the Countryside Commission to pay particular regard to this aspect of 
recreational and amenity planning. Whilst section 43 of the Act 
provided what could be regarded at the time as a working definition 
of a country park, in the late 1960's and early 1970's there was no 
clear conception of what a country park was in practice (Duffield and 
Owen, 1970). There appeared, therefore, to be little conflict of 
interest between the Commission and the local authorities when the 
Commission suggested that Strathclyde Park should be termed a "country 
park", although the local authorities continued to regard the park 
as having a regional focus. It was not until the 1931 Countryside 
Act that separate definitions and roles for country parks and regional 
parks were articulated.
The Commission's initial objectives for Strathclyde Park, within 
the framework of the 1967 Act, were (Cameron, 1982):
1. conservation: protection of the nature reserve and the natural 
woodland;
2. rehabilitation of the landscape;
3. provision of recreational facilities for a deprived area.
Although the 1967 proposals for the park had already been 
prepared, and advanced discussions between central and local government 
had already taken place before the Commission's establishment, there­
after Commission officials played a central role through (a) advising 
on general landscape matters, and (b) influencing the style of the 
development. Hie Countryside Commission became involved in the park 
proposals automatically and inevitably, since the whole project 
developed out of a Scottish Office initiative. It should also be 
noted that proposals for the development of the park were evolving 
coincidentally with the campaign in the early 1960's for the
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establishment of a Countryside Commission for Scotland.
Whilst the 19 67 Act provided a remit for the Commission and 
a working definition of a country park, it was not until the mid 
1970's that the Commission began to develop a countryside recreation 
policy framework (Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974), Between 
the late 1960's and the mid 1970's therefore, there was no firm policy 
context for Scottish countryside planning other than ideas imported 
from abroad, and the "Countryside in 1970" conferences. The early 
initiative of Strathclyde Park therefore provided a test bed for 
recreational ideas, and perhaps had more influence on the development 
of the Commission's policies and objectives than vice-versa.
The early aims of the Countryside Commission for Strathclyde 
Park were very much the aims of SDD planners, since the Commission 
was pitched into the detailed planning and implementation of the 
modified 1967 proposals from the outset. Strathclyde Park provided 
a learning experience for the embryo Commission, whilst its 
involvement assisted in bringing the park idea to practical reality, 
particularly concerning the detailed design of the landscape and the 
passive recreational facilities.
The criticisms of country parks generally articulated by Slee 
(1932) are directed at the process by which countryside recreation 
policies have emerged, in particular the early policy vacuum and 
the imprecision of the country park concept. The changing aims of 
countryside recreation policy in general, as stated by the Country­
side Commission from the mid 1970's, have influenced the fate of 
Strathclyde Park. Whilst these aims did not alter significantly 
during the construction of Stage 1, their subsequent reformulation 
(Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1930) has served to reduce the 
prospects for the further development of the park.
At the time of construction, Strathclyde Park was consuming 
most of the Scottish countryside budget (Scott, 1933; Cameron, 1982) 
primarily due to the advocacy of the park members and officials. To 
date, the Commission has contributed £3,200,000 in grant aid for the 
park's countryside facilities. The Strathclyde Park experience, 
together with the other early parks, has assisted in the clarification 
of countryside recreation planning objectives, and has also clarified
-117-
the role of the Countryside Commission in their achievement.
By the time that construction had begun on the park, the 
Countryside Commission had indent!fied three main functions of a 
country park;
(i) the provision of a convenient area, in a rural location and 
within a parkland system for Scotland, where people can 
enjoy a wide range of open air leisure pursuits;
(ii) as a means of reducing recreational pressures on high quality 
farmland and in vulnerable scenic and wildlife areas;
(iii) to assist in the improvement of education in conservation.
(Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, 1972, pll9)
By 1974, the Commission had formulated these objectives into 
its "Park System for Scotland". By 1981, sufficient clarity had 
been brought to the parkland concept to separate the roles and 
functions of country parks from regional parks in the 1981 Country­
side Act. Cameron (1982) suggests that, initially, Strathclyde Park 
was not considered country park material, and certainly there were 
disagreements within SDD during the formative stages of the park 
proposals. Cameron also suggests that the experience of Strathclyde 
Park changed the Commission's ideas about countryside recreational 
provision, particularly with regard to the potential of urban fringe 
areas:
Countryside recreation is wherever a countryside 
experience can be found. In the case of 
Strathclyde Park, this countryside experience 
was created. (Cameron, 198 2)
In the view of at least one senior official, therefore, the 
park experience changed, to some extent. Commission policy to give 
preference to recreation schemes in the urban fringe.
The Scottish Sports Council was established in 1972 by Royal 
Charter with the objects of "fostering the knowledge and practice 
of sport and physical recreation among the public at large and the 
provision of facilities therefor" (SDD, 1975). Like the Countryside 
Commission its members are appointed by the Secretary of State and 
serve as individuals rather than in representative capacities. The 
Council identifies its main role as being to encourage people to take 
part in some form of sport or physical recreation and to provide or
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assist in the provision of opportunities to enable them to do so.
Sports interests first became involved in the Strathclyde Park 
proposals in January 1967, through the predessor organisation, the 
Scottish Council for Physical Recreation (SCPR). SCPR had links with 
water sports interests, and followed up the proposed mile-long loch 
and water sports centre by suggesting to the local authorities the 
provision of a rowing and canoeing course to international standard, 
since there were no such facilities in Scotland at that time.
According to one senior official of the Sports Council (Davies, 1983), 
the international rowing course derived from one member of SCPR, who 
also happened to be a member of the Scottish Amateur Rowing 
Association (SARA), learning in the mid 1960's of the middle Clyde 
park proposal "on the grapevine", and suggesting SCPR capitalise on 
the opportunity to provide a rowing and canoeing centre to a 
standard capable of attracting international competition.
By the time the Scottish Sports Council was established, the 
main elements of Stage 1 of the park had been defined, and the 
construction period was soon to commence. Like the Countryside * 
Commission, this was the new Sports Council's first major project, 
and it participated in its planning and development on two levels:
(i) grant-aiding those aspects of the park's facilities intended for 
international competition and national training, and (ii) advising 
on the design and provision of other facilities for sport or other 
active recreation, such as sports pitches, golf courses, equipment 
storage. From autumn 1973, the Sports Council began to make financial 
contributions in the form of grant aid for the rowing and canoeing 
course, and for associated facilities.
In addition to advising on sports facilities, the Council 
played an influential role, in the form of its predecessors the SCPR, 
in the formative stages of the park plan, advocating, in concert with 
water sports interests, the adaptation of the loch element of SDD's 
outline plan to include a rowing and canoeing course to international 
standard. In this respect, SSC/SCPR were taking advantage of a 
large scale engineering project, which was to have a mile-long man- 
made loch as its focus, to provide a catalytic facility for rowing 
and canoeing, and thereby to aid the development of such watersports 
in Scotland. Over the period of evolution and implementation of the
-119-
park proposals, SSC has not shifted in attitude or intention, whereby 
its objectives for the park hove been on two levels (Davies, 1932):
(i) provision of advice and, where appropriate, grant-aid for the 
provision of sports facilities in accordance with the terms 
of the Sports Council Charter;
(ii)provision of a water sports centre for national training 
and international competition for rowing and canoeing.
There is evidence from 1974 that SSC was becoming concerned 
that active sports were tending to dominate the park, to the detriment 
of its country park role (SSC, 1974), whilst its latter objective 
remains unfulfilled pending the completion of the rowing and canoeing 
course to international standard. To date, SSC has contributed 
£300,000 to the development of the rowing course, and has allocated 
a further £40, 000 as a contribution to its completion.
WTiilst the rowing and canoeing centre has yet to stage 
international competitions, SSC regards it as providing a valuable 
national training facility, and it is well used by rowing and 
canoeing clubs. However^ such a facility did not have to be provided 
in a country park, nor in north Lanarkshire. The mere fact that 
major land rehabilitation, including the provision of a large, man- 
made loch, was proposed presented the opportunity at the time 
to provide such a facility. In these respects the water sports centre 
meets the Sports Council's objectives.
The Council did not play a leading role in the project, but has 
been dependent upon what one SSC official regards as the rigours of a 
local democratic process made more complex by the number of local 
authorities involved, presenting difficulties in the disbursement of 
its grant aid according to its capital programme (Davies, 1932).
The Nature Conservancy was established under the National Parks 
and Access to the Countryside 7ict 1949, and was one of the few 
provisions of that Act which applied to Scotland. It acquired some 
additional powers under the 1967 Countryside Act, and became the 
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) with the passing of the Nature 
Conservancy Council Act in 1973.
Prom the very early stages of the evolution of proposals for
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Etrathclyde Park, there was a strong nature conservation interest
with the colonisation of the ponds and wetlands (created by the
subsidence) by wildfowl and other fauna. This led to the designation
of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) in 1955, and a Bird
Sanctuary in 19 53, The early objective of the Nature Conservancy
was to safeguard the wildlife value of this area during consideration
of a Hamilton by-pass road in the 1950*s, which in the 1960's became
the 1174 motorway. Tlie Nature Conservancy officer with responsibility
for the area indicated in 1967 that, even then, there was a danger
of the wildlife interest being neglected in plans for the area;
There has been confusion and uncertainty in the 
minds of those with whom 1 have been dealing as 
to the area of the bird Sanctuary, what its 
interest was and whether the fact of the bird 
Sanctuary laid any limitations upon their 
proposed plan, (Huxley, 1967)
In the early 1960's, when SDD was preparing its outline plan, 
Nature Conservancy, together with the Royal Society for the Protection 
of birds and the Scottish Wildlife Trust, expressed strong reservations 
about a major recreation facility in the Hamilton Low Parks area, in 
particular the replacement or extension of some of the ponds to form 
a new loch. Although Nature Conservancy had little direct involvement 
in the discussions leading firstly to the 1967 proposals, and latterly 
to the 1971 modified Stage 1, Norden and Idle (1975) were able to 
state:
Despite the construction of the M74 the interest 
and potential of the area has hardly waned and 
still has considerable scientific, educational 
and amenity value. The creation of Strathclyde 
Regional Park presents an excellent opportunity 
to both develop and conserve the wildlife 
resources of the area for the benefit of the 
community as a whole. (p.2)
The impact of the decision to proceed with the M74 motorway
through the Bird Sanctuary, effectively bisecting it, radically
changed the context for Nature Conservancy attitudes to the park idea. 
\7hilst Huxley could bemoan in 1967 the apparent inability of SDD to 
coordinate the activities of its engineers and roads surveyors with 
the requirements of the 19 5^ Order, once the motorway was constructed 
a park whereby the nature conservation interest could be managed and 
developed was recognised as representing the best prospect. On this 
basis, a Nature Conservation Advisory Group was established with the 
agreement of the Joint Committee in 1973, chaired by the Conservancy,
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and including representatives of the Scottish Wildlife Trust (SWT), 
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), and Hamilton 
Natural History Society. It provided detailed comments on the local 
authorities proposals, whereas the 197 5 habitat survey by Norden and 
Idle provided more detailed guidance in the wake of Gillespie's 1974 
landscape plan.
Nature Conservancy Council today regards Strathclyde Park as
meeting nature conservation objectives, in that being included within
the park,, it has been easier to control public access to the nature
reserves and the SSSI. Most of the damage and disruption to the
nature conservation value of the area occurred during the
construction of the M74 in the 19 60's. Overall, NCC regards the
development of the park as a benefit to nature conservation. However,
in 1974 when Stage 1 was under construction and the Joint Committee
was considering the detailed requirements of Stage 2, NCC and others
criticised the local authorities' enthusiasm for maximising active
recreation facilities in the park, which were perceived as prejudicing
other objectives:
There does seem to be the danger here of trying 
to squeeze too many uses into the area, and 
very careful thought will be required if the...
..activities (proposed) do not begin to cut
across other things proposed for the Park. (Idle, 1974)
The' Clyde River Purification Board (CRPB) first became involved 
in the Strathclyde Park project in 1965, since the creation of the 
loch was to be controlled by the Reservoirs (Scotland) Act, and then 
with the decision to supply the loch from the South Calder Water. 
Earlier, the hydraulics and engineering feasibility studies on firstly 
damming and secondly diverting the river Clyde had significant 
implications for the flow of water in the river (which was subject 
to periodic spate), and for water catchment and the river system 
generally. CRPB was established under the Rivers (Prevention of 
Pollution)(Scotland) Act 1951, but it obtained special powers to 
control underground discharges and the diversion of rivers under the 
Clyde River Purification Board Act 1972.
There were great problems of discharges to the South Calder 
Water due to a plethora of outlets from local steelworks which 
multiplied in the years preceding the establishment of the River 
Boards. Much of the pipework was underground and unrecorded, and
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there were many discharges to boreholes and old shafts* The effect 
of the Strathclyde Park scheme was to tackle, much earlier than would 
have been the case, these substantial pollution problems if the water 
sports facilities were to operate successfully.
CRPB did not participate directly in the planning of the park, 
and only became significantly involved in 1972 when problems of 
effluent discharge to the South Calder Water were bringing pollution 
issues to the fore on the eve of the onset of construction works.
Even after 1967, by which time the local authorities had formulated 
their proposals for the park, the pollution aspect was only given 
serious consideration immediately prior to the formation of the loch, 
despite attempts by CRPB to become more formally and directly 
involved in the deliberations of the Joint Committee. Whilst the 
priority, regionally and locally, for Strathclyde Park served to 
accelerate the introduction of measures to deal with pollution, 
including major treatment works at Ravenscraig and the upgrading of 
public plants, serious consideration of the continuing problems of 
effluent discharge, which threatened the viability of the water sports 
facilities, only began to take place with the establishment by the 
Park Director in 19 75 of a Loch Consultative Committee in recognition 
that:
The success of the Park depends upon and will 
continue to depend upon the collaboration of the 
British Steel Corporation works in and around 
Motherwell. (NCC, 1975)
Water quality as an objective only became significant during 
park construction, and the failure to directly involve CRPB 
throughout design, particularly after 1968 when the source of water 
supply was to be the South Calder, serves to highlight the lack of 
consideration of the full implications of using the South Calder as 
the source of water supply for a loch which was to have a major 
recreational function.
6. Sectional Interests
The major industrial operations fringelng the park had little 
involvement in implementation beyond the Loch Consultative Committee, 
whereas water sports interests played a more central and direct role
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in the development of the park from the outset. The Scottish Amateur 
Rowing Association(SARA) in particular, through links with SCPR, 
pressed for the international standard rowing course. In 1971, it 
submitted views to the Joint Committee in support of this element 
at a time when the additional costs of the higher specification for 
the loch design were being reappraised by the engineering consultants. 
SARA and the Scottish Canoe Union (SCU) advised on detailed design 
aspects of the water sports facilities and, with completion of the 
rowing course to international standard in time for the 1986 
Commonwealth games, can be considered to have achieved their objectives, 
if belatedly.
Nature conservation interests were represented by the Scottish 
Wildlife Trust (SWT) and the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB), who were involved from the early stages of park design, 
and the Hamilton Natural History Society, which joined with the 
former in the Nature Conservation Advisory Group. The Trust and RSPB 
were particularly active in initially opposing the whole idea of a 
park at this location, which they saw as conflicting with the needs 
of conservation, particularly with regard to the control of public 
access. However, the completion of the M74 had the more significant 
impact, which Norden and Idle (1975) indicated was of a short term 
nature. Thereafter the park was regarded as a means of introducing 
positive management of the wildlife resource.
7* Conclusion
Strathclyde Park is the product of a diversity of aims and 
intentions deriving from a multi-organisational planning context. 
Although the original idea is rooted in the Clyde Valley Regional Plan, 
although SDD resurrected and promoted the idea in the early 1960's, 
and although responsibility for implementation was vested in a Park 
Authority created for the purpose, no one particular set of aims 
dominated throughout. Indeed, the Park in its current form could be 
considered the outcome of a conflicting central-local government 
relationship, mediated by the viewpoints and influences of a range of 
other government, quasi-government and sectional interests.
Whilst no one set of aims held eminence throughout the life of
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the project, it is also the case that sets of ideas changed and 
evolved over the period, as a response to external and internal 
factors, and as a consequence of the learning process of experience 
(Dunn, 1971).
IVhilst SDD's primary consideration was to rehabilitate the 
landscape, including the formation of a loch, to assist economic 
planning initiatives, the radically different intentions of the local 
authorities soon brought them into conflict with the Government view. 
As a consequence, the whole project underwent a bargaining process 
over the period 19 67-1974 in which SDD was concerned to limit the 
ambitions of the local authorities to the level of grant aid likely 
to be available.
Both central and local government were motivated by a concern 
to see environmental improvements to an area badly scarred by 
industrial processes. SDD saw this being achieved by a landscape 
improvement which, in the view of the local authorities, merely 
removed the appearance of dereliction as seen from the motorway. The 
local authorities, on the other hand, wanted to improve the whole 
environmental image of the area in a much wider sense. They were 
thus receptive at the outset to approaches from watersports interests 
that a rowing and canoeing course to international competition 
standards should be incorporated in the loch design. At that time, 
there was only one inland water sports centre of international 
standard in the UK, and none in Scotland. The acceptance by the local 
authorities (and SDD) of the rowing course idea radically changed 
the whole nature of the park, and particularly the role of the loch 
within it.
The local authorities saw the opportunity to bring national 
and international attention to North Lanarkshire as a venue for 
water sports competition, with the attendant publicity. Although 
the rowing course was included in the local authorities' 1967 
proposals, it was the establishment of the Scottish Sports Council 
in 1972 which gave a further boost to the prospect for providing 
the rowing course by virtue of the Council's remit to advise on 
the provision of sports facilities generally, but particularly for 
national training and international competition, and its grant-aiding 
powers. Up until that time, SDD expected the local authorities to
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finance the rowing course, since SDD was financing, through grant 
aid, the land reclamation and countryside elements.
The Scottish Council for Physical Recreation, reconstituted 
as the Scottish Sports Council in 1972, had been a supporter of the 
rowing course from the outset by virtue of its links with the Scottish 
Amateur Rowing Association and the Scottish Canoe Union. SARA in 
particular strongly advocated the inclusion of the rowing course 
specification in the loch design, thus seizing the opportunity 
provided by the intention to form the loch as an integral part of the 
project. In the meantime the Countryside Commission for Scotland 
had been established following the 1967 Act, and from early 1969 had 
begun to advise the local authorities on the countryside recreational 
aspects of the park. The growth of leisure research stressing 
mobility and affluence, and the importance of ideas and concepts 
from the United States, both combined with the rising currency of 
regional planning to encourage the local authorities to stress what 
they saw as the strategic importance of the middle Clyde valley as 
added justification for the rowing course, as well as their ambitious 
range of recreational proposals. These factors shifted the park idea 
much closer to the Abercrombie proposal for a centre for regional 
sports and pastimes, and away from an essentially land reclamation 
exercise with attendant recreational facilities.
Whilst the development and implementation of Strathclyde Park 
has been characterised by a multi-organisational planning framework, 
with the added involvement at various times of sectional interests, 
some of these organisations, as in the case of Government agencies, 
only became involved during Implementation. Although they were unable 
to influence the design stage, they sought to bring their own interests 
and objectives to bear during implementation, and thereby reappraise 
original objectives and alter the course of implementation. Others, 
as in the case of sectional interests, were involved from the outset, 
and although enjoying mixed success in achieving their aims did
influence the project throughout its evolution and established at an 
early stage a priority for their particular interest. Yet others, 
such as CRPB and local industries were unable to become centrally 
involved, due to a lack of appreciation by the Joint Committee of the 
pollution implications for the project. This omission, and the 
failure to ensure that pollution control paralleled park development.
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has had some adverse consequences for the park's public image, and 
contributed to the curtailment of the project after 197 5. Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1973) have shown that it is often the failure to 
consider some of the fine detail of implementation that can have 
serious consequences for the success of a project.
A feature of park development has therefore been the need for 
the implementers to resolve a number of conflicts which were 
highlighted by sectional interests. Vihilst the recreational interests 
have largely achieved their aims, the pollution problem has still to 
be adequately resolved.
The central participants in the project were representatives of 
central and local government. The particular feature of their 
involvement was the changing nature of their objectives, which in 
the case of both saw a reduction in their horizons of expectations, 
both due primarily to changes in the involvement of key personnel.
In the case of SDD, the early enthusiasm of Government planners which
launched the project in 1964 gave way to the financial pragmatism of
the administrators of the countryside and land reclamation budgets, 
particularly after 1970 and more seriously after 1974. The commitment 
of the local authorities disappeared after 1975, when responsibility 
for the park passed from the joint Committee to the new regional 
council, which had wider interests and different priorities.
From the preceding analysis, it would appear that;
(i) it is difficult to evaluate the success of the park in meeting 
its objectives, since objectives varied between participants
in the project, were not clearly defined, and tended to change
as the park project evolved;
(ii)the development of the park cannot be explained by reference 
to any model of comprehensive rationality, but rather has 
proceeded via a bargaining process in a multi-organisational 
planning context in which some objectives have been reformulated 
in order to achieve reduced expectations;
(iii)the objectives and interests of organisations participating 
only during later stages of the development have had a mediating 
effect on the objectives of the principal participants, 
particularly the Joint Committee as main implementing agency;
(iv)park development has proceeded not by one planning process.
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but by a number of sub-processes emerging in response to 
the currency of particular issues. These processes have 
been less of a linear and more of a recursive or iterative 
nature.
The changes in objectives explain in part the changing nature 
of the various park proposals, derived in part from revised 
organisational arrangements. These changes also coloured the 
processes of communication generated by the organisational framework 
and the wider influence of external factors, providing at various 
times opportunities for and constraints to action. The central- 
local government relationship, mediated by the multi-organisational 
planning context, is the main feature affecting the development and 
implementation of Strathclyde Park, and is uppermost in the following 
chapters in which means, processes and external factors are considered 
in detail.
CHAPTER VII
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (2) 
THE MEANS TO ACTION
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (2): 
THE MEANS TO ACTION
1. Introduction
Although the proposal for a major recreational facility in the 
middle Clyde valley originates with the 1946 Regional Plan, a period 
of 18 years elapsed before the conditions became favourable for 
action. The regional and national recreation facilities proposed in 
the 1946 Plan were dependent upon the establishment of a regional 
planning authority, also advocated in the plan, to provide and manage 
such facilities, as well as to coordinate the implementation of the 
overall strategy as it affected the conurbation, specifically: (i) 
acquisition and control of green belt land; (ii) regional parks; (iii) 
conservation of water resources; (iv) establishment of new towns and 
oversight of local planning schemes; (v) distribution and location 
of industry; (vi) land rehabilitation
Much of what was recommended in the plan was accepted by the 
Advisory Committee, but no agreement was reached on the proposed 
regional authority. This proposal was not implemented, and with the 
failure to establish the regional authority some aspects of the plan, 
including the regional parks and recreation centres, were not 
incorporated Into the subsequent development plans of the local 
authorities.
Any action to bring about a rehabilitation of the middle Clyde 
valley was dependent upon (a) substantial financial resources, due 
to the major engineering operations required, and therefore 
necessitating the involvement of the Government; (b) the motivation 
for action: up until the mid-1960's, Government grants for land 
rehabilitation militated against large-scale schemes with a low 
financial return, such as recreational open space. There were no 
grants until 1967 for the provision of recreational facilities, and 
no policy direction on countryside recreation until the 1960's.
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2. SDD's 1964 Outline Scheme ; a Catalyst for Action
One of the proposals in the Clyde Valley plan was for an A74 by­
pass road for Hamilton, passing through the middle Clyde valley. In 
the 1950's, SDD engineers reassessed the requirements of this road, 
and concluded that upgrading to motorway standard was required. The 
programme for the construction of the M74 indicated that site works 
would take place in the middle Clyde valley in the 19 63-66 period.
At the same time, emerging Government regional policy, first expressed 
in the 1963 White Paper, was identifying a link between high levels 
of out-migration from Scotland (particularly from west central 
Scotland) and poor environment, and it became a priority of regional 
policy to focus attention on action to improve the physical 
environment as a complement to economic policies for the attraction 
e r f new industrial investment. It was these factors in combination 
which motivated SDD planners to prepare in 1964 an outline plan for 
the rehabilitation of the middle Clyde valley (SDD, 1964a, b) and 
thereby give a lead to the local authorities through the North Lanark­
shire Growth Area Committee, established in the wake of the 1963 
White Paper.
The 1964 plan was important in that (a) it focused discussion 
on a series of proposals, although both their implications and 
feasibility required further investigation; (b) it demonstrated to 
the local authorities what could be done, given the commitment, the 
resources, and a positive attitude; (c) it provided the first clear 
indication to the local authorities that SDD regarded the middle Clyde 
valley as a planning priority. The main features of SDD's 1964 
proposal for a "Middle Clyde Regional Park" were:
(i) landscaping of the Low Parks west of the motorway, using 
surplus soil from the M74 roadworks;
(ii)creation of a loch providing a surface of 200 acres for 
sailing and other water sports;
(iii)use of material removed in forming the loch in the rehabil­
itation of adjoining areas;
(iv)landscaping of sites surrounding the loch and construction 
of a boating centre, restaurants and picnic spaces, and a 
caravan and camping centre;
(v) construction of a tourist roadway with parking spaces east 
of the loch;
(vi)formation throughout the valley of a system of pedestrian
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ways, picnic places and tourist viewpoints, and provision of 
parks at Blantyre and Dalzell, Motherwell;
(vii)extensive tree planting to form a sense of enclosure and a 
clear visual break between the built-up areas and the valley.
The 1946 Clyde Valley Plan had referred to the advantage of
having a water focus to each of the regional parks and recreation
centres, and one of the locational advantages of the Hamilton Low
Parks was that the river Clyde meandered through it, and there were
a number of ponds created by mining subsidence. The provision of a
loch was central to the park plan from the outset, and was given
additional credence by SDD's view in 1964 that:
Not only is the creation of the lake itself a main 
feature of the proposals, but its construction is
closely linked with the rehabilitation and after
use of the adjoining land. (SDD, 1964b, p.2)
The estimated cost of the 1964 plan, excluding the formation 
of the loch was £575,000. The only grant aid likely to be available 
at that time was for clearance of derelict land under section 5 of 
thè Local Employment Act 1960. Additional proposals included a new 
railway station to serve the recreational centre, a heliport to 
provide a link with internal air routes, a motel at nearby 
Chatelherault, and a limited number of high cost housing sites in 
the valley, to assist in recouping some of the costs of the scheme. 
The proposals were accepted in principle at the meeting of the North
Lanarkshire Growth Area Committee in November 1964, Early in 1965,
the three affected local authorities established a Joint Working 
Party to commission consultants to establish firstly the engineering 
feasibility of the loch proposal, followed by a detailed plan for the 
middle Clyde Valley.
3. The 1967 Proposals : a Bid for Resources
In their 1965 Interim Report (Binnie & Partners, 1965), the 
engineering consultants established the feasibility of the loch proposal, 
at a cost in excess of £300,000. The 1967 Montagu planning proposals 
were based on assumptions of local population growth (as indicated in 
the 1963 White Paper), the expanded catchment area provided by the 
accessibility of the motorway, and that the provisions of the (then)
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forthcoming Countryside Act would apply to the proposals. Whilst 
Montagu saw the middle Clyde area as a potential linear park on the 
Lee Valley Park model (Civic Trust, 1964), they also saw the proposed 
loch as the obvious location for "Strathclyde Park" as the focus for 
the whole area.
The 1967 proposals comprised a list of landscaping and 
recreational projects for a nine-mile stretch of the Clyde valley, 
with Strathclyde Park at its focus. These comprised:
(i) the elimination of industrial dereliction and dumps, and the 
screening of essential industrial features;
(ii)the improvement of access to the area, including a Clydeside 
footpath, connecting footpaths, bridleways, roads, bus services 
and car parks;
(iii)the provision of additional attractions and amenities, and 
their grouping with those already existing in the area.
In (iii) a Strathclyde Park was seen as the focus of the whole 
rehabilitation scheme, with the main elements comprising:
(a) caravan sites and a motel as staging facilities for motorway 
travellers in addition to the service areas;
(b) a loch, with provision for sailing, international rowing and 
canoeing, and angling;
(c) an educational training centre;
(d) a nature reserve in lieu of the former Bird Sanctuary;
(-6-) a riding and pony trekking centre;
(f) dry ski slopes and a lift in the South Calder Valley;
(g) adventure playgrounds and a canoe centre;
(h) a lochside road, restaurants, picnic areas and car parks;
(i) a regional sports centre, including an athletics stadium, 
museum and cinema, the whole complex to be capable of 
supporting national and international events, and located 
close to the motorway interchange for maximum accessibility;
(j ) a local park golf course, and a sports village to serve the 
regional sports centre.
The programme for the creation of the Strathclyde Park was 
envisaged as being undertaken in four stages, with the land rehabilita­
tion and landscape works, the playing fields, countryside recreation 
and water sports centre comprising Stage 1, at an estimated cost of
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£2,532,000. The costs given were emphasised only as a very rough 
guide and indication of the scale of operations required to implement 
Stage 1. Of this sum, by far the most expensive item was the 
formation of the loch at an estimated cost of £420,000, and a further 
£200,000 for the water sports centre. The main items to be provided 
in Stage 2 were the sports centre, dry ski slopes, a canoe centre, 
and a museum and art gallery. A large athletics stadium was the 
principal component of Stage 3, and a sports village in Stage 4.
In the range of facilities proposed, the 1967 proposals were 
approaching the original idea of the regional recreation centre in 
the Clyde Valley Plan, and represented a substantial move away from 
the landscaping exercise outlined by SDD three years earlier. These 
proposals could therefore be considered a "bid" by the local 
authorities for additional Government finance, in the context of (a) 
the favourable economic and regional policy environment, (b) the 
Government's advocacy of major projects to tackle land rehabilitation 
in the interests of economic expansion, and (c) the Government's 
concern to illustrate how the provisions of the Countryside Act could 
apply to large-scale recreational developments.
■^Jhilst the 1964 plan served the purpose of illustrating to the
local authorities how the aims of the 1963 White Paper could be
implemented in practical planning terms (and hence sufficed as a
catalyst for action), the 1967 proposals were the product of the local
authorities' new-found enthusiasm for recreation planning in a new
and favourable development climate. In addition, the 19 67 proposals
envisaged a rehabilitation of the middle Clyde valley with a regional
park at its centre, attracting population from throughout central
Scotland in addition to the north Lanarkshire/middle Clyde area. In
this respect, the local authorities saw the opportunity to provide,
within the loch design, an international standard rowing course as
not only a means of legitimising the regional focus of the park, but
also as a means of improving the symbolic image of north Lanarkshire,
through its association with international rowing events and the
attendant publicity:
That centre, being in its complete, finished 
product, would have been a "one-off" for Western 
Europe. Indeed, we could have sold the west of 
Scotland on Strathclyde Park, as far as incoming 
industrialists are concerned. (Scott, 1933)
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The ambitions of the local authorities, as expressed in the 1967
proposals, provoked a new round of central-local government discussions
SDD criticised the revised scheme as being "too lavish", although
agreeing that;
The work which the County and burghs have done here 
meets the terms of the (1967) Act, and is the kind 
the Countryside Commission was designed to encourage.
(SDD, 1968, p.2)
The estimated costs of £2*5 millions for Stage 1 were
considerably in excess of SDD’s anticipations as expressed in the 1964
plan. The concern to keep the costs within manageable proportions, 
whilst at the same time seeking to avoid dampening the enthusiasm of 
the local authorities (with consequences for the political momentum 
of the project), led to the establishment of the Technical Working 
Party in 1969, the identification of those aspects likely to qualify 
for grant-aid, and an emphasis on Stage 1 only. The outcome was 
revised proposals by Montagu in 1971. Additionally, the estimated 
10% increase in the costs of the engineering and hydrological works
due to the need to divert the river Clyde encouraged SDD to adopt
a much more pragmatic, finance-led approach to the project after 1963.
4. The 1971 Proposals : a Compromise
The revised 1971 proposals included the loch and by-pass channel, 
retention of the rowing course, the nature reserve, two caravan sites 
and a camping site, playing fields, car parks and a park road, and 
informal open space and footpaths. The total cost of the revised 
proposals was estimated at £2,784,600 (bearing in mind the cost 
increases due to the diversion of the river Clyde via a new by-pass 
channel). Approximately 50% of this cost was expected to qualify for 
derelict land grant.
The 1971 proposals represented a considerable reduction in the
scope of the project. In Scott's (1983) view, this was a major
paring-down of what the local authorities wanted;
(SDD) were going to do a cosmetic exercise and tart 
up the thing so that they would only then have to 
take away the appearance of dereliction...We then 
made up our minds that we were going for something 
worthwhile, that this community needed. (Scott,1983)
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The 1971 proposals therefore provided the basis for the start 
of construction work in 1973, and represented in large part a shift 
back to the earlier intentions of SDD in 1964. However, the local 
authorities continued to press for their vision of the park in 
discussions on Stage 2, to which SDD had given no commitment when 
accepting the revised Stage 1 plan in 1971.
The 1964 and 1967 proposals represented, in their purest forms, 
the expectations of central and local government respectively. The 
1964 plan was conditioned by an initial concern to meet the timetable 
of earthworks for the M74 construction, and latterly to improve the 
landscape appearance of the middle Clyde valley. For their part, 
once they had been spurred to action, the local authorities expressed 
in their 1967 proposals an emphasis much more on recreation than on 
landscape. In this respect they could be said to be closer than the 
SDD plan to the intentions of the 1946 proposal.
The 1971 proposals represented a victory for central government 
pragmatism over local authority idealism. SDD was to be the major 
financial sponsor since approximately 80% of the costs of Stage 1 were 
to be met from rehabilitation and countryside grants. SDD had gone 
some way in the late 1960's to bend the definition of derelict land 
which qualified for grant under the 1966 Act, and it was generally 
recognised that the project as a whole could only proceed on the basis 
of substantial Government financial aid. The park proposals therefore 
had to satisfy Government objectives more than local objectives, since 
the local authorities, even in combination, did not have the resources 
to proceed to implementation on their own account.
Sillince (1934) suggests that, as means, plans have multiple 
purposes :
(i) the production of a technical result, such as a master 
plan or blueprint;
(ii)a tool for arguing for more resources, by presenting a 
rationally argued "bid" (such as Housing Plans);
(iii)a means of countering criticism, by responding to particular 
political pressures, but keeping its objectives implicit;
(iv)a generator of ideas or catalyst for action by others, or for 
simply generating confidence.
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From this analysis Sillince contends;
Thus plans nearly always have a wide variety of 
functions. Only some of these functions are 
technical, or implementational, or product 
orientated. The rest are political. It may be a 
mistake therefore for planners to evaluate plans 
solely in terms of whether or not they are 
implemented. Sometimes whether or not a plan is 
implemented can be an irrelevance. (p.21)
Clearly, the only plan in the Strathclyde Park process geared 
towards producing a technical result was the 1974 Landscape Master 
Plan, together with individual designs for the loch, the water sports 
centre and other components. The 1964 SDD plan, on the other hand, 
functioned as a generator of ideas: as a catalyst for the actions of 
the local authorities. The 1967 proposals represented a clear bid 
by the local authorities for Government resources. The 1971 revised 
scheme could therefore be regarded as the outcome of a process of 
mediation between local political aspirations, technical feasibility, 
and realism in terms of the financial resources likely to be available.
Construction work began on the basis of the revised 19 71 
proposals in June 1973. At the outset of the construction period, 
the cost of Stage 1 was estimated at £4*3 millions. During 
construction the inadequacies of the 1971 proposals were highlighted, 
particularly in regard to the landscaping and design of the Car parks. 
These inadequacies contributed to the commissioning of William 
Gillespie and Associates as replacement landscape architects in 1973. 
Many of the specifications of the 1971 proposals were changed in 
response to criticisms by the Countryside Commission and the Nature 
Conservation Advisory Group. New specifications for the design of 
car parks, and for landscaping and tree planting, substantially 
increased the costs of the project, as did the design of the rowing 
course to meet the exacting standards required for international 
competition.
Much of the detail of Stage 1 was therefore redesigned during 
construction on the advice of the replacement landscape consultants 
and others, such as the Countryside Commission, who had played little 
or no part during the earlier planning stages. In this respect, the 
constitution and operation of the Joint Committee, and the influence 
and behaviour of the Committee Chairman and the Park Director, were 
central influences on the outcome of Stage 1 and the lobbying for
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Stage 2*
5, The Joint Committee
Joint planning and administration of local government functions 
was not unknown in Lanarkshire when in 1965 the three local authorities 
of Lanark County Council, Hamilton Town Council, and Motherwell and 
Wishaw Town Council set up a joint steering group and joint working 
party to undertake feasibility studies and produce planning proposals 
for the middle Clyde valley. Similar joint working arrangements were 
already in operation for the fire, police and education services.
Since all three authorities had responsibilities for different parts 
of the"middle Clyde valley, since there was no regional authority in 
existence at that time, and since SDD had no means by which to bring 
their outline ideas to reality, joint investigation by the three local 
authorities was the obvious means to progress the "middle Clyde Park" 
initiative.
Although proposals for a much larger land rehabilitation and 
recreation project were being progressed at that time for a Lee 
Valley Regional Park north of London (Civic Trust, 1964) via a 
Regional Park Authority, and by means of special legislation promoted 
by the Greater London Council, there was no equivalent for Scotland 
at that time. There would have been little justification for promoting 
special legislation for a regional park of 1600 acres in Scotland.
There was a willingness by the local authorities to cooperate on 
investigation of the proposal, as well as precedents for joint 
working and so, from 19 65, the joint committee was established.
Following preparation of the 1967 proposals, SDD suggested in 
discussions that the local authorities might consider forming a joint 
park authority, taking advantage of the provisions of the Countryside 
Act. In circular 75/1967, which introduced the 1967 Act, the 
Secretary of State laid particular emphasis on the importance of 
local planning authorities, especially those in the central belt, 
taking early action under section 48 of the Act to study the establish­
ment of country parks. In 1968, therefore, at a Ministerial meeting 
to discuss the local authorities’ proposals, SDD suggested a joint 
authority to set up and operate the park. Section 48 of the Act was
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designed explicitly for this purpose. SDD also had other motives
for this suggestion:
From the presentational point of view, we should 
be very pleased to see these provisions of the Act 
inaugurated for a big, pioneering scheme of this 
kind, and we hope the local authorities will adopt 
this procedure. (SDD, 1968, p.5)
In the meantime, the Joint Working Party progressed the 1967 
proposals through the meetings over the 1969-70 period of the Technical 
Working Party, to the 1971 revised proposals. In July 1971 it first 
considered the draft constitution for the joint park authority. The 
Strathclyde Park Joint Committee (SPJC) was formally constituted in 
July 1971, six years after the local authorities embarked on their 
joint planning exercise, and four years after the introduction of the 
1967 Act. The constitution of the Joint Committee was amended in 
November 1971 to raise the number of members from nine to 15 (five 
from each local authority).
Under section 48(5) of the Act, the Strathclyde Park Joint 
Committee had transferred to it the functions conferred on local 
authorities under section 43(4), namely powers to (a) acquire land, 
lay it out and manage it as a country park, and (b) make bye-laws in 
terms of section 54. Under the Joint Committee's constitution (i) 
the three local authorities agreed to transfer to SPJC land within 
the park boundary belonging to the three councils; (ii) nett 
expenditure of SPJC would be apportioned between the three councils 
on the basis of 467. from Lanark County Council, 367. from Motherwell 
and Wishaw Town Council, and 18% from Hamilton Town Council; (iii)the 
expenses of SPJC would be met from a Strathclyde Park Fund, to which 
each council would contribute; (iv)a chairman and vice-chairman would 
be appointed annually; (v)a clerk and treasurer would be appointed 
from the officers of one or more of the three councils, and (vi) SPJC 
could appoint its own officials, and engage professional and technical 
consultants.
The Strathclyde Park Joint Committee was the first formally 
constituted joint park authority under section 48 of the 1967 Act, so 
there were no well tried models other than those.which had operated 
in respect of other jointly administered services. By any standards, 
the powers delegated by the three councils to the Joint Committee 
were considerable, and provided substantial scope for independent
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action. The fact that its members were drawn exclusively from the 
three local authorities provided political accountability, although 
only at a distance. The financial arrangements also gave SPJC 
considerable power to commit local authority expenditure to the project, 
and these financial arrangements, particularly the lack of budgetary 
control exercised by the three councils, were criticised by the 
successor Strathclyde Regional Council after 1975. This lack of 
financial stringency, and a development-rather than a finance-led 
approach by SPJC, was regarded by the Regional Council as a prime 
cause of escalating costs over the 1973-76 main construction period.
Although the constitution of the Joint Committee invested it 
with considerable powers to bring Strathclyde Park to reality, the 
great driving forces behind the park were the Joint Committee 
Chairman and the Park Director, and their roles and influence are 
now considered in turn.
6. The Park Chairman
Bernard Scott represents the one, continuous strand of 
consistency in the whole history of Strathclyde Park. At the time 
SDD introduced their 1964 rehabilitation plan, Scott was planning 
convener of Motherwell & Wishaw Town Council, and the last chairman 
of the Clyde Valley Regional Plan Advisory Committee, which ceased 
to function after 1972. By his own admission, Scott was perhaps the 
most enthusiastic member of the most enthusiastic of the three local 
authorities for the park project. He represented an authority which 
had on its doorstep some of the worst dereliction and industrial 
pollution in Lanarkshire. He is a socialist, and has strong views 
about a community which has contributed so much to the success of the 
country's heavy engineering, mining and steelmaking, but which had so 
little to show in return other than a polluted and degraded environ­
ment. He is a man of great energy and commitment to what he thinks 
is right, and also displays some arrogance in his views;
My job as a local authority representative is to 
create an environment and create horizons, and create 
a different way of life if possible from a very 
industrialised area - an area which had suffered 
from the industrial revolution. (Scott, 193 3)
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Scott was chairman of the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee for
all but one year of its existence, and for his efforts he was
appointed to the Countryside Commission, and to the Scottish Sports
Council. It was largely at his insistence that, on local government
reorganisation, the park was transferred to Strathclyde Regional
Council. On election to the Regional Council in 1975, he became
the first convener of its leisure and recreation committee. Scott
is the only member of the original Joint Committee still active in
local government. He was and remains an enthusiastic advocate of the
regional park concept, and is the sort of politician who could get
commitment in principle from people and agencies without paying too
much attention to costs;
What are you trying to create? Is it right? Is it 
proper? And if you come to the conclusion that it 
is right and proper, then you go ahead and do it, 
and to damn with the costs. All the big things 
that have been done in this world would have never 
been based on a cost exercise. You have got to get 
the thing right, and then to have the dedication 
and drive to do the thing. Then stand up and take 
the criticism. (Scott, 1983)
Scott therefore did not see the cost of the project as a 
problem, provided the "concept" was right; the whole idea of a 
regional recreation facility centred on the middle Clyde Valley.
Whilst the Joint Committee met bi-monthly to oversee park develop­
ment, there was considerable scope, either provided or assumed, for 
the Chairman and Park Director to sanction changes in detailed 
specifications, and hence increases in costs. Scott argues that 
this allowed quick response to additional costs arising during con­
struction, although it also allowed the Chairman to dictate changes 
and present his committee with a series of faits accompli.
There was considerable friction between the Park Chairman and 
Scottish Office Ministers, which Scott puts down to changes in their 
attitudes to the project according to whether they were in or out of 
office. Interestingly, most of the friction occurred with Labour 
Ministers. Friction also arose between Scott and his new regional 
colleagues after 1975, who did not share his enthusiasm for the project. 
He found that he had to "sell" the whole project all over again in 
1975. Scott is perhaps the clearest example of what Cranz (1982) has 
termed an "inspired change agent";
Anybody, in any walk of life, who has got the
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power and drive will do things. You always find, 
right throughout life...all the gigantic things, the 
good things that have been done, have been done by 
one or two or three individuals. It all boils down 
to individuals who believe in a thing, not for 
themselves, but the creation of something for the 
community. That's what its all about. (Scott, 1983)
7. The Park Director
The constitution of the Strathclyde Park Joint Committee 
provided for the appointment of its own officials, and in 1972 a 
Park Director was appointed. From the initial launch of the project 
in 1964, the local authorities had been advised directly by their own 
officials. However, this ceased from 1973, and planning and other 
officials of the three local authorities had only a peripheral 
involvement in the project after that time.
The Joint Committee had been considering the appointment of
a "park manager" from 1971, when it was formally constituted. They
took advice from the Sports Council on the matter, which strongly
advocated the appointment of someone with overall responsibility for
translating policy into practice, and for reviewing the effectiveness
of that practice. In the Sports Council's view;
The success of any recreational establishment is 
directly related to the quality of the management..
..the Strathclyde Park project could eventually b e __
one of the largest in Scotland if not in the 
United Kingdom, involving an extremely wide 
variety of facilities...The importance of this post 
cannot be overemphasised and we would make a special 
plea that this appointment be made as soon as 
possible. (Chapman, 1971)
The Joint Committee, up until 1972, had been advised by a 
number of officials, but then took the view that they should have an 
officer of their own to coordinate the whole project. Up until then, 
they had been experiencing problems in committee with conflicting 
professional advice (Reid, 1932). Sam Reid was appointed Park 
Director in November 1972. Reid was at that time occupying a third- 
tier post in the Parks and Recreation Department of Edinburgh 
Corporation. Prior to that, he had varied experience of town planning, 
recreation planning, education and management in England and Scotland.
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The Park. Director (apart from the clerk to the Committee) thereafter
was the only official who attended the meetings of the Joint Committee;
They took the view that they had appointed an
official who would act as coordinator with all
these different officials and try to rationalise
their views on each issue.,..What the Joint
Committee wanted was a single approach that was
being presented to them, with all the answers, and
that was by no means an easy situation. (Reid, 198 2)
For the first eighteen months after appointment, Reid had no 
department and operated on his own, liaising with all the consultants 
who were operating on site, and with the other agencies involved. 
Although the overall design concept was fixed prior to the Park 
Director's appointment, so many aspects had not been worked out in 
detail that a great deal of redesign took place during the construction 
period. Those aspects that were fixed were the location of the loch 
itself and the buildings. Whilst the original contract for Stage 1 
was let in 1973, costs increased as a consequence of the Park Director 
and his Chairman advising the Joint Committee that certain aspects 
could not operate the way they had been proposed. Redesigning 
facilities, such as changing pavilions and car parks, and the edge 
treatment to the loch, substantially increased overall project costs.
In practice, Reid was responsible, through the Chairman, for 
ensuring that the contract for Stage 1 was carried out, and for 
coordinating the advice of the consultants and participating agencies 
on detailed aspects of the project during implementation. In this 
regard, the role of the Director could be described as a "fixer", as 
well as principal adviser to the Joint Committee. In detail, progress 
on implementation, and modification of the proposals in the light of 
problems arising, proceeded via a series of ad-hoc committees 
convened by the Director in reaction to such problems.
The Park Director and Chairman worked as a team, taking decisions 
on behalf of the Joint Committee in order to resolve quickly design 
or cost issues as they arose. They were both forceful individuals, 
with a commitment to the park project which bordered on evangelism.
From 1974, Stage 2 of the 1967 proposals was under active 
consideration by the Joint Committee. As well as coordinating the 
implementation of Stage 1, the Park Director also advised the Joint
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Committee on the content of and specification for Stage 2. By 1974, 
the financial, regional policy and political climate had changed 
radically from the much more conducive climate of the I960’s. SDD 
was taking a less enthusiastic view on Stage 2, in view of the 
escalating costs of the project and impending local government 
reorganisation. However, Reid and his Committee approached Stage 2 
as if this climate had not changed at all. As well as proposing a 
whole series of major capital and revenue-intensive recreational 
facilities, they were also considering the extension of the park 
boundaries to include adjoining countryside with recreational 
potential, such as the Avon Gorge and the Hamilton High Parks (Reid, 
1974).
The Sports Council in particular was concerned, with the Nature
Conservancy Council, that too many facilities for active recreation
were being "squeezed into" the park to the detriment of the
countryside and nature conservation elements. SDD was concerned to
avoid any consideration of Stage 2 until Stage 1 had been completed;
Stage 1 of the project has committed a substantial 
proportion of the total monies available for the 
Scottish Countryside programme and it seems 
evident that the costs of Stage 1 may be higher 
and the period of construction longer than 
originally provided for. In effect this would 
mean a more prolonged and greater demand on 
countryside funds generally for this particular 
project...Faced with the likely effects of the 
expenditure for Stage 1 during a period of 
restriction on public expenditure generally and 
in fairness to other parts of Scotland we could 
not at this time give any undertaking to commit 
countryside funds to Stage 2...It will not be 
possible for your Committee to determine precisely 
the priorities and probable costs for the 
development and expansion of countryside facilities
in the park until the Stage 1 facilities are
brought into use and that this should be the first
priority. (Neilson, 1974)
Stage 2 of the project, as outlined by the Park Director, 
comprised a substantial expansion of the activities to be provided in 
the park as intended in the 1967 proposals, and included a dry ski 
slope, an interpretation centre, indoor sports centre and swimming 
pool, a sailing centre, athletics track and stadium, a golf course, 
an equitation centre, a canoe slalom course, additional playing fields,
car parks and footpaths. Reid’s advocacy of the regional park
concept was matching Scott’s, although certainly whatever additional
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facilities were provided in the park would represent a considerable 
accretion of power, responsibility and prestige to the Park Director. 
Reid was therefore concerned to point out to the Joint Committee in 
1974 that;
The momentum which the whole project gains weekly 
and the interest generated locally, nationally and 
internationally will be substantially reduced if 
we stand still pending reorganisation, which in 
substance is what SDD are saying. (Reid, 1974b)
At local government reorganisation, Reid no longer reported 
directly to a Park Authority, but to the Regional Council's Leisure 
and Recreation Committee, of which Bernard Scott was convener.
However, the Park Director was firstly responsible to the Director 
of Leisure and Recreation, and so the essential link between the 
executive and political leaders of the park project was severed. The 
unique Joint Park Authority was replaced by a minor Committee of a 
large bureaucracy which, at its political head, had wider interests 
and other priorities. Reid and Scott no longer had the freedom to 
take executive action, and the interests of the park, its centre of 
power and influence, shifted dramatically. Figures 13 and 14 show 
the changing organisational structure of the Park project during 
the periods preceding and proceeding local government reorganisation 
in 1975.
Stage 1 of the park was substantially completed in 1976, and 
the Regional Council expressed little interest in further development. 
Reid's responsibilities changed from construction to management of 
the facilities that had been provided. Capital expenditure for the 
park was substantially reduced. Reid resigned in September 1980, and 
the park presently has an Acting Director,
Reid considers that there is still a requirement for some
facilities to "logically round off" Stage 1; a multi-purpose leisure
centre; residential accommodation for sports participants; hotel
accommodation; and educational/interpretation facilities. He believes
strongly in the value of recreational facilities to offset social
deprivation, and he sees the potential of Strathclyde Park as an
important social factor in counteracting the effects of local
unemployment:
The park's function is heavily involved with the 
social interface of the community. (Reid, 1932)
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As a means of implementing the park proposals, Reid considers
that the Joint Committee did not work satisfactorily, principally
because the finance for the project came from within the traditional
central-local government relationship* This meant that:
One of the problems in creating a project of this
nature was that we were competing for Scottish
national resources, which were part of the British 
national resources in a field where really practically 
all the money that was available for Scotland had 
in fact to come to Strathclyde Park in order to let 
the job be done. (Reid, 198 2)
Reid considers that the implementation of Strathclyde Park 
would have been better served by the model of the Lee Valley Park 
(Civic Trust, 1964), with a special Act of Parliament providing for 
the establishment of an agency and a guaranteed source of funds for 
development* He considers that the park development suffered from 
the multiplicity of agencies involved, each pursuing their own 
objectives, and failing to come together on an agreed, coordinated 
approach* It was left to the Park Director to undertake this 
coordinating role* Although the construction of Stage 1 took less 
than three years, the nine years which had elapsed between SDO’s 
outline scheme and site works proved crucial, since the climate for
action changed considerably over this period, particularly during
the early 1970’s.
8• The Role of the Individual
Much of the recent literature on policy-making identifies the 
key role of the individual in shaping the outputs of implementation 
processes* In the case of Strathclyde Park, whereas SDD provoked 
the local authorities into action, the role of key individuals within 
the agency responsible for the coordination of action, the Joint 
Committee, was central to the destiny of the whole project after 
the momentum had gathered during the I960’s.
Although the Joint Committee was formally constituted to apply 
the provisions of the 1967 Countryside Act as a means of creating 
countryside and recreational resources from a rehabilitated landscape, 
it clearly emerges from analysis of this process of environmental 
change that the continuing momentum of implementation through the
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1970's depended upon the energy and enthusiasm of the Joint Committee 
chairman, who saw the park as the realisation of his own vision of an 
improved environment for north Lanarkshire. An integral component of 
this vision was the provision of facilities which would attract people 
and interest from a much wider area, and thereby improve and heighten 
the image of an area previously associated with an over-industrialised 
landscape.
Scott was the "inspired change agent" of the project (Cranz,
1932), and he certainly had the characteristics considered essential
by Edwardes (Hingely and Cooper, 1983):
All change agents have one thing in common, 
provided they are the right people for that role, 
they all have drive. That is the one thing they 
must have. They don't need a high intellect, but 
drive, yes, it's crucial, (p.468)
Kingley and Cooper identify two principal characteristics 
from their study of successful individuals:
(i) such individuals see their actions as part of a much wider 
philosophical perspective;
(ii)they have well developed and clearly articulated value and 
belief systems in which their own actions are precisely located. 
These beliefs not only provide direction and purpose, but also 
justification and support when they come under pressure.
Scott's attitude and behaviour fit well with this model. Ivhilst 
power derives from legislation and institutions, it is focussed in 
individuals, and Scott used his power and influence to promote and 
defend the regional conception of Strathclyde Park. Scott's key role 
in the realisation of the project was also understood by the other 
participants, particularly the Scottish Office, and he deployed the 
tactic of threatening resignation to good effect on occassion unless 
his view prevailed.
An analysis of the evolution and implementation of Strathclyde 
Park points to a characterisation of policy processes as not 
comprising abstract organisations pursuing corporate policy objectives, 
but of individuals bringing their own interpretation of their 
organisations' interests to bear, deploying their own values and 
aspirations, based on their respective "assumptive worlds" (Young,1979): 
what Dunsire (1973) has identified as the rational man pursuing his
— 1 4 8  —
own interests via the organisation.
I'Jhilst Scott played the "inspired change agent", it was Reid 
who played the "fixer", or what Friend et.al. (1974) term the 
"reticulist" in a multi-organisational planning context where "connec­
tive planning" is central to action processes: the ability to identify 
and construct informal networks of cooperation across formal 
administrative boundaries. Reid therefore could be said to have 
been the prime mover in the sub-processes of the implementation of 
Strathclyde Park.
Although Scott and Reid can be identified as the principal 
advocates of Strathclyde Park, they had clearly separate roles: Scott 
the politician and "leader", negotiating with Ministers, chairmen of 
government agencies, and political colleagues on the local 
authorities. Reid's responsibility was to ensure that the political 
commitment mobilised by Scott, and the extra finances he brought 
to the project, were translated into action on the ground. Here Reid's 
role was as coordinator of the inputs of the other actors in the 
process: arranging technical meetings and detailed programming; 
providing briefs for the landscape consultants; identifying 
where changes in design specifications were required; articulating 
these to Scott, who mobilised the support of his Joint Committee in 
submissions for additional finance.
The roles of Scott and Reid in the implementation of Strathclyde 
Park reveal the importance of key individuals, in the right place at 
the right time. Scott in particular exploited to the full the 
favourable climate for planning during the 19 60's and early 19 70's, 
in mobilising commitment and translating broad ideas into specific 
requirements for the 1967 proposals. Reid joined the project during 
the much less favourable financial climate of the 1970’s, when the 
whole idea of Strathclyde Park was decreasing in the priorities of 
the Government and, after 1975, in the priorities of the Regional 
Council. In their evangelism for the project, which did not temper 
during this more hostile period, the counter-productive effect on 
those key institutions with much less commitment and interest in the 
project, had an influence on its frustrated output and the limited 
success of the Joint Committee in realising its full intentions for 
Strathclyde Park.
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9. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to identify the means which influenced 
the evolution and development of Strathclyde Park, their characteristics, 
and in which ways they were influential* These means were identified 
as :
(i) the need for a favourable climate for action ; this did not 
exist in the 19 50's, but emerged during the mid-1960's, 
through to the early 1970's, and partly explains the failure 
to carry out the proposal in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional 
Plan;
(ii)a commitment to action from the Government ; deriving from its 
concern to promote major environmental change in the middle 
Clyde valley in pursuit of wider economic objectives, and 
latterly to demonstrate the provisions of the 1967 Act. The 
contiguity of objectives of local and central government provided 
the springboard in the mid-1960's from which momentum gathered 
until the mid-1970's. This Scottish Office commitment ensured 
the priority of the project in the allocation of grant-aid;
(iii)new legislation providing grant-aid : to the extent of 
funding 80% of total development costs. Without this grant- 
aid, and SDD's liberal interpretation of the qualifying 
guidelines, it is unlikely that anything other than minimal 
landscaping would have been undertaken;
(iv)the establishment of the Joint Committee : effectively a 
joint park authority whose sole objective was the pursuit of 
the project for which it was created. The constitution of 
the Joint Committee ensured the commitment of the three 
sponsoring local authorities;
(v) dedicated individuals : with drive and enthusiasm, committed 
to their conception of change. They provided the necessary 
motivation and sense of urgency which maintained the 
momentum of the project.
CHAPTER VIII
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (3) 
PROCESSES, NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (3): 
PROCESSES, NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING
1. Introduction
The 'process of preparing and carrying out proposals for the 
construction of a regional park on derelict and degraded land in the 
middle Clyde valley is characterised by a multi-organisational planning 
context consisting of local authorities, a park authority. Government 
departments and agencies, private consultants, and independent 
sectional interests.
The implementing agency was the Joint Committee, constituted 
from the ranks of the three local authorities. SDD and the Scottish 
Education Department (SED) provided the initial sponsorship, regulated 
the Government’s financial contribution, and the borrowings of the 
Joint Committee for non-grant-aided aspects. The Countryside Commission 
and the Sports Council participated late in the design of the project, 
primarily during implementation, providing technical advice to the 
Joint Committee on countryside and sporting aspects respectively, and 
advising SDD and SED on grant-aid. Nature Conservancy Council (NCG) 
was involved from the earliest stages, but only in respect of the 
nature conservation aspects. SARA, SCU, Cl\PB and British Steel 
similarly were involved only in respect of specific aspects. The main 
participants, therefore, were the local authorities (in the form, 
latterly, of the Joint Committee) and the Government, ie SDD.
The Government had commissioned the Clyde Valley Regional Plan, 
resurrected the park proposal in 1964, advocated the idea in the early 
stages for Treasury support, and saw the whole project as a prototype 
for regional economic and physical planning, derelict land reclamation, 
and countryside recreation provision. The local authorities provided 
the means of translating legislative backing, grant-aid, and ideas 
into practice through cooperative effort and their powers under the 
planning and countryside Acts.
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The whole evolution and development of Strathclyde Park is 
therefore characterised by the interplay of changing central and local 
government intentions and priorities, and this central-local relation­
ship was an influential factor in the development of the park. In 
order to understand the process of interaction between central and 
■local government, it is necessary to consider the structural context 
within which this is set, since it is the structure which determines 
the means and nature of the central-local relationship.
2. The Structure of Central-Local Relations in Scotland
The principle of a separate administrative system for Scotland 
derives from the Act of Union of 1707, which preserved the legal, 
educational and religious systems, although it was not until 1334 
that Scotland had a Secretary of State. Until 1939, with the 
establishment of the Scottish Office, policy was administered by a 
number of ad hoc boards. Since 1939, the Scottish Office has 
accumulated further functions where (i) strict UK uniformity was not 
essential, or (ii) in response to pressure from Scottish interests.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, concern about the 
performance of the Scottish economy and the need to improve physical 
and economic planning led to the creation of the Scottish Development 
Department in 1962. Prior to 1962, town and country planning and 
local government had been the responsibility of the Scottish Health 
Department. This integration of physical and economic planning was 
maintained until the establishment of a separate Scottish Economic 
Planning Department in 19 73.
In addition to the Secretary of State, there are up to four 
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and, since 1951, a Minister of State 
in the House of Lords. Under recent Labour administrations, there 
has also been a Minister of State in the House of Commons. The 
Scottish Office is linked into the UK decision-making structure at 
several levels: the Secretary of State is a Cabinet minister, and 
able to put the Scottish viewpoint on major policy matters. In 
addition, Scottish Office is also represented on all committes dealing 
with matters for which it has responsibilities. The status of the 
Scottish Office partly depends upon the political rank of the
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Secretary of State, and on the perceived importance of Scotland to 
the Government. Scottish Office acquired added political weight in 
the late 1960's and late 1970’s due to the Labour government's 
greater dependence on Scottish seats than the Conservative government* s 
(Keating and Midwinter, 1933). Figure 15 shows the administrative 
structure of the Scottish Office.
The Scottish Office's budget is provided in the form of a block 
sum from the Treasury. Although the Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
(PESC) system is a major constraint on Scottish Office autonomy due 
to its functional approach, within its block allocation Scottish 
Office does have scope to transfer surplus sums between different 
budget areas. In this context, Keating and Midwinter (1983) identify 
three functions of the Scottish Office as a territorial department 
of the UK government:
(i) to administer those functions which need separate management 
in Scotland (due to the legal system or tradition);
(ii)to allow for a distinctiveness in policy making for Scotland;
(iii)to "lobby" within Government for extra resources for Scotland,
VJhilst each of the five departments of the Scottish Office is 
headed by a Secretary, and with its own portion of the block allocation, 
the Finance Division of SDD controls grant-aid to local authorities 
and therefore, in theory at least, provides a corporate context for 
Departmental financial assistance to local authority spending.
The powers of local authorities are provided and circumscribed 
by statute. In recent times, 65 to 70% of all local authority capital 
spending has been financed by the Government through the Rate Support 
Grant, whilst capital borrowing also requires Scottish Office approval. 
Legislation also provides the Secretary of State with powers of 
Direction, ie to statutorily require specific actions by local 
authorities. Government also provides advice and guidance in the form 
of White Papers and Circulars. Since 1977-73, the distribution of 
grant-aid in Scotland has been on the basis of a block allocation which 
some contend gives local authorities more freedom to decide between 
priorities, whilst others argue that the block grant system represents 
a further shift in the balance of power to the centre (Cuthbert et. 
al., 1982).
153-
CL
3
O
O
c
QJ Ol(/) E
1 ouen
ro
QJ c
X3 m
CI z:
3
o
c
OJ JC
c .(d
fU
e
o
QJ
ÛL co
QJ
QJ
m ro
ÜO C/1
i+-o o
Iflro
QJ
QJ </)
EQJc/l
o
_(/)
<u
(/)
O)•a
c
t/ï in
^   ^ ‘fi Ô VI O tÇ
S .515
"c ^
^ l ïiD o s
«I. fffilllll
c
OJ
JC
.Ü2
e
CL
O
QJ •*-
o > CL
QJ QJ
(/) Q Q
x:
CL
QJ
Q
«Q ro f“
ttJ
o fc= ro
o QJ
c/l X X
! il Jllii
3 3:
§ g 
I  S
r n 
|y 
££ 
8X
%)
4 :
I I
■ C
a
o zS,
m zz o ^
-i- ro
o
o
o CLu X ) QJ Ss(/) LU t_l
n i i l  I
.ZT ipu
CL
QJ
a
C1J QJ ■o
Z3
c_
QJ
c
ro u
cr.
3 V»u_
O
c/l
X
3
3
î)
Ü 1 T3C o i
< ro < u.
îl
I i i >II il
(/)
eu
>
fü
c_
W—"
(/)
c
B
TD
<
eu
W
O
j=
vo
o
w
00
Ln
en
-154-
The structure of central-local relations would therefore appear 
to favour central government in terms of compliance with central 
policy aims which, in the 1960's when economic and population growth 
were the dominant concerns, laid emphasis on the capital investment 
programmes of local authorities and their need to facilitate economic 
and industrial development. Since the 1970's, the emphasis has been 
on financial stringency and a policy focus on (a) inner cities and
(b) economic development. Local government reorganisation straddled 
eras of expenditure growth/low inflation and economic stringency/ 
high inflation.
An additional arm in the power of central government over local 
government has been the growth of "quangos" (quasi-autonomous non­
governmental organisations) such as the Countryside Commission, the 
Sports Council and, since 1975, the Scottish Development Agency. The 
creation of these agencies, with an emphasis on implementation, has 
been designed to ensure further compliance with the policy aims of 
central government.
3. Models of Central-Local delations
The "conventional wisdom" model of central-local relations 
argues that local authorities are merely the agents of central 
government, existing to implement national policies, supervised by 
central departments, with little or no discretion.' The "partnership" 
model assumes a consensus of values and objectives, an equality of 
power and influence, and therefore that local authorities have 
considerable discretion in designing and implementing their own 
policies. Both models have been criticised in recent literature 
(Schon, 1971; Friend et. al., 1974; Rhodes, 1931; Barret and Fudge, 
1981). Critics of these models contend that local authorities 
should be seen as political systems in their own right. Rhodes (1981) 
argues that it is misleading to talk of central control: rather, 
there are different types and degrees of control exerted by the 
various constituent units of central government, and that local 
authorities vary in their willingness to accept such control.
The convential wisdom model assumes that (a) intentions are 
fully defined prior to implementation, (b) there is central management
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of the process of implementation, and (c) there is full control at 
the centre, and that the implementers operate in a compliant 
relationship. In contrast, Rhodes (1931) posits the "forgotten 
dimensions" in the study of central-local relations:
(i) that there is bargaining in central-local relations as well 
as central control;
(ii)that there is a plurality in central-local relations; since 
other organisations have an influence, we cannot assume a 
single pattern of links between control departments and local 
authorities;
(iii)the influence of political factors: there is little known 
about political channels of influence between central and 
local government, eg to what extent, and under what conditions, 
can local politicians embarass national politicians and affect 
changes in policy?
(iv)the influence of pro fessional/bureaucratic factors : little 
is known about their role in central-local relations.
This analysis leads Rhodes to his articulation of a "power- 
dependence" model of central-local relations, the main features of 
which are:
(a) any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for 
resources;
(b) in order to achieve their goals, the organisations have to 
exchange resources;
(c) although decision-making within the organisation is constrained 
by other organisations, the dominant coalition retains some 
discretion. The appreciative system of the dominant coalition 
influences which relationships are seen as a problem and 
which resources will be sought;
(d) the dominant coalition employs strategies within known 
rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange;
(e) variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the 
goals and the relative power potential of interacting 
organisations, relative‘power potential is a product of the 
resources of each organisation, of the rules of the game, and 
of the process of exchange between organisations.
Barret and Fudge (1931) identify three key issues of negotiation 
processes central to the understanding of implementation processes:
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(a) the multiplicity and complexity of linkages;
(b) questions of control and coordination;
(c) issues of conflict and consensus.
They regard implementation as an interactive and negotiative process
over time between policy-makers and implementers, emphasising issues
of power and dependence, interests, motivation and behaviour. Thus,
as Rhodes (1981) asserts:
Local authorities are not "mere agents" of central
government. Ihey are political systems in their
own right with the capacity to resist central demands.
Moreover, central government is dependent upon local 
authorities for information, for expertise and for 
the implementation of policy. (p.87)
Based on the recent literature of the study of inter-governmental 
relationships, and the power-dependence model of central-local relations, 
the interactions between central and local government can be regarded 
as a process of negotiation and bargaining in a political context, in 
which the process of exchange affects the deployment of financial, 
manpower and other resources, in which personalities have a central 
role to play in the deployment of these resources and the selection 
of strategies. Furthermore, the larger the number of participants, 
the more complex the process of exchange, the greater the constraints 
on participants, and the more difficult it will be for any participant 
to achieve a desired outcome. Where such processes occur over extended 
periods of time, the greater will be the influence of external factors 
on the context for negotiation and bargaining, and on the power- 
dependence relationship.
4. Strathclyde Park and the Central-Local Relationship
It was not until the 1960’s that Government was assembling the 
means to directly influence the actions of local authorities in 
economic and physical planning. The proposals of the 1946 Clyde Valley 
Regional Plan were advisory only : there was no statutory obligation 
on the local authorities to carry these out, whilst Government's 
influence on physical aspects was limited to the regulation of 
development plans. During the 1960*s, the Scottish Office began to 
acquire expanded powers, backed by substantially improved and new 
financial inducements to encourage local authorities to tackle large- 
scale physical planning problems.
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The relationship between central and local government in 
Scotland therefore came to be more clearly articulated from the mid- 
1960's with the formalisation of regional development policy, which 
in itself was dependent upon the cooperation and commitment of local 
authorities for its implementation. To this end, additional 
financial aid was provided by the Government. Much of the dialogue 
between central and local government interests in the case of 
Strathclyde Park revolved around conflicting ideas of what the park 
proposals should consist of, and the grant-aid factor was used by 
Scottish Office as both a control lever and negotiating weapon. At 
the same time, the principal weapon deployed by the local authorities 
was their role as implementers, in particular, their resources of 
manpower, skills, local organisation and land ownership.
The initial proposals launched by SDÛ in 1964 received a 
limited response from the local authorities. After 1966, however, 
and following the first Ministerial meeting when the prospects of 
substantial Government financial support were raised, the local 
authorities became much more committed to the project, and this 
commitment received its full expression in the 1967 proposals. By 
this time, the Industrial Development Act 1966 had increased grant- 
aid for the reclamation of derelict land to 85%, whilst the 
Countryside Act, which introduced up to 75% grant-aid for countryside 
recreation projects, was close to enactment.
The 19 67-71 period was one of intense bargaining between SDD 
and the local authorities. SDD was concerned at the ambitious 
nature of the local authorities' proposals, which exceeded its own 
initial thoughts on the area. This "planning" phase extended overall 
to the period 1964-74, and provided the main focus of negotiation and 
bargaining between central and local government. The Intense nature 
of this bargaining, leading to the 1971 proposals, partly explains 
the length of this period.
Very little of the landscape rehabilitation involved "derelict" 
land within the strict meaning of the 1966 Act. Host of the area of 
the park was not "derelict" at all, so the local authorities were 
dependent upon the liberal interpretation of dereliction established 
by SDD in negotiations with the Treasury, to include the reinstatement 
or bringing into beneficial usé land for development which would
-158-
improve the industrial attraction of a locality (Irving, 1983).
North Lanarkshire was a "growth area" as identified in the 1963 Nhite 
Paper, and the Strathclyde Park project was seen by SDD as serving 
as an example to other local authorities of what could be achieved in 
this field through cooperation between central and local government. 
The project illustrated the intentions behind some of the main 
provisions of the 1966 and 1967 Acts, and SDD was particularly 
concerned to see the park proposals progressed to realisation for 
these reasons. The main weapon the local authorities could bring to 
bear on SDD was their role as implementers. Without government 
financial aid and sanction, the project could not proceed. Similarly, 
without local government cooperation, there was no means to implement 
SDD's objectives. Hr ere was, therefore, a dependence on the one hand 
by SDD, on the active cooperation of the local authorities, and on 
the other by the local authorities on Scottish Office to provide 
financial support.
The resources which each deployed in the process of negotiation
and bargaining were therefore crucial to the planning phase of the
development. SDD could ensure that the grant-aiding provisions of
the 1966 and 1967 Acts were mobilised to provide the capital funds
required to realise the project. SDD strongly advocated maximum use
of this grant-aid in its negotiations with the Treasury:
Substantially increased provision should be made 
for clearing dereliction, within the total allocated 
to environmental services, but if it becomes 
necessary to review the rehabilitation programme 
provided for*..to give this scheme the priority it 
ought to have, we are prepared to do so...our 
experience to date of Countryside Grants is that 
they are being sought for the provision or 
improvement of fairly small facilities. This is 
understandable but it has always been our expectation 
that as time passed they would also be required for 
creating major recreational facilities. Strathclyde 
is the first proposal on this scale to have reached 
this stage of specific planning and we should be 
glad to have Treasury approval to taking the matter 
a stage further with our giving an assurance to the 
local authorities that Countryside Grant will be 
payable...on whatever scale is decided to be 
appropriate. (Butler, 1969)
Pkodes' (1931) power-dependence model therefore seems highly 
appropriate as a means of explaining the processes of negotiation 
and bargaining in the evolution and development of Strathclyde Park.
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The resources deployed by the local authorities comprised manpower, 
local organisation (political and administrative), the powers of 
action provided under the Industrial Development, Countryside and 
Town and Country Planning Acts, and a growing commitment on the part 
of local politicians to a major improvement of this part of the 
middle Clyde valley:
I made the statement in 1967, at a Clyde Valley
Planning Advisory Committee meeting, that I would
bring the seaside to Motherwell and Hamilton,
(Scott, 1983)
Bardach (1977) developed his "games" metaphor of implementation 
processes in order to identify and analyse:
(i) implementation processes that result in perversion or 
subversion of policy goals; or
(ii)processes that lead to excessive financial costs; or
(i i i ) interactions that routinely link different kinds of 
institutions or roles normally involved in assembling 
p rogra m m e s .
A focus on implementation as a "game" leads to the identification 
of "players", what they regard as the "stakes", their strategies and 
tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play, the nature 
of the communications among players, and the degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the possible outcomes.
The rules of the game in the case of Strathclyde Park were 
largely determined by the structure of central and local government 
in Scotland, the legislative and procedural arrangements, and the 
normal pattern and channels of communication, which functioned 
initially through communications between officials, followed by 
communications between poli t i c i a n s . The establishment of the formally 
constituted Strathclyde Park Joint Committee in 1971 changed the 
procedural and administrative arrangements to the extent that central 
government was no longer dealing directly with local authorities, 
but with a quasi-independent park authority wherein the allegiance of 
its members was to the park concept (specifically the 1967 version 
of it). In 1971 the Joint Committee acquired the powers of the 
local authorities in respect of the Countryside Act, but held political 
accountability only at a distance. Thereafter, the approach of 
the Joint Committee to the park concept was basically i d e o l o g i c a l .
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Part of the reason for the ten-fold increase in the costs of 
the project over the period 1971 to 1931 was the success of the Joint 
Committee in obtaining concessions from SDD on the content of the 
park plan, particularly the changes made during construction. The 
establishment of a formally constituted Joint Committee with specific 
powers and responsibilities served to heighten the commitment of its 
members to the park project. SDD was therefore dealing with an 
implementing authority whose whole reason for existence was to 
undertake the Strathclyde Park project. It was therefore during 
the latter stages of the "planning" phase, and throughout the main 
construction period 1973-76, that the Joint Committee wielded its 
maximum power and influence in the central-local relationship. The 
actual process of construction therefore accrued additional power 
and resources to the Joint Committee by virtue of the political and 
financial commitment established once work had begun. This allowed 
the Joint Committee to subvert or pervert the aims of central 
government.
IVhilst SDD dominated the central-local relationship during the 
early, planning, stages by virtue of its control over the financial 
resources, it was during the main phase of construction 1973-76 
(during which there was a financial as well as a political commit­
ment to action) that the balance of power in this relationship tilted 
in favour of local objectives. As Joint Committee chairman, Scott 
wielded this power to the full in negotiations with central 
government over additional finance for increasing costs. For example, 
conflict arose over the costs of the sports pavilions. Scott was 
adamant that the higher standards proposed were necessary;
So I said "you build them. I ’m not building them.
I'm walking out". Then they (SDD) caved in.
(Scott, 1983)
By 1974, the balance of power in the central-local relation­
ship was tilting back towards SDD during a period of increasing 
financial stringency. At the same time, the costs of Stage 1 of the 
project were increasing significantly, and media attention began to 
focus on this aspect. The Strathclyde Park project was no longer the 
only land reclamation or country park project requiring a financial 
input from central government. In addition, the Countryside Commission 
was beginning to clarify its policy objectives for country parks 
(Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974) and the loose coalition
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of interests that had brought the Strathclyde Park project to
fruition was beginning to fragment. At this time also, whilst the
local authorities were dependent upon Government support for Stage 2
of the project, impending local government reorganisation held
uncertainties for the future administration of the park. The Park
Director recognised the implications of delay for the full completion
of the project, and suggested that the park should merit special
financial arrangements due to what he saw as its national and
international significance:
The project is just too big to fit into all the 
peculiarities of existing regulations. (Reid, 1974b)
On the opening of the park to the general public in September
1976, Scott commented;
It is ludicrous that, we can't get the money to 
finish the job and bring the loch facilities up to 
the standards required for holding national and 
international events. (Bellshill Speaker, 1976, p.15)
After May 197 5, the central-local relationship changed
fundamentally with the transfer of responsibility for management and
development of the park from a uni-directional and highly committed
local park authority to the larger and more heterogeneous Regional
Council with wider interests and other priorities. The extinguishment
of the Joint Committee meant the removal of the power base of the
park's protagonists, save for the Park Chairman and Director, but
whose power and influence were significantly eroded in the new
regional administration.• At the official opening of Strathclyde Park
in April 1973, Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce Millan,
stated that;
The creation of the Park marks a magnificent 
achievement by local government with central 
government support. (Motherwell Times, 1973, p.10)
Despite the problems achieved in obtaining the funds required
to complete the park to the standard he wanted, Scott said:
kkat you see today is Phase 1. We have, I think 
created the base for an expansion of leisure 
facilities in this area by both private and public 
expenditure. 1 see today not as the end of this 
project, but merely the beginning of a new era and 
approach in the field of leisure and recreation.
(Motherwell Times, 1978, p.10)
The involvement of implementing agencies such as the Countryside
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Commission and the Sports Council, although government-appointed, 
assisted the local authorities in their dealings with central 
government since, in the early stages of their existence (which 
largely coincided with the detailed planning and construction of Stage 
1), Strathclyde Park appeared to be tailor-made for the remits which 
these agencies had been given. It was only towards the end of the
t
construction of Stage 1, when costs began to escalate seriously 
(and by which time these agencies had begun to formulate their own 
policies, partly based on their Strathclyde Park experience) that their 
support began to diminish. By 1976, Strathclyde Park was no longer 
seen as strictly country park material (Countryside Commission for 
Scotland, 1974), although the Sports Council continued to support 
and lobby for the completion of the international rowing course 
(Scottish Sports Council, 1981).
5. The Negotiation Process : Outcomes
The central-local relationship in the planning and development 
of Strathclyde Park was a central element in the whole process, and 
was characterised by these two main participants vying for control 
over policy execution. Yet neither had the required comprehensive 
control over resources, agencies, and the whole implementation 
"environment" to ensure policy execution on their terms. The original 
intentions of the principal participants had to be compromised in 
order to ensure action.
SDD wanted a development which would improve the image of west 
central Scotland's environment, expecially the sensitive southern 
"gateway" via the A74/M74 route. SDD also sought to use the park 
concept and its procedural arrangements as a model scheme for (a) 
the reclamation of derelict land, and (b) the country park concept, 
and thereby to illustrate in a striking way the potential offered by 
the 1967 Act.
The park project was conceived on a "grand" scale to "sell" 
west central Scotland economically, and to attract Treasury funding. 
The ends at the outset were SDD's, the means were provided by grant- 
aid and by the action of the local authorities. When these aims were 
largely met (ie after the project was officially launched and
-163-
committed in 1973) SDD was no longer interested in ambitious plans
by the local authorities for additional facilities, particularly 
where these involved additional capital costs. SDD had achieved its 
objectives, whilst problems of continuing pollution and accelerating 
costs had attracted media attention, with the result that the project 
was becoming politically sensitive. It was not functioning as ^ 
regional park (Amott et. al., 1978 )and, being wedged between two 
urban areas and with distinctly urban-orientated intensive recreational 
facilities, it could not be regarded as a "true" country park either. 
Studies had shown it to operate as "a rather lavish local park"
(Amott et. al,, 1978 ), whilst ,the water sports facilities attracted 
only a very small proportion of park users.
From the onset of active planning in 1964, through to 
construction in the mid-1970's, there was strong political commitment, 
and strong influence from SDD. Central and local government objectives 
were coterminous for as long as was necessary to effect the basic 
scheme all were agreed on. After 1975, central and local objectives 
converged once more on the pragmatic decision to wind down park 
development in the face of escalating costs. The park protagonists 
no longer had a political power base from which to resist these changes 
Local government reorganisation effectively quashed the autonomous 
park authority and replaced it with a political organisation with 
wider perspectives and loyalities during an era of changing political 
priorities in response to an adverse economic climate. As a result, 
the pace of development was all but halted, the momentum of the 
project dissipated, and the park "completed" as far as was required 
both politically and financially. Plans for the development of 
Strathclyde Park, conceived during the 1960's, eventually fell victim 
to a readjustment in planning strategies to meet much-altered 
circumstances in the 1970’s.
CHAPTER IX
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (4)
OUTPUTS
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATHCLYDE PARK (4):
OUTPUTS
1. Introduction
In his analysis of policy execution, Dunsire (1978) observes 
that whilst policy-makers may devise a policy to solve a problem, it 
is common experience that the policy "output" actually produced is. 
not that which was envisaged. Either no output is produced at all 
(ie the policy intentions never reach the point of being transformed 
into action), or else an output different in quantity, quality or 
direction from that intended is produced. Whatever policies are 
agreed and promulgated, by measuring output intended, comparing it 
with output achieved, and accounting for any difference, the 
"implementation gaps" (the extent to which policy intentions are 
realised) can be identified. Implementation gaps may well be a factor 
in any "impact gaps" (ie the variation between the intentions and 
the consequences of action).
Unlike most studies of policy-making processes, the emphasis 
here is less on the origins and characteristics of the policy itself, 
and much more on the influences acting upon the processes which 
translate the policy intention into action on the environment.
There are two aspects to a consideration of the outputs of 
the Strathclyde Park planning processes:
(i) the environmental changes' brought about in the middle Clyde 
valley; and
(ii)the behavioural changes induced in the future actions of 
the main participants, ie, the effect of the implementation 
experience on policy-makers - what van Horn (1983) has 
termed the "implementation images" that become the basis 
for future interventions.
-165-
2. Environmental Outputs
In considering environmental outputs, there are four central 
questions :
(a) how does the current state of development of Strathclyde Park 
compare with original intentions?
(b) how do the uses and functions of the park compare with the 
planning conceptions?
(c) in what ways, and by whom, is Strathclyde Park considered to 
be a "success" or "failure"?
(d) as a planning process, how does it compare in its 
characteristics with what might be expected from current 
knowledge of decision-making processes?
A. Plan Performance
Construction work on the revised Stage 1 proposals began in 
June 1973, and by September 1976 was sufficiently completed to permit 
the opening of the park to the general public. Within the three- 
year construction period, a park of 651 hectares was created out of 
reclaimed and rehabilitated land. At its focus was a man-made loch 
2,000 metres long and extending over 31 hectares, incorporating an 
Olympic-standard rowing and canoeing course. The river Clyde had 
been diverted via a new by-pass channel; a watersports centre 
constructed; 23 hectares of playing fields; car parking for 1200 
cars and 14 kilometres of roads; a nature reserve of 39 hectares; 
and 9 kilometres of public footpaths (Figure 16). The park was 
formally designated a country park by the Countryside Commission at 
its official opening by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 
May 19 73,
ll/hat has been provided is based on the 1971 revised Stage 1 
proposals. None of the elements of subsequent stages, as envisaged 
by the Joint Committee firstly in 1967 and then in 1974, have been 
realised. On the contrary. Stage 1 suffered substantial expenditure 
cuts in 1976 following a financial review by Strathclyde Regional 
Council. However, the completion of the rowing course to inter­
national competition standard in time for the 193 6 Commonwelath Games 
will conclude the main focus of the park 19 years after the 
preparation of the 1967 proposals (Figure 17).
Pollution of the loch continues to be an intermittent problem
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and one which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. The park has 
not continued "to grow and meet needs as they develop"(Surveyor, 19 73) 
as envisaged by the Joint Committee, and in the current economic 
climate and priorities of the Regional Council, further development 
or expansion is unlikely in the forseeable future. Responsibility for 
the park has been transferred from a policy-making body of the 
Regional Council (the Leisure and Recreation Committee) to the 
Buildings and Property Committee, largely on a "care and maintenance" 
basis. The private investment which it was envisaged would be 
attracted to the park to provide restaurants, hotels and other leisure 
facilities has not been forthcoming, and this aspect is currently 
the subject of a feasibility study commisioned by the Scottish 
Development Agency (Drivers Jonas, 1983).
At the present time, the final costs of park development have
still to be apportioned between the main participants, largely due
to what one senior finance officer of the Regional Council termed
the "financial shambles" which the Council inherited in 1975. It is
likely, however, that the total cost will be around £12 millions,
with approximately 1 5 u  to SO/, being financed by central government
through grant-aid for land rehabilitation, informal countryside
recreation, and sports facilities. However, Bernard Scott, who now
has other responsibilities as a Regional Councillor, could still
remark in 193 3:
I've had personal frustration with the whole thing, 
because the park was never built the way it should
have been built...it doesn't function as it should 
function. Some of the main essential things are 
missing. (Scott, 1983)
B, Park Useage
A study by consultants of the use of Strathclyde Park (Amott 
et. al., 1978) was commissioned jointly in 1977 by Strathclyde 
Regional Council and the Countryside Commission for Scotland in order 
to :
1. provide a comprehensive record of the initial use of the park, 
and thus a baseline for assessing future changes;
2. help in the guidance of decisions about future park development;
3. contribute to an assessment of the impact of the park on 
patterns of recreation in north Lanarkshire.
The study found that:
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(i) over a 16-week period in the summer/autumn of 1977, an 
average of 2,300 vehicles per day entered the park,- whilst 
total visitors (including pedestrians) was 938,000;
(ii)32/= of park users came from Hamilton and Hotherwell Districts, 
with the average travel distance of 6*4 kilometres. Only
6/o of car-borne users had travelled more than 16 kilometres;
(iii)the average length of visit by users was 1*5 hours;
(iv)only 97. of users made use of the active sports facilities;
(v) attitudes to the park were generally favourable: over 6 6 u  
of users were attracted by features related to the park’s 
rural character, particularly the open-air and "sense of 
freedom" (24H)and the scenery (23). The built facilities and 
those for sport attracted much smaller proportions;
(vi)only 5% of residents interviewed in neighbouring areas had 
not heard of Strathclyde Park, whilst 744 had visited it.
Host used the passive facilities such as the beaches (61/^), 
play areas (544), restaurant (44/.) and picnic areas (33/.);
(vii)60'/o thought the creation of the park had benefitted their 
area, whilst 22/. disagreed. Over 30/„ of respondents living 
in Motherwell District thought it had benefitted their area.
The findings from the survey led the researchers to conclude
that :
(a) the Park's primary appeal was based upon its open nature, 
scenery, natural features and landscaping "which combine to 
provide an almost rural environment in a predominantly 
urban setting" (Arnott et. al., 1978, p.74);
(b) the designers and managers of the park have been largely 
successful in presenting the loch and associated facilities 
for water sports as the primary focus for activity within 
the park;
(c) by and large, attitudes to Strathclyde Park were positive: 
local people felt that the area had benefitted from the 
creation of the park, and that the money spent on leisure 
and the improvement of local amenity was well spent;
(d) the park is capable of much greater use, particularly in 
respect of informal recreation; that its use is selective in 
respect of the demographic and social groups from which users 
are drawn; and that the great majority of users come from the 
immediate locality.
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These findings, from the only comprehensive survey undertaken 
of park useage, indicate that, whilst the revised Stage 1 plan was 
largely carried through to realisation, the concepts upon which the 
park was based, and which largely justified its priority allocation 
of national land rehabilitation and countryside funds, were not 
realised. The reasons can be partly explained by;
1. Scott's view that, as a regional park, it does not function 
because the full implications of the regional conception were 
never accepted by the Government, ie the implementation of the 
1967 proposals in full; or
2. the conception of a regional dimension to the park was 
fundamentally flawed, in that (a) it was based on over- 
optimistic forecasts of population growth, car ownership and 
mobility, and (b) it did not take into account competing 
recreational and leisure attractions for the population of 
central Scotland (most notably Loch Lomond and the Clyde coast 
resorts), nor leisure and recreational initiatives which would 
be undertaken in the future by other local authorities, also 
taking advantage of the provisions of the Countryside Act and 
other legislation. Only in respect of the watersports
facilities does the park attract users from outwith the
immediate locality.
G. Strathclyde Park ; Success or Failure?
Evaluation of the impact of Strathclyde Park is beyond the 
scope of this study. However, all planning processes are means to 
ends, and aspirations for the middle Clyde valley area coloured the 
intentions and attitudes which both shaped detailed proposals and 
influenced their implementation. This evaluation is therefore limited 
to an appraisal of how the impact of the park has been regarded by
others, and the influence of such evaluations on the development of
the park, particularly after 1975.
Seen as the creation of countryside and recreational resources 
out of a despoiled and largely neglected landscape, the 
park is generally considered to have been successful and worthwhile, 
as reflected in statements made at the official opening in 1973 by 
Secretary of State for Scotland and the chairman of the Countryside 
Commission, The study of park useage (Arnott et. al., 1973) suggests 
that this view is shared by the residents of the surrounding areas,
-1/1-
who are the main park users. Major watersports and passive country­
side facilities have been provided in an area generally regarded as 
being deprived of open space and recreational facilities at the time 
(SDD, 1964a,b), whilst these areas continue to be regarded as deprived 
communities requiring priority treatment in the programmes of 
Strathclyde Regional Council. On completion of the rowing and canoeing 
course to international competition standard, the park will provide 
a giajor focus for international events, and in that respect one of 
the main aspirations of Bernard Scott will have been fulfilled.
Overall, however, Scott considers that the project has been 
only partially implemented, and an SDA study (Drivers Jonas, 1933) 
suggests that the full potential of the park has still to be achieved. 
The study by Arnott et. al.,(1973) revealed a general perception 
amongst the main users of the park that further facilities were still 
required, such as a sports centre and a swimming pool.
Criticisms of the park have been levelled less at the outputs 
of the planning processes, and more at the processes themselves. 
Strathclyde Regional Council criticised the lack of budgetary control 
by the local authorities as a major cause of the rapidly escalating 
costs of the project during construction, whilst Reid (1932), Davies 
(1933) and others have criticised the complex nature of decision­
making necessitated by the number of participating agencies. This 
complex structure, requiring "multiple clearance" for decisions 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) was a contributory factor in the delays 
which occurred during a period of particularly high inflation. The 
regional Council's evaluation led to £300,000 being cut from the 
park's budget for 1976/77.
Although major criticisms can be levelled at the development- 
led nature of implementation, construction costs were subject to 
the influence of factors outwith the control of the Joint Committee 
(particularly inflation). Furthermore, as Scott (1933) contends, it 
is unlikely that the park would have been constructed even in its 
present form if the full cost implications had been known from the 
outset. Mall (1930) has illustrated the particular problems inherent 
in large-scale "prestige" developments.
The content of the park proposals and their implementation were
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no t subject to any direct public participation, which only became a 
statutory requirement for the preparation of the new-style development 
plan system introduced in the 1969 Town and Country Planning (Scotland) 
Act. By 1969, and the Report of the Skeffington Committee (1969), 
proposals for the park were already well advanced and entailed a high 
degree of commitment. Development Plan amendments were submitted 
jointly by the three local authorities in 1970, and were approved by 
the Secretary of State in 1971, without a public inquiry. The 
proposals were implicitly assumed to be beneficial, and the land­
scape improvements long overdue.
D. The "Rationality" of the Process
The processes leading to the development of Strathclyde Park 
followed no rational-comprehensive model of decision-making. Whilst 
procedural planning theory provides a normative basis for planning 
frameworks, in practice "disjointed incrementalisra" is a closer 
approximation to the characteristics of the Strathclyde Park 
processes since:
(i) the 1971 proposals were reached through a process of conflict 
and bargaining which was continued during the construction 
stage, when the balance in the power-dependence relationship 
shifted, thus blurring distinctions between policy-making 
and implementation;
(ii) objectives and intentions changed during development in
response to changing circumstances and horizons of expectations;
(iii) the multi-organisational planning context, and the power-
dependence relationship (particularly in respect of resources 
for implementation) distorted notions of simple decision 
hierarchies and channels of control;
(iv) external factors, outwith the control of participants, 
had an important bearing on the opportunities for and 
constraints to action;
(v) key individuals played a central role in implementation, 
acting on the basis of their own "assumptive worlds" and 
perceptions of room for manoeuvre;
(vi) the Joint Committee was constituted soley to plan, develop,
and manage the park, and thus the rationality of their actions 
was ideologically based;
(vii) planning and development proceeded via a series of recursive 
steps, largely due to the foregoing.
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Thus, the decision-making processes from which Strathclyde 
Park emerged were more incremental and pragmatic than comprehensive 
and "rational"; more political than technical; conducted and controlled 
according to whom prevailing circumstances favoured; and depended 
upon human factors, whilst the focus for action was constrained by 
external factors.
The main features of the implementation of Strathclyde Park 
were therefore:
1. the role of central government as the catalyst and prompter 
for local planning action, setting down the regional economic 
policy context, and mobilising and controlling the financial 
resources for implementation;
2. conflicting central-local government objectives for the 
middle Clyde valley area, which in combination with (1) led 
to extended negotiations, conducted in a political arena, 
over the legitimacy of planning proposals;
3. the importance of wider economic and political conditions, 
which influenced the timing of planning and development, the 
priority of the project for Government funds, and which either 
facilitated or frustrated the general scope for action. 
Certainly, over the period 19 64-73, Strathclyde Park was an 
"idea in good currency" (Schon, 1971);
4. the key role of certain individuals or "inspired change 
agents" who used their positions of power and influence to 
steer the development of the park towards particular objectives 
which coincided with their own aspirations;
5. the central influence of an implementing authority established 
specifically for the achievement of one single objective. To 
some extent, the Joint Committee shared some of the ideological 
characteristics of new town development corporations, inasmuch 
as there was an interdependence between the agency and its 
implementation task. In other respects, the Joint Committee 
had coordinating functions more characteristic of contemporary 
physical and economic planning;
6. the implementation of the park fell victim to a changing 
planning context for action which rendered obsolete many of 
the assumptions upon which it was based, and which served to 
erode the commitment to action which had been built-up under 
previous conditions;
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7. although a lineage in park, development can be traced back to 
proposals in the 1946 Clyde Valley Regional Flan, these 
earlier proposals served only as a springboard to legitimate, 
firstly, SDD's 1964 outline scheme and, latterly, the regional 
concepts and assumptions upon which Joint Committee aspirations 
were founded;
3. the length of the planning period in particular made the park 
proposal sensitive to changes in planning "fashion" and hence 
to the influence of external factors.
3. Behavioural Outputs
Although during its planning and the early stages of its 
construction Strathclyde Park was a major development project which 
consumed substantial national financial resources and provided early 
experience for the embryonic Countryside Commission, Sports Council 
and Scottish Development Department, it is difficult to' draw accurate 
assessments of the influence of the Strathclyde Park experience on 
subsequent countryside and recreation planning in Scotland.
Certainly, during this period there was no countryside policy 
(Irving, 1933), so the park experience must have had some influence 
on the subsequent thinking of these organisations. For example, 
Cameron (1932) suggests that Strathclyde Park influenced the Country­
side Commission's attitudes to urban fringe recreation.
Within SDD, the debate as to whether the local authorities' 
proposals were or were not "country park material" suggests that 
during this period there was little clear idea as to what functions 
a country park was intended to perform (Duffield and Owen, 1970).
This was a problem with which the Countryside Commission was grappling 
in the early 1970's, culminating in "A Park System for Scotland" 
(Countryside Commission for Scotland, 1974), and further refined in 
the 1931 Countryside (Scotland) Act, which introduced the statutory 
definition of a regional park.
Both the Commission's and the Sports Council's operations were 
largely determined by the pace of implementation, which was dictated 
by the central-local relationship, and the need to forge agreement
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between the main participants; an arrangement of which Cameron (1982) 
and Davies (1983) were highly critical, but which is more characteristic 
of contemporary planning contexts.
Whereas the early focus was on the concepts upon which the 
proposals were based, latterly the overriding considerations were of 
a budgetary nature, when it became clear that the project was 
consuming a substantial proportion of funds available for both land 
rehabilitation and countryside recreation. Lessons were learnt 
about the cost implications of planning processes, and their impact 
on horizons of expectations, during a transition in the mid-1970's 
from profligacy to parsimony in the availability and deployment of 
financial resources.
The planning and development of Strathclyde Park straddled not 
only a period of change in local government administration, and in 
economic and political conditions, but also in the emergence of central 
and local policy on a whole range of land-use and environmental issues. 
Tire fate of Strathclyde Park was intertwined with these new policy 
initiatives since the onset of construction work coincided with a period 
of changing attitudes by central government, the Countryside Commission, 
Sports Council and other agencies, arising from the development and 
refinement of their own policy frameworks. The 1974 West Central 
Scotland Plan was the last of the sub-regional plans sponsored by SDD, 
and brought the context for planning in the Clyde Valley, and the 
fate of Strathclyde Park,full circle since 1946 (Figure 13),
-17 6—
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UNDERSTANDING ACTION:
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EPISTEHOLOGY OF 
PLANNING PROCESSES
1. Introduction
The purpose of this concluding chapter is three-fold 
(i) to relate the case study findings to the hypotheses and concepts 
discussed in Chapter I;
(ii) to consider contemporary issues in the theory and practice
of town and regional planning in relation to the understanding 
of implementation developed in preceding chapters;
(iii) to suggest avenues for further research into implementation 
processes*
Chapters II to IX have provided a detailed analysis of one 
major, long-running development project, and identified the detailed 
processes of bargaining and negotiation in the evolution and 
implementation of the project in relation to (a) the power relation­
ships between, and patterns of influence brought to bear by, 
participating individuals and organisations; (b) the context for 
action provided by changes in regional economic planning, and in 
planning for leisure, over the post-war period; (c) the effects of 
combinations of circumstance on the course of implementation, and on 
the scope for action and manoeuvre as perceived by participants.
The first section of this final chapter attempts to progress 
the knowledge-base of implementation processes in terms of action in 
the context of circumstance, and the implications this has for the 
policy-action relationship. This section concludes with a 
reformulation of the main characteristics of public planning processes. 
The second section considers current trends in UK planning practice, 
in particular the ideology of the plan and its relationship to 
planning processes. It is suggested that, since the introduction of 
a comprehensive system of statutory land-use planning, the significance
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and value of the development plan as the main vehicle for implementing 
land use planning strategies may have been overstated, to the neglect 
of opportunities to develop less formalised action-response frame­
works which are not necessarily plan-based. It may be a misconception 
of the role of a formal plan to judge its effectiveness by the extent 
to which its stated provisions are realised. The third section 
suggests avenues for further research into implementation processes* 
Greater understanding of the influence bearing upon the 
implementation task is required, and the role of the planner in this 
dynamic environment.
Efforts in theory and practice to date have focussed on the 
improvement of decision technologies in the pursuit of the cybernetic 
principle of "requisite variety" (Ashby, 1969), to the detriment of 
a consideration of the political nature of policy in action. This 
suggests a need for a shift in research, teaching and professional 
attitudes towards understanding (a) the political nature of the 
implementation of public policies, (b) the organisational and resource 
requirements of such processes, and (c) the implications of both 
for how planners approach the planning task, in particular how they 
address the problems of future uncertainties* The concluding section 
re-visits the interrelationships between policy, implementation and 
politics, the linkages between which comprise the overall theme of 
this research.
2* Implementation Processes
The case-study analysis suggests a re-evaluation of (i) the 
role of the individual in processes of change, and (ii) the nature 
of planning processes in relation to the characteristics of 
implementation.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of planning is problematic, 
since there is currently no generally accepted model for, or concept 
of, planning (Healey et. al., 1982), nor consequently of the place of 
implementation within it. In recent years there has developed a 
plurality of theoretical positions on the meaning and nature of 
planning within strategies of public intervention, which may have 
assisted the general flight of practitioners from theory towards a
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pragmatic concern for utility. The implementation of. proposals for 
a Strathclyde Park can therefore be variously interpreted. Even 
against criteria of plan conformance, which is the evaluative focus 
of rational-comprehensive planning, the park as constructed represents 
a significant under-achievement for the progenitors of the regional 
park idea, as articulated in the 1967 proposals. Yet, as the main 
catalysts for action. Government intentions were exceeded, both in 
terms of the content and the cost of the subsequent development.
In the context of more incremental criteria of plan performance, 
Strathclyde Park represents a significant achievement, not least 
since the local authorities succeeded in a major development Initiative 
during a generally unfavourable economic and political climate, and 
in the face of some resistance from central government to proposals 
which, by their nature, exceeded the letter’s view as to the degree 
of environmental change that was required. The following paragraphs 
summarise the main characteristics of implementation processes.
(i) The Structural Context
Due to the structure of government in Scotland, and the 
distribution of financial and other powers, local authority initiative 
is significantly constrained by the attitudes and policy priorities of 
central government. At the same time, central government has 
traditionally been dependent upon action by local authorities for 
the achievement of its social and economic objectives. There exists, 
therefore, a power-dependence relationship in which central govern­
ment financial and other powers are mediated by a dependence upon 
action by local authorities. There is evidence, since the mid-1970's, 
that this relationship is changing fundamentally as more financial 
control is concentrated at the centre (Guthbert ed., 1932; Keating 
and Midwinter, 198 3), and as the resources to act are redirected from 
local authorities to Government-appointed agencies with an 
implementation remit (such as the Scottish Development Agency). In 
the case of Strathclyde Park, there was confusion as to the most 
appropriate kind of relationship between central and local government 
for effective action: whether the local authorities should take the 
initiative and commit resources in the manner they thought most 
appropriate to their own conception of local needs, or whether the 
project was primarily a central government initiative in which the 
Scottish Office should determine, or at least oversee, the deployment
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of resources.
(ii) Entrepreneurial Action.
Despite the power-dependence relationship, the structural context 
can be mediated and influenced by "policy entrepreneurs" - highly 
motivated and committed individuals who can "gatecrash" this frame­
work and manipulate or "bend" it in the direction of other ends.
The development of Strathclyde Park was significantly influenced by 
key individuals, acting at the local level, who were able to exploit 
implementation processes and the power-dependence relationship*
The significance of individual action can be considered from 
the polar positions of materialist and idealist social theory (Young 
and Mills, 1983). Materialist social theory contends that the 
influence of individuals in social change is but an intervening 
variable, a source of friction or distortion in a system which is 
otherwise driven by force of circumstance. Individual action is 
therefore secondary to and derived from the underlying realities of 
political life. In the idealist view, however, reality is itself 
seen as a product of consciousness, and the reforming politician or 
administrator is seen as an independent agent. Decision-makers are 
portrayed as engaged in a process of "strategic choice" in order to 
manage uncertainty (Friend and Jessop, 1969). According to whichever 
view is adopted, therefore, individuals and organisations may be 
seen as either borne along on the stream of material events, 
responding as promptly or prudently as they are able to the exigencies 
of an ever-changing situation, or as shapers of events.
However, neither the materialist nor the idealist view can 
account satisfactorily for policy change, the first because it denies
the significance of the role of the individual, the second because it
overlooks the pressures of rapidly-changing circumstances. Further­
more, a shift of the attention of analysis from the individual agent 
to the agency is complicated by the organisational context for action. 
Young and Mills (1933) therefore conclude;
The entirely independent agent is then inconceivable..
..no policy-maker is invulnerable to turbulence or
to the relentless contraction of domain - be it 
political support, clientele, market share or empire.
Men are constrained both by circumstances and by 
their own appreciations; they make their own 
history, but not under circumstances chosen by 
themselves. (p. 15)
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(iii) Objectives and Intentions*
Intentions and motivations are more significant than declared 
policy objectives. The former derive from what Young (1979) has 
termed the "assumptive worlds" of participants in policy-making, 
which derive from group values and ideologies. Such interpretations 
of the scope for action in processes of negotiation and bargaining 
have a mediating effect on the pursuit of technical rationality in 
planning processes. As a result, objectives tend to shift in 
response to changing circumstances and expectations. The decision­
making process is not discrete, but part of an ongoing complex of 
interrelated acts. Implementation is therefore circumscribed by 
multiple realities; any particular "objective" context is capable of 
an infinitude of possible appreciations and interpretations. Yet, 
within a given organisational setting, there are likely to be only 
a limited number of plausible accounts competing for legitimacy, as 
well as a strong drive towards finding a single, accepted account 
masquerading as a technical rationality.
(iv) Political and Economic Circumstances.
This context can significantly affect expectations and 
intentions, especially in the case of complex, long-running 
implementation tasks. The development of Strathclyde Park was 
substantially affected by a climate for action radically different 
from the climate prevailing when the project was launched* Inter­
national events can also have an influence, such as the effect of the 
oil crises in the 1970's on subsequent patterns of mobility and 
energy consumption.
(v) The Mercurial Mature of Implementation.
Much implementation activity is so heavily influenced by 
circumstances, by external events, and by the pattern of relation­
ships between participants (all of which are dynamic) that it has 
a mercurial quality as a social phenomenon which makes the development 
of explanatory theory problematic. Policy does not exist in a pure 
form, independently of those who make or influence it. It has both 
subjective and objective qualities, and is as much a matter 
of interpretation as of statute (Higgins et. al., 1933). Consequently, 
what policy is, and whose particular ideas have shaped and fashioned 
it, are open to considerable dispute. Strathclyde Park emerged from 
a complex of processes characterised by shifting coalitions of groups.
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each pursuing their own rationality* Planning and development
proceed, therefore, not by any pure rational mode, but by a series
of compromises. This would accord with Hall's (1980) "tentative
theory" of decision-making in which he suggests that:
Decisions arise from a complex process of 
interactions among actors* All these people 
think themselves rational, and are trying to 
behave rationally for much of the time; but 
their conceptions of the rational differ* They 
have different goals, and different ways of 
achieving these goals. (p. 196/7)
This leads Hall to suggest that planning in practice, however 
well managed, is "a long way from the tidy sequence of the theorist"
(p.293). It involves conflicts of values which cannot be fully 
resolved by rational discussion or by calculation; the clash of 
organised pressure groups and the defence of vested interests; and 
the confusions that arise from the complex interrelationships between 
decisions at different levels and at different scales, at different 
points in time. These complex interrelationships, together with the 
unpredictable consequences of the increasing rapidity of knowledge 
about the external environment of planning decisions, and the tendency 
of human values to change over time, combine to explain to some degree 
why intentions and expectations tend to "drift" during implementation, 
and often why policy intentions yield unexpected outputs and 
unintended impacts. Strathclyde Park's completion suffered 
significantly from changing values and political priorities from the 
mid-1960's, to the mid-1970's.
In summary, implementation is therefore:
(a) both constrained by context and circumstance, yet presents 
opportunities for entrepreneurial action;
(b) affected by fashion and "ideas in good currency" (Schon, 1971), 
and hence exhibits mercurial qualities;
(c) not amenable to the development of positivist explanatory 
theory, but analysis can assist in the understanding of the 
limitations and dependencies of programmes of action;
(d) in the Scottish context at least, strongly influenced by 
central government financial controls and policy priorities, 
although does provide opportunities to deflect or subvert 
centrally-derived goals;
(e) changing in its nature, during a period of financial and
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other resource restraints, towards less formalised structures 
for action
3. The Main Features of Planning Processes
It was suggested in chapter I that a feature of planning
processes is the attempt by planners and other policy advisers to
both central and local government to construct a technical rationality
for implementation in a decision context dominated by political
rationality. Whilst the various proposals for Strathclyde Park sought
to exhibit a rationality based on professional and technical values,
they were exploited as instruments of bargaining in a political arena.
Planners especially have been generally criticised for seeking to
cloak their own political objectives behind a technical rationality,
often in the form of blueprints or development plans. Whilst this
led Davies (1972) to coin the descriptive term "evangelistic
bureaucrat", Knox and Cullen (1981) suggest that there is an "ideal
type" of planning personality which centres on a managerial ethos,
and which is directed towards "problem-solving" in a rationalistic,
positivistic way, within a strictly defined hierarchy of authority.
Recent Marxist-inspired analyses of urban planning have supported Knox
and Cullen's conclusion that planners are:
The functionaries of a political apparatus which 
exercises its power to create a physical landscape 
in its own ideological image and to sustain a 
social environment conducive to its own preservation.
(p.897)
- Thus, not only are the boundaries of planners' "action-space"
(and thereby potential for exerting influence in the political arena) 
more limited than they would wish, but also, in attempting to increase 
their influence, they adopt principles which are likely to be 
acceptable to those they seek to influence (Healey and Underwood, 1978). 
Planning principles thus come to be influenced by the interests of 
the dominant pressures within any organisational context. This may 
partly explain current attempts to seek utility for planning within 
the context of the prevailing market economy ideology. From this 
analysis, it would appear that planning principles are unstable and 
subject to the influences of the interests which surround them.
Planners are not, therefore, a variable independent of the 
organisational context, as Pahl's (1970) managerialist thesis would
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contend.
Hall (1980) suggests that the technical-professional planning 
process was overcome by the political planning process as a 
consequence of changes in dominant social values during the 1960's 
and 1970's, in particular against rational-comprehensive planning 
concepts and the large-scale urban renewal projects they generated.
The pre-war concept of urban order narrowed in the 1950's and 1960's 
to a focus on technical solutions based on heavy investment- Both 
were "hard planning solutions" (Hall, 1980) demanding investment for 
major urban surgery. The late 1960's onwards witnessed the emergence 
of a radically alternative mode : a more "flexible" system in which 
policies were progressively shaped by changing opinion and community 
concern.
An assessment of the main characteristics of planning processes, 
that substitutes for the normative traits of rational-comprehensive 
planning, features that derive from a more incremental, political 
perspective is complicated by two contrasting conceptual viewpoints: 
planning as a cognitive style, and planning as a substantive policy 
field.
Planning as a cognitive style derives from experiments and
trends in the 1960's and 1970's when town planning began to occupy
more central ground in the management processes of local government,
particularly in metropolitan authorities. Eddison (1975), Stewart
(1971) and Webber (1969) have been among the foremost advocates of
the corporate management style. The idea of town planning knowledge
and expertise being central to decision-making systems is frequently
paired with the contention that technically-skilled persons hold the
required knowledge:
Just as troubles with an automobile engine can be 
analysed and then repaired by a skilled mechanic, 
so too can the problems confronting communities of 
people. (Webber, 1969, p90)
Yet implementation analyses reveal that most problems in 
planning do not enjoy that fortuitous mix of goal consensus and 
available technique. The rational-comprehensive planning model will 
not work in the absence of agreement on objectives, nor where there 
is consensus on goals, but no available technology. Therefore,
-18 5-
there are two basic misconceptions in rational-comprehensive planning:
(i) a unitary set of goals, and (ii) technocratic substitutes can be 
found for the self-correcting processes of social systems. The 
"planning idea" suggests that portraits of desired future conditions 
can be prepared, usually accompanied by time-sequence programmes 
mapping out courses of action to attain desired ends. This requires 
detailed plans to be drawn up. Yet, unitary plans deny that there 
are plural publics which seek plural purposes, many of them mutually 
incompatible. Although Webber (1983) strives for a planning style 
that does not seek a unitary set of plans or policies, does not 
promote a single conception of public interest, and which professes 
to be essentially political rather than technical in character, he 
fails to spell out the implications of his analysis. Friedmann (1973) 
is one of the few to follow up a critical analysis of rational- 
comprehensive planning with an alternative decision technology, based 
on a decentralised, bottom-up sequence.
Approaches based upon planning as a cognitive style have
recently been criticised (Healey et. al., 198 2) for their contentless
and contextless approach, which subsumes political rationality within
an overt technical rationality in which the planning method is
monopolised by professional ideologies. From these criticisms a view
has emerged that planning concepts must be context-based, that planning
should be regarded as a substantive policy field (namely, land use
planning). Thus Healey and Underwood (1978) suggest that:
To maintain credibility in the eyes of central 
government, local government and the public at 
large, it is time that thinking among planners 
was focussed more directly on land use policy, 
its implementation and the interests and ends 
this can serve. (p.124)
This view assumes an acceptance of the current structural 
context for planning, and is an attempt to legitimise the current 
pragmatism in planning practice which seeks a utility for planning 
within the prevailing economic and political environments. It also 
rejects the advantages and benefits of the corporate administration 
of public policy (ie planning as a cognitive style). The current 
focus in planning practice on implementation and "getting things done" 
is a symptom of the general view that the scope of government should 
be reduced because government lacks the capacity to translate its 
ideas into effective programmes of action - what Booth et. al. (1982)
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describe as the reach of government constantly exceeding its grasp.
A focus on land use planning could be interpreted as a reaction to 
the 1960*3 and early 1970*s ideology of planning as "urban governance" 
(McLoughlin and Diamond, 1973), which itself was a reaction to the 
perceived deficiencies in the role of planning as contained in the 
1947 Town and Country Planning Act.
In concluding Chapter I, it was suggested that the principles 
of rational-comprehensive planning had little value either for
(a) normative guidance, or, (b) practice. In the former, such 
principles exude technical rationality, whereas in the latter, 
such principles are rarely applicable to practical contexts, which 
exhibit much more the characteristics of incrementalism. It is 
therefore less problematic to consider what the planning process is 
n o t . It is not a unitary, logical sequential process integrating 
means-ends relationships, in accordance with the model of classical 
rationality. Organisational activity appears to exhibit much more the 
characteristics of "disjointed incrementalism" (partisan mutual 
adjustment and sub-optimising strategies), together with its general 
resistance to change which Schon (1971) terms "dynamic conservatism". 
From the analysis in chapter I, and the case-study findings, the 
characteristics of public planning processes include the following;
(a) fluid intentions and objectives, in response to the dynamics 
of such processes;
(b) an amalgam of sub-processes, rather than one unitary process;
(c) founded upon political rationality, yet influenced by the 
overt technical rationality of professional ideologies;
(d) less goal-directed and more issue/contingency directed;
(e) generally incrementalist, but containing elements of purposive- 
rationality (such as plans).
Within this context. Rein (198 3) understands implementation to 
be (i) a declaration of (usually government) preferences, (ii) 
mediated by a number of actors, who (iii) create a circular process 
characterised by reciprocal power relations and negotiations. 
Implementation involves "drift" from declared purposes since no 
acceptable trade-off rules can be formulated in advance of practice. 
Implementation could therefore be regarded as a continuation of the 
political process (including policy-making) in another arena. It 
involves not only processes of political bargaining, but also processes
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of administrative learning (ie it uncovers new and unanticipated 
problems). Ideals tend to drift in this context. Implementation may 
therefore be regarded as an attempt to reconcile three potentially 
conflicting imperatives:
(i) what is legally required;
(ii) what is rationally defensible in the minds of administrators;
(iii) what is politically feasible in striving for agreement 
between contending parties, each with a "stake" in the 
outcome.
The "legal" requirement for Strathclyde Park was established in 
SDD*s 1964 view of the scope for action, in the constitution of the 
Park Joint Committee, and in the provisions of the 1967 Countryside 
(Scotland) Act. Rational defensibility depended on from which interest- 
perspective the various park proposals were viewed. The 1971 revised 
proposals exhibited what, in the minds of Scottish Office administrators, 
was rationally defensible in the context of the resources likely to 
be made available. The political feasibility of the project varied 
according to the prevailing circumstances : what was politically 
feasible in the 1960's was not so in the late 1970*s. The fortunes 
of Strathclyde Park were affected by variations in these three factors 
from the mid-1960*s onwards. This suggests that, since "implementation 
takes a long time" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), it cannot be 
assumed that the rationales on which plans and policies are launched 
will be the same rationales during the period they are put into effect. 
This poses questions concerning the dynamic nature of "effectiveness", 
which is a relative and not an absolute term.
4. The Nature of Effective Planning
The RTPl’s (1979) "Implementation in Planning" Working Party 
drew three main conclusions:
(i) planning objectives and procedures must have regard for the 
realities of constraints and objectives affecting development 
decisions, if these are to be influenced;
(ii) the formal planning machinery has little influence on
development, and insufficient attention is paid to other 
forms and patterns of influence;
(iii) the "top-down" model of implementation is a questionable one
—188-
in practice. There is a need to harness the positive 
advantages of the influences which combine to "disrupt" this 
model in reality.
This analysis led the Working Party to conclude;
In the past it has been commonly assumed that the 
essential ingredient of the planning process is the 
plan or policy, and to the extent that this is not 
implemented, there is cause for concern...this is a 
false and misleading basis from which to proceed in 
search of ways of making planning more effective.
(p.30/31).
This infers that there are powerful and influential informal
processes (as opposed to legislation, plans and procedures) affecting
the development process, including attitudes, commitment and
inspiration, sense of purpose, rewards and incentives. It therefore
follows that formal planning processes can often be marginal to much
more complex processes of political negotiation. Rein (198 3)
therefore contends that:
Only for the planners who are professionally 
committed to the process, does the meaning lie within 
the plan itself : for everyone else, planning is a 
political means from which they will be tempted to 
withdraw, covertly or openly, whenever there is a 
better way of pursuing their advantage.
(p.52)
Whilst planners do not characteristically carry out their plans, 
only for them is the integrity of the framework for prospective 
action a constant, crucial preoccupation. Others only look for a
plan when they are frustrated or bewildered by events or by other means.
For them, planning is "an episodic response to the disintegration of
purpose in action" (Rein, 1983, p.62).
One of the reasons for the change from the 1947 Act plan system 
was the assumption that the circumstances in which policies are 
applied may change, and that plans should be sufficiently flexible 
to adapt accordingly, whilst intentions would remain fairly stable. 
However, policies are articulated through vehicles such as development 
plans, and the plans subsequently used in a multi-organisational 
context. Government and local authorities play a central part in 
determining the content of plans, but are not necessarily in aggreement 
over either their general direction or their detailed realisation.
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The Planning Advisory Group (Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, 1965) was appointed in 1964 to reappraise the development 
plan system established under the 1947 Act. In its report, the Group 
proposed that "strategic"policy decisions should be distinguished 
from detailed "tactical" decisions, and that each should be handled 
in different ways. The Group's report was prepared against the 
background of accelerating rates of demographic and economic growth, 
which influenced a perception that plans needed to be responsive to 
change.
In the late 1960's and early 1970*s, there was a significant 
shift in UK local government practice towards the adoption of more 
corporate and purposeful approaches to processes of public policy­
making, drawing on experience in the United States. There was a 
similar, related movement in central government. This led to a 
proliferation of planning systems for particular policy sectors and 
to the development of expenditure-based programmes. The 1970's 
witnessed what Hambleton (198 3) refers to as an "enormous expansion" 
in planning activity linking central and local levels of government, 
and a growing acceptance of the need for more "rational" approaches 
to policy-making. This movement was linked to a body of theory which 
stressed the idea of planning as a rational, problem-solving method 
(Faludi, 1973; ed.^ 1973; McLoughlin, 1969; Chadwick, 1971).
Evaluations of the effectiveness of planning tend to focus on
the degree to which the intentions of plans and policies, as
originally formulated, are achieved. Eddison (1975) and others contend
that too much attention is focussed on the plan, to the detriment of
the process. The"ultimate faith"in plans as products is enshrined
in legislation, professional ideology, local government structure,
and the management structures and administrative processes of local
authorities. The process of plan-making is seen as central to the
process of planning. A re-commitment to the process is as important
as the validity of the modes of expression for policies and plans.
Planning, suggests Eddison (1975), is too concerned with "sets" of
decisions, as distinct from decision-making in general:
A planner, of whatever sort, is not in business to 
produce plans. His task is to understand the 
planning system so that he can help to enable it 
to produce the effects society wants of it.
(p.17)
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The town planning system has been described as "the means by 
which the public interest is brought to bear on the process of 
developing land"(ETPI, 1979), although the institutional arrangements 
and legislation introduced in the 1947 Act assumed considerable direct 
public involvement in development. The central purpose of develop­
ment plans within this conception was to guide local planning 
authorities in the consideration of the "public interest", as well as 
to coordinate development initiatives. The development plan remains 
the pre-eminent heart of the planning system. However, since the 
early 1970's, in practice schematic planning, focussing on the 
preparation of plans designed to anticipate future events, has been 
replaced by a political strategy of programmatic planning in 
response to prevailing economic conditions and a heightened awareness 
of uncertainty, and which operates within the perceived constraints 
on action. In this strategy, budgetary instruments have replaced 
spatial development plans as the principal device of forward planning 
(Gillingwater, 1933). Within the programmatic style, policy is seen 
as "an ongoing stream of intentions" (Healey et. al., 1932).
Development plans may thus be viewed as episodic responses in relation 
to these shifting intentions, as well as mechanisms for their pursuit. 
In this context, it may be more appropriate for planning to concentrate 
primarily on influence and intervention, utilising a wide range of 
tools, not just plans. Thus, the ATP I (1979) Working Party suggests 
that:
Planning and planners should be far more entrepreneurial, 
product-orientated, opportunistic in pursuit of the 
service to the public interest...these qualities and 
aptitudes...are latent in the profession more often than not 
locked in by a preoccupation with the production of plans 
rather than being applied to the task of implementation.
(p.33)
A central tenet of planning and policy-making rests on the 
notion that such activity is primarily about using knowledge to change 
the world in some way, rather than to solely understand it. Knowledge 
and action represent two poles which are spanned by the activity of 
planning. .Much evaluative analysis of the effectiveness of planning 
and other forms of social policy reviews actions in the light of 
their outcomes, and these outcomes compared with the stated purposes. 
Such analysis implies that policies will make sense when the actors 
know their situation and define their purposes clearly. Marris (1932) 
contends that such an approach treats purposes artificially, as if
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they were plucked out of a repertoire of values which the actors
are supposed to cherish independently of events. On the contrary,
purposes are as much an Interpretation of previous experience (ie
a response to the outcomes of action) as an expression of pre-conceived
ideals. Thus;
The rationality of purposes in the light of experience 
is as crucial and analysable a question as the 
rationality of actions in the light of purposes.
(Marris, 1982, p.4)
The context of meaning expresses the needs of living actors 
constantly adapting to events - a conceptual operation by which an 
actor or group constantly develops an interpretation of experience.
It comprises a comprehensive, integrative structure of interpretations 
which each individual elaborates through experience, and which he 
depends upon for confidence to act. It may not be possible, therefore, 
to learn very much by evaluating actions soley in terms of their 
"effectiveness". Actions can only be effective or ineffective from 
some standpoint of attention which itself reflects a whole context of 
purpose and understanding.
Social policy has been based upon the paradigm of positivist 
applied social science, in which social and economic relationships 
were perceived as regular and "lawful", and government was based on 
objectivity, the maximisation of the total supply of welfare, and its 
equitable distribution. It also assumed that, given an understanding 
of economic ^ nd social "laws", and a sense of collective social 
purpose, the government of society had the power to use this knowledge. 
Social policy in the UK now confronts characteristic problems which 
neither it nor any other nation knows how to solve. A dominant 
paradigm represents the collective intelligence of society - the 
ability to ground action in a coherent sense of purpose and bring all 
relevant knowledge to bear on an issue. Once it disintegrates, 
policies become more impulsive, opportunistic, and vulnerable to 
intellectual or ideological "fads". Being less coherent or consistent, 
policies are thus likely to be cumulatively less successful, on their 
own terms, and to teach less by their failures. The prevailing 
paradigm of planning is in a state of transition, exhibiting a plurality 
of theoretical positions which has "balkanised" research and stimulated 
a hostile, anti-theoretical view in planning practice, a relapse into 
pragmatism, and a concern to demonstrate the effectiveness of planning
and of planners, in terms of both process and outputs. The likely 
effectiveness of planning, and the entrepreneurial role, can be 
judged according to two contrasting paradigms : the "market economy" 
paradigm, and the "ecological balance" paradigm.
(i) The Emerging Market Economy/International Capital Paradigm.
This paradigm assumes a dominant structure of economic > 
organisation to which societies must adapt themselves competitively; 
that social goals incompatible with competitive success are 
unrealistic and self-defeating; but that intelligent planning in 
conformity with the logic of the international organisation of 
capital makes the most of a nation's assets. If every political 
jurisdiction acts in this way, without inhibiting the competitive 
deployment of capital, the growth of global wealth will be as great 
and its distribution as fair as possible.
The emergence of the "getting things done" attitude, and the 
entrepreneurial approach currently in vogue In planning practice, flow 
from this paradigm, and have stimulated several "market theory" 
approaches to planning (Sorensen, 1983; Moor, 1984). Such approaches 
infer that planners are coming to terms with the fact that the 
prevailing political-economic environment (rather than their own 
professional ideology) is the major influence on the choice of policies 
they must implement. This is manifested in professional doubts with 
regard to the ability and desirability of planning attempting to 
redirect market forces, an over-emphasis on plan-making to the 
neglect of implementation, and a failure to take account of likely 
resource availability in the compilation of planning policies and 
programmes.
The focus of entrepreneurial planning is therefore on utilising 
rather than re-directing market forces. To impose new patterns on 
market forces requires a level of resources which is no longer 
available. The practical problems of funding development programmes 
have tended to be ignored in the past as a consequence of (a) the 
relative isolation of the planning profession from the centralised 
budgetary and financial planning carried out in local authorities, 
leading to (b) limited contact with the realities of securing resources 
for implementation, resulting in (c) a skill-deficiency in planners. 
Entrepreneurial planning is concerned with the relationship between 
resource availability and planning policy, in the context of real
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reductions in local authority expenditure as a consequence of central 
government policies, the disproportionate share of these resources 
being borne by the planning budgets of local authorities, and the 
limited access by the planning function to either specific sources or 
specific resource-bidding machinery.
The RTPI report "Land Values and Planning in the Inner Areas"
(RTPI, 1978) indicated a need for planners to be more aware of market
conditions and trends, and put forward some recommendations for
changes in practice, especially in the preparation of development plans,
which might meet the conflicting requirements of certainty and the
creation of confidence on the one hand, and responsiveness to
change on the other:
We must, in future, act positively and make sure
that we do not, wittingly or unwittingly, stifle
the developer's flair, initiative and investment
which are vital if our plans and policies are
ever to be implemented. (Booth, 1979, p.181)
To date, local economic planning has emphasised practical 
action at the expense of wider considerations of objectives and 
effectiveness. Local economic planning, and the development of the 
entrepreneurial approach, is perhaps the clearest example of the 
current pragmatism in planning and the professional/academic focus on 
"town planners in search of a role". This approach focusses on 
supply factors (land and premises, information, finance and skills) 
and is predicated on growth and small firms policies. It raises a 
number of questions, including whether planning should confine itself 
to land and development matters (as advocated by Healey et. al., 198 2) 
or embrace wider corporate concerns, and the implications of such an 
expanded focus for developing and implementing planning strategies.
Such questions have profound implications for professional training 
and practice.
The debates leading to the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act
envisaged that the public sector would have a major role to play,
not only in planning post-war reconstruction, but in directing it and
carrying it out. However, Cadman (1984) suggests that:
Economic uncertainty and high levels of unemployment 
have made local authorities acutely aware of the 
need to generate economic activity and to create jobs.
This need has come to dominate policy, pushing the 
aims of what was once thought to be "good planning" to
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a much lower place on the agenda* Planners brought 
up to think in terms of design, social gain and long 
term strategy have been encouraged to become "Mr. 
Fix-its" and to "get things done" - almost at any 
cost. (p.207)
This suggests that the planning system can no longer be 
adequately measured against the expectations and conditions of the 
immediate post-war period. Its relevance and effectiveness must be 
assessed within a new and dynamic set of social and economic conditions.
(ii) An Alternative Ecological Balance/Transactive Paradigm
This paradigm assumes the impossibility of continual economic 
growth due to (a) the scale of changes it imposes, and (b) eventual 
exhaustion of the fossil fuels on which it depends. Furthermore, the 
use of energy at such a rate is likely to cause irreparable damage to 
the natural world which sustains human life. This paradigm rejects 
the economic ideal of growth, in favour of the ecological ideal of 
balance. It reintegrates government with the cooperative management 
of everyday life as a pervasive, decentralised process of mutual 
accommodation.
The pluralism at the heart of this paradigm has only been 
enshrined in planning law since Che 1968 and 1969 Town and Country 
Planning Acts, stimulated by the Reports of the Planning Advisory Group 
(Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1965) and the Skeffington 
Committee (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 1969). Until the 
1970's, neither the law nor the practice of planning had been much 
informed by pluralist and participatory concepts (Simraie, 1984).
The Skeffington Report was an early establishment response to 
the criticisms then being levelled at the impacts of comprehensive 
urban renewal programmes. Yet, despite criticisms of the Report by 
Levin and Donnison (1969) and others, its recommendations still form 
much of the basis of planning statute and practice. No adequate 
consideration has yet been given to public participation in planning 
per se (including implementation) as opposed to plan-making,
Skeffington (1969), RTPI (1982) and political responses to demands 
for more citizen involvement in public policy-making and execution 
have focussed on land-use planning, and have merely sought to overlay 
new procedures for participation, rather than address more fundamental 
concepts concerning the role of public participation in government:
-19 5-
unitary and pluralist concepts of society; participatory and 
representative styles of democracy; and the nature of the "public 
interest" as a foundation for the professionalisation of decision­
making. The evidence of the last fifteen years has shown the 
consensus view of planning to be fallacious. The distributive effects 
of planning show it to be a political process by nature, in which some 
interests are served at the expense of others, and that implementation 
in the planning process functions as an extension of the politics of 
decision-making.
The pluralist conception of society infers a pluralist 
conception of policy-making. Such a conception implies a revolution 
in professional roles and in the processes of policy-making and 
implementation. In contrast to the market economy paradigm, the 
ecological/transactive paradigm infers a decentralised bottom-up view 
of policy-making, and takes as its cue experience in the United 
States with advocacy planning (Davidoff and Reiner, 1960), and emerging 
ideas from ecological politics and humanitarianism (Schumacher, 1973, 
Robertson, 1980). Friedmann's (1973) "transactive planning" seeks 
to apply these concepts and ideas in the pursuit of principles for 
planning in which the entrepreneurship of the professional planner is 
mobilised in support of individual and community self-help (ie human 
resources), rather than the financial resources of corporate interests. 
Friedmann thus seeks to shift the emphasis away from planning as an 
activity of professional planners, towards planning as "a process of 
social systems". Here, the social environment would give rise to 
a style of planning adapted to the conditions through which it had to 
work.
Friedmann's "transactive" planning is normative, analytical, 
future-orientated, and strategic. In his conception, the role of 
the professional planner is not to set out alternative courses of 
action, but to advocate points of view that will explicitly affect 
the lives and well-being of others, in a process of mutual learning. 
Here, innovative planning involves"a fusion of plan-making with plan- 
implementing activities during the course of action itself". Innovative 
planners perform an entrepreneurial function in mobilising and 
organising the use of institutional resources, rather than distributing 
resources among competing users, in the traditional allocative style.
The transactive style involves forging relationships between the
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"corporate" structure and the "participant" structure in which 
planners assume an advocacy role. In this relationship, professional 
planners contribute concepts, theories, analysis, professional 
knowledge, new perspectives, and systematic research procedures, 
whereas clients contribute an intimate knowledge of context, realistic 
alternatives, norms, priorities, feasibility judgements, and 
operational details.
The transactive style is rooted in concepts of advocacy 
planning as developed in the United States. The closest parallels 
in the UK context include the evolution of planning aid and the 
emergence of neighbourhood action. Here, the planner is divorced from 
the "corporate" structure, and acts on behalf of the "participant" 
structure, ie client groups. The transactive style is perhaps most 
useful in indicating ways in which planning skills can be directly 
applied to implementation tasks, as an alternative to allocative 
planning, than as a model for revolutionising a UK planning system 
which operates within a unitary governmental structure.
5. Implementation Analysis : The Search 
for Understanding
Policy-making processes are extremely complex, and thereby 
present severe methodological problems for analysis. Levin (1981) 
contends that, at the present time, established methodologies are 
lacking. Essentially, any methodology selected involves a choice 
about which aspect of the decision process (usually based on some 
variation of the classical model of rationality) is to be studied - 
some more or less "visible" feature, amenable to analysis (its 
output, inputs to itf some aspect of the process itself, or the 
structure within which it takes place) and exploring what lies behind 
it. Levin identifies six characteristics of public policy-making 
processes:
(a) a process, comprising activities both of a "technical" kind, 
to do with the generation and treatment of information, and 
overtly "political" activities, such as bargaining, 
negotiation, and mobilising support;
(b) its output, usually a policy, which is essentially a 
specification for action of some kind, or a statement that
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has implications for whatever course of action may later be 
specified and adopted;
(c) inputs, usually information and the claims of certain interests, 
either of individuals or organisations who stand to be similarly 
affected by the output of a process;
(d) a governmental structure within which processes of public 
policy-making take place, comprising organisational elements, 
political elements, and procedural requirements;
(e) an environment, ie "the world outside", and patterns of life 
and work within which the structure exists. This environment 
continuously impinges upon government through the medium of 
pressures, demands and supports, and is in turn impinged upon 
through the medium of policies and their implementation;
(f) human factors influencing each stage of the process, such as 
pre-dispositions, abilities and ambitions. These factors are 
less amenable to study than the more visible or regular 
structural and environmental factors, but are of considerable 
influence.
Research on planning processes to date has been largely based 
on studies in the United States, has been theoretical in nature,heavily 
biased towards policy design and organisational aspects, and has used 
as case examples the evolution and implementation of mainly economic 
and social programmes at the national, regional, or city-wide scales. 
Alterraan (1982) classifies current work in the broad area of 
"implementation analysis" as follows;
(i) theoretical-descriptive; such contributions are intended to 
aid in the description of implementation processes and in 
their understanding, usually using some metaphor as an 
analogy (Bardach 1977; Barrett and Fudge 1981; some aspects 
of Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). It is doubtful that a 
descriptive framework can be proposed that would be appropriate 
for all contexts;
(ii) descriptive-narrative; empirical work based on case studies 
describing the course of implementation (Meyerson and 
Banfield 19 55; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Such narratives, 
which attempt to bring out the salient political and social 
factors, require to be set in a theoretical context;
(iii) theoretical-analytic: theoretical work intended to present a
set of factors, or a checklist, to aid in the prior assessment
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of chances of successful implementation (Sabatier and 
Mazmanian 1980; van Meter and van Horn 1975). Such studies 
present a significant advance in conceptualisation, if over­
reaching in seeking to establish "theory". They provide 
a stimulus for more contextual, empirical analysis;
(iv) empirical-analytic; empirical work often using statistical 
techniques, attempting to identify factors that enter the 
implementation process and that can explain its progress 
(Alterman 1980; Montjoy and O'Toole 1979). Such work has yet 
to focus on variables of specific interest to town planning;
(v) prescriptive; "how to" contributions providing clues for 
achieving better success at implementation (Bardach 1977 
in part). Such contributions lack any stated theoretical 
basis;
(vi) evaluation studies: empirical work that is often both descriptive 
and analytic, commissioned by some agency in order to 
evaluate the performance of some programme and the reasons 
for success or failure, whether ex-post or during the process 
of implementation (Derthick, 1972; Alexander, 1975). Such 
work is process-orientated, focussing on goals and impacts/ 
outcomes.
Whilst it may be difficult to "get things done", to implement
public policy, it is also difficult, as Barrett and Fudge (1981)
conclude, to provide general explanations which hold in a variety of
situations. Furthermore, implementation analysis is not a tool of
the explanatory sciences : it is not amenable to law-like statements.
It is much more a tool of the interpretary sciences. Since there is
a paucity of UK case material on policy implementation, practice
must be the starting point for the development of understanding. The
issue of the in-depth case-study versus the comparative focus is a
central methodological problem (ie the level of analysis on which to
operate). Barrett and Fudge (1981) therefore suggest that:
The study of implementation at this time needs to 
consider a linking of levels of analysis, a 
synthesis of different theoretical positions and 
viewpoints and yet be grounded in practice. (p.250)
I
The approach in the current analysis is to complement the wide 
range of comparative social policy research with an in-depth case 
study over a long time period, and set against the background of
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current hypotheses and concepts. Thus the research is structured 
around (a) alternative views of implementation in planning processes,
(b) in-depth empirical research, (c) an evaluation of how well the 
"current wisdom" fits with what goes on in reality, and (d) the 
provision of some normative guidelines for future research and 
practice.
Implementation could be regarded as a field of what Healey
(1981) terms "interactive policy studies", which is concerned with
the ways in which policy is created, interpreted, manipulated and
transformed through the perceptions and actions of the individuals
and groups who constitute the organisational environment in which
policy is made and promulgated. This replaces the previous emphasis
on policy design with an emphasis on the way individuals and groups
interact within complex organisational settings. Such studies thus
follow the development of organisation theory and management studies,
shifting between scientific/mechanistic approaches and behavioural/
interactional approaches. This is essentially a pluralist view of
the social structure within which public agencies exist, and reflects
a socio-psychological focus. An implementation perspective does not
merely focus on action, reaction or response, where the nature of
organisations and their behaviour influences the differential scope
for action and the use made of this scope within a given policy. It
also focuses on the politics of policy. Theoretical understandings
therefore require to be set within an understanding of a specific
socio-historical situation, and require to articulate the relationship
between economic and social processes, and the nature and role of
government. Implementation is viewed as one element in the politics
of change, and policy is seen as being subject to a range of
environmental determinants. Thus, Stewart and Underwood (1981) suggest:
It is indeed because the policy sector is so diffuse, 
so all embracing, and so opaque that it is the 
implementation process which sheds light on the 
politics of the policy and on the values and purposes 
which underlie the policy. (p.219)
Understanding has to overcome the complexity of the policy- 
action relationship. Interactions between actors are the crucial 
areas for understanding. It is important to examine the particular 
organisational and administrative linkages used for implementation, 
and the negotiative activity taking place. Plans and policies 
cannot be regarded as constants, since they are mediated in
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implementation by actors operating with different assumptive worlds 
from those formulating policy. The conventional wisdom rests on the 
assumption that successful implementation requires the achievement of 
consensus in the policy process. In reality, however, conflict is 
likely to occur at various stages in the "implementation chain", as 
a reflection of different interests and value systems impacting upon 
the power structure of society, and differences in values concerning 
policy content and direction.
Understanding the meaning of assumptive worlds is essential to
successful policy analysis, since it enables events to be interpreted
in the context of the meaning which the actors involved ascribe to
their own actions, rather than to interpret these actions in terms of
postulated motives, interests or goals. Thus;
The degree to which policy represents change can be 
seen both as a function of the polarisation of 
ideologies, attitudes and value systems participating 
within the existing social order and as a 
determinant of the degree and types of negotiation 
likely to be necessary if it is to be implemented.
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981, p. 273)
Planners are not alone in devoting attention to implementation.
In recent years, policy science has produced a considerable amount 
of theoretical and empirical works directed specifically at 
implementation. Alterman (1981) suggests that, if the field of urban 
and regional planning is to benefit from implementation analysis, 
there is much room yet for developing theory and empirical research 
directed specifically at the types of problem and contexts faced by 
planners. A variety of perspectives is required when attempting to 
interpret a phenomenon so diverse as implementation. Detailed, in- 
depth historical analysis and interpretation provides one perspective.
In this regard, Masser (1983) makes a plea for "middle range" 
theory, recognising the degree to which elements of different 
theoretical positions can be combined. He suggests that the attention 
of analysis is increasingly being directed towards planning practitioners, 
in recognition that the success of planning is mainly constrained by 
the interactions of professionals, bureaucrats and politicians 
engaged in planning, rather than by resources or technology. This 
infers a notion of the planner as an instrument of the planning process 
rather than a mere technician. Thus, plans are shaped as much by
the actions of planners and politicians in implementing them as by 
the substantive tasks that are involved. Masser therefore suggests 
that there is a need to develop both personal and organisational 
theories of action which stress the importance of qualities such as 
flexibility, ingenuity, opportunity and advocacy, and which take 
account of personal and organisational beliefs and commitments.
1
Hall (1980) suggests that there is no all-embracing model for 
predicting the likely success or failure of plans and that, at best, 
we must look for piecemeal improvements that can be "stitched" together 
to provide some normative guidelines. Hall sees the potential for 
two types of improvements:
(a) improvements in forecasting the future world : we need to 
know how people will judge the results of decisions;
(b) improvements in evaluation : what should be the criteria 
where choices between alternatives have to be made?
Whilst this involves the development of more incremental, 
adaptive strategies, Hall's focus on improving explanatory theory is 
unlikely to be productive (for the reasons stated earlier). Rather, 
the choice lies between developing better explanatory theory 
(attempting to improve the predictive value of planning) or better 
interpretive theory, based on improved understanding of the complexity, 
dynamism and socio-psychological characteristics of policy processes.
During the last ten years or so, there has been a sustained 
strengthening of work on planning theory, marked by a proliferation 
of academic texts and debates (Healey et. al., 1982; Paris et. al,, 
1983). However, paralleling these developments in theory has been 
a steady deterioration in the standing of planners and planning 
practice, reflecting a disenchantment with the products of the planning 
system, the decline in actual and anticipated economic and 
demographic growth, and the advent in the UK of a dominant political 
doctrine ideologically hostile to government intervention in market 
processes.
In the context of the foregoing, there would be benefits to be 
gained from the improvement and development of interpretive and 
interactive theory by focussing future research on:
(a) the political nature of planning processes, ie a behavioural 
orientation;
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(b) organisational and resource requirements of planning 
processes, eg "connective" planning (Friend et. al., 1974);
(c) a plurality of methodologies (Levin, 1981; Alterman, 1981),
This would assist in the improvement of action-research 
knowledge aimed at improved understanding of the processes of policy 
implementation.
6. Policy, Implementation and Politics
This concluding section seeks to draw together the main themes 
of the preceding analysis.
Esher (1981) remarks that, for centuries, construction was
regarded as synonymous with improvement and constructors with improvers
From the early 1960's, there was a "moral revolution", spurred by
the adverse impacts of urban renewal, and a rejection of town
planners as interpreters of the public interest in a consensus world.
It was at the time that the Skeffington Committee was publishing its
findings and recommendations that Webber (1969) wrote:
Planning is unavoidably and inherently a political 
activity... Insofar as the outcomes of planned actions 
effect a reallocation of benefits and costs (and 
they almost always do), the problems they address 
can have no technical solutions - only political ones.
(p.61)
In the conception of a plural, dynamic, conflict-ridden society,
therefore, there is no one "best answer" to urban and regional policy
problems. In their criticisms of Skeffington, Levin and Donnison
(1973) argue that :
Conflict amongst the many interests in a complex 
urban society is inevitable, and can be resolved 
only by staging explicit public contests leading 
not to agreement but to compromise based on 
bargains. (p.91)
Negotiation and bargaining are at the heart of the politics of 
planning, are illustrated in the case study of Strathclyde Park, and 
are the features of planning processes which in-depth implementation 
analysis highlights as an aid to heightened understanding. From 
the standpoint of constructing useful interpretive theory, this
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suggests a need to examine planning processes more carefully and 
deeply than hitherto.
Since there is no universally accepted test of "effectiveness" 
in planning, it is misleading to consider greater democracy in 
planning processes as a means of ensuring "better" plans and policies. 
Experience since the Skeffington Report has shown how public 
involvement can lead to delay or even the abandonment of planning 
proposals (eg motorway schemes in the 1970's; third London airport).
It may be more useful to regard such démocratisation of planning 
as an end rather than a means, since it presents opportunities to 
maximise variety in the "inputs" to such processes (assumptive 
worlds, interests and values) and thereby the scope for negotiation 
and bargaining which is at the heart of decision-making activity.
Furthermore, it may be misleading to conceive of one planning 
process, since (a) planning involves a range of processes, only some 
of which converge, and (b) such processes are rarely sequential or 
linear, but more iterative and reticular in character. The 
assumption of the cyclical model of continuous planning serves to 
obscure the inherent complexity of planning processes and to focus 
attention on abstractly-defined phases, to the detriment of the 
detailed consideration of the whole complexity of processes which 
together produce the outputs, of decision-making, and which in turn 
are translated into impacts, both positive and negative.
Ihe search for improved techniques of forecasting in an attempt 
to build "requisite variety" (Ashby, 1969) into planning systems is 
predicated upon the false assumption that better policy design 
(in anticipation of future consequences) leads to better policy 
implementation* In contrast, innovative styles of planning seek to 
work within the limited horizons of partial knowledge of social 
and economic behaviour, and addressed to the realities of 
uncertainty. Implementation then becomes less the automatic process 
of policy execution, and more an arena for political bargaining in 
the deployment of financial, managerial, informational and other 
resources. In this respect it is also a learning process, in which 
knowledge gained through action is applied to future policy-making. 
The pursuit of long-term visions of the future is not antithetical to 
this conception. Such visions drive and motivate the ambitious in
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their dealings in the political arena, and sustain a momentum which 
counteracts the debilitating effects of delay. What Lindblora (19 59) 
describes as "partisan mutual adjustment" is less the pursuit of sub- 
optimal strategies as such, and more the outcome of the deployments 
of power and resources in multi-organisational planning contexts 
where no single interest has sufficient control over the levers of 
change, and where compromise is inevitable.
The pursuit of greater understanding of the processes by which 
planning becomes "action-on-the-world", together with analyses of the 
impacts of policies (particularly the distributional consequences) may 
occassion the paradigm-shift in professional practice that already 
seems underway in academic thinking (Healey et. al., 1982)
The rational-comprehensive model is misconceived as describing 
how decisions are, or ought to be, made. Planning in many respects 
has, according to Eddison (1975) and others, deceived itself by 
evading the realities of uncertainty about the future and of change 
through the passage of time. Whilst Dennis (1972) describes planning 
as a process which is intended to increase the predictability of life 
and the scope for orderly control, because policy-makers ignore the 
fact of uncertainty and the realities of power, they in effect 
decrease both predictability and control. Implementation aspects 
have been rated lower-order concerns in the mistaken belief that 
the pursuit of rationality in processes of policy-making will be 
automatically and faithfully replicated during policy execution.
There has been, both professionally and politically, a "faith" in 
planning, almost a faith in the omnipotence of plans. By contrast, 
much of British public policy is the story of the incremental 
adoption of measures imperfectly conceived in respect of problems 
only partially understood.
Friedmann's (1973) thesis is that this problematic should not 
be regarded as a pathology to be cured, but a reality to be faced 
and accounted for in the design and operation of planning frameworks. 
Whilst Davies (1972) and others contend that social and economic changes 
must first occur "before planning can become either possible or 
desirable", innovative styles of thinking and practice are attuned to 
more short-term considerations. Here there is potential for studies 
of implementation processes to reveal and articulate the political
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realities of the operational environments of planning in order to 
avoid a "mindless relapse into pragmatism" by practice (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973), Whilst acknowledging the changed social, economic 
and political conditions from those within which the statutory planning 
system became established.
Advocates of "market economy" planning propose an accommodation 
to this reality if planning is to survive as an activity of 
government. Whether or not this is desirable, it is clear that, 
just as pluralist conceptions of society can generate pluralist theories 
of its behaviour, so they may also generate pluralist styles of 
planning* Such styles would pursue greater opportunities for 
innovation, and the operationalisation of "transactive" strategies 
which may be less orientated towards the assumptive worlds of the 
"corporate" structure of governmental institutions and professional 
ideologies, and more towards the "participant" structure and the 
community groupings which have hitherto been regarded as the 
"objects" of planning.
The acceptance of an explicitly politically-orientated approach 
to the analysis of planning behaviour may be closer to an 
understanding of processes which, by their nature, are political.
Such heightened understanding may lead to conclusions of greater 
benefit to the improvement of the theory and practice of public 
policy-making, of which town and regional planning will continue to 
be an integral part.
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